



A Dangerous Discrepancy 
 
Testing the micro dynamics of opportunity and 





















Master’s Thesis  
Department of Political Science 



















A Dangerous Discrepancy 
Testing the micro dynamics of opportunity and grievance on 















Master’s Thesis  
Department of Political Science 



















© Solveig Hillesund 
2013 
A Dangerous Discrepancy: Testing the micro dynamics of opportunity and grievance on 
Palestinian support for armed resistance. 
Solveig Hillesund 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 




This study aims to uncover how grievance and opportunity factors affect attitudinal support 
for violent and non-violent resistance among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
To that end national survey data is applied to operationalize the mechanisms proposed in the 
traditionally macro-oriented theories of the opportunity-grievance debate on the micro level. 
On the grievance side of the debate, I hypothesize that (i) the poorer a highly educated 
individual is, (ii) the better an individual considers the civil and political rights situation in the 
occupied territories, and (iii) the larger the difference in economic conditions between the 
individual’s own governorate and the closest Israeli sub-district is, the more likely he or she is 
to support violent resistance. Results indicate support for the latter two hypotheses, which I 
argue is in line with the economic and political horizontal inequality mechanisms proposed by 
Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011). The mechanism is a special case of the relative 
deprivation mechanism described by Gurr (1970): Frustration arises when people feel there is 
a discrepancy between their own economic situation or the amount freedom and political 
participation they are allowed, and the economic or political situation of a reference group, in 
this case Israeli Jews. On the opportunity side of the debate, I hypothesize that coming from 
(iii) a less wealthy household or (iv) a less wealthy governorate will significantly increase 
support for violent resistance. Neither opportunity cost hypothesis is statistically supported. 
At the heart of most macro theories attempting to explain the onset of internal conflict, lies the 
question of why some groups resort to violence while others restrict their collective action to 
non-violent forms of resistance. While the macro theories make assumptions about the 
underlying micro-mechanisms, quantitative researchers often resort to highly aggregated 
proxies when testing the theories. Micro-level studies therefore provide an important 
supplement, but good micro data on participation in armed insurgency is rare. Given these 
constraints, I argue that this study – despite limitations resulting from the attitudinal nature of 
the dependent variable and the  limited generalizability of a single case study – contributes to 
the opportunity-grievance debate by providing one of the best micro-level tests of opportunity 
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Why do some national, ethnic and religious groups resort to violence, while other groups limit 
their collective action to non-violent strategies of civil resistance? This central political 
question has become particularly pronounced in light of the recent Arab uprisings. While 
Tunisians and Egyptians succeeded in overthrowing their governments through largely non-
violent means, the situations in Libya and Syria soon evolved into outright civil war, with 
armed insurgents challenging their governments by force. In the occupied Palestinian 
territories there has been no revolution, but the so-called Arab Spring is reflected in a revival 
of traditional practices of non-violent civil resistance against the Israeli occupation 
(Christophersen, Høigilt, & Tiltnes, 2012:17). These renewed boycotts and weekly protest 
marches are best seen as a compliment to, rather than a replacement of, the practice of armed 
resistance. Renewed violent clashes recently ended a four month cease-fire that followed the 
latest Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip (Kershner, 2013; Sanders, 2013). This study aims to 
shed light on some factors than can help explain why some Palestinians support violent 
strategies of resistance instead of non-violent resistance. 
In the field of armed conflict research, an important debate revolves around the relative 
importance of opportunity and grievance factors in defining the circumstances under which 
the number people resorting to violence is sufficient to result in civil conflict. On the 
grievance side of the debate, theorists from Gurr (1970) to Cederman et al. (2011) have 
argued that frustration arising from different kinds of relative deprivation – economic, social 
and political exclusion – can explain rebellion. On the opportunity side of the debate, this 
view has been challenged by scholars who emphasize instead the feasibility and viability of 
rebellion. They argue that the primary factor determining civil war onsets is the opportunity 
rebel actors have to rebel, rather than their motivation to do so. A much applied measure of 
such opportunity is country-level GDP per capita, which has been found to correlate 
negatively with risk of civil war onset. Important opportunity proponents have interpreted this 
differently. Fearon and Laitin (2003:80) consider GDP per capita a proxy of state strength, the 
mechanism being the state’s ability to monitor, deter and suppress rebellion. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004:88) suggest that increased wealth increases the opportunity cost of individuals 
for taking part in costly rebellions. 
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Micro-level studies can offer important contributions to the grievance-opportunity debate. 
There is a tendency to lean towards either large-N cross-country studies or small qualitative 
studies in the field. The macro-level studies use highly aggregated measures to test proposed 
mechanisms that ultimately rest on dynamics at the individual and group level. As stated by 
Justino (2009:317), “existing research offers only limited systematic accounts of the micro-
level channels through which low incomes among a large fraction of individuals in society 
affect the viability of violent conflicts”. GDP per capita is a particularly crude measure in this 
context. First, it is difficult to interpret, as it tends to correlate with many omitted variables 
(Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009:7). Second, it may in fact proxy both opportunity and 
grievance (Hendrix, 2010:283), making it ill-suited for solving the debate at hand. Statistical 
studies that aim to get closer to the actual mechanisms at play, by testing the macro theories 
systematically on the local and individual level, therefore provide an important supplement. A 
micro-level approach allows the researcher to operationalize the concepts of opportunity and 
grievance on the level where they logically belong, permitting more nuanced tests of the 
propositions of the debate.  
1.1 Research problem  
To test the micro-level mechanisms of the opportunity-grievance debate, I introduce national 
survey data from the occupied Palestinian territories. Good survey data from active conflict 
zones is rare, because considerations of security and data quality make large-scale data 
collection difficult. The pragmatic consideration that good survey data do exist in the 
Palestinian case weighs heavily in the choice of this case. The dataset at hand has an 
important limitation, however. The mechanisms proposed by the macro theories of civil war 
onset aim to explain why individuals decide to participate in insurgency, but there is no 
variable in my dataset measuring actual participation. Thus my focus will be on explaining 
attitudinal support for violent resistance. 
Research question:  How do grievance and opportunity factors affect support for 
violent and non-violent resistance among Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip? 
Support for violent resistance can be considered a first step towards actual participation in 
such resistance. While most supporters never get from attitudinal support to actual 
participation, studying attitudes helps us understand how people become part of the 
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mobilizational potential of a movement. And in the socio-psychological literature attitudinal 
support has been found to be an important predictor for more proximal measures of behavior 
(Saab, 2011:142). Because measures of actual participation in violent conflict are rare and 
very difficult to obtain, the study of determinants of attitudinal support for violence is 
probably among the best micro-level tests of grievance and opportunity mechanisms that 
existing data allows.  
Popular support for violence also merits study in its own right, as public opinion undoubtedly 
matters in civil conflict. Justino (2009:318-319) has argued that the support and participation 
of local populations in the provision of shelter, information, material support, as well as 
participation as fighters, is of crucial importance for the decision to start such a conflict. 
According to Tessler and Robbins (2007:306) the correlation between public support and 
militant action in the Palestinian case is sufficiently strong that the Israelis have been able to 
use public opinion surveys to forecast trends in violent resistance. Hamas’ sensitivity to 
public opinion in their choice of strategy is well-documented. Popular pressure seems to have 
contributed to both the declaration and suspension of ceasefires (Gunning, 2009:156; 239; 
Roy, 2011:205-206; Tamimi, 2007:243).  
But while the importance of a certain level of public support for rebels in civil conflict is 
widely recognized, there is little agreement about the determinants of such attitudes (Tessler 
& Robbins, 2007:306). In the Palestinian-Israeli case quantitative studies of the determinants 
of attitudes acting as barriers to the resolution of the conflict on the Israeli side include Maoz 
and McCauley (2005) and Halperin and Bar-Tal (2011). Studies that attempt to explain such 
impediments, more specifically attitudes towards violent resistance, on the Palestinian side, 
include Sønsterudbråten (2009) – who finds that opportunity factors affect the risk of 
supporting rocket attacks – and Lundervold (2012) – who finds that nationalism and political 
trust affects the risk of supporting violent rather than non-violent resistance. 
1.2 Study structure 
Chapter 2 provides a backdrop for the study in the form of a brief historical overview of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, focusing on the evolving nature of resistance strategies employed 
by the Palestinian side and the coexistence of violent and non-violent resistance. Chapter 3 
outlines the theoretical framework of the study – the opportunity-grievance debate. After 
briefly reviewing the merits of testing macro theories on the micro level, I use well-
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established macro theory contributions from grievance (Cederman et al., 2011; Gurr, 1970) 
and opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) theory to derive testable hypotheses on the micro 
level. Drawing on the grievance literature, I hypothesize that higher perceived (i) relative 
economic deprivation, (ii) relative political deprivation and (iii) socio-economic horizontal 
inequality should increase the risk that an individual supports violent strategies of resistance. 
The counter-hypotheses derived from the opportunity cost literature propose instead that a 
lower absolute level of wealth, on both household and regional level, should increase this risk. 
I conclude the chapter by discussing how the pragmatic choice of an attitudinal dependent 
variable, support for violent resistance rather than participation in such resistance, makes this 
study a somewhat easy test for the grievance arguments and a very though test for opportunity 
theory.  
Chapter 4 discusses the research design with which I aim to answer the research question. 
First, I present the Fafo survey dataset I use in the analysis and justify the handling of missing 
data by use of the technique of multiple imputation. Second, I discuss issues concerning the 
measurement of key concepts. Third, I outline the logic of the principal analysis models to be 
applied – the standard multinominal logistic regression model and the two-level multinominal 
logistic regression model.  
In Chapter 5 the results of the analysis are presented and discussed. I find some support for 
the grievance arguments that center on the mechanism of political and economic group 
comparison. Coming from a governorate that is much poorer than the closest Israeli sub-
district increases the risk that an individual will support violent rather than non-violent 
resistance. Perceiving the status of civil and political rights as low will have the same effect. 
Relative economic deprivation, the hypothesis that highly educated individuals in the lower 
economic segments of the population would be more likely to support violence, is not 
supported by my analysis. Neither is the opportunity cost mechanism, whether on the 
household or the regional level. 
The results appear reasonably robust across various operationalizations and specifications, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 6. I conclude that the validity of my construct-, statistical- and causal 
inferences is satisfactory, but that attempts to generalize from the Palestinian case to other 
cases of civil conflict is fraught with uncertainty and should be done with caution. In Chapter 
7, I summarize the main findings and theoretical contribution of the study and make some 




This chapter outlines a backdrop against which to understand Palestinian attitudes towards 
resistance. It provides a brief historical overview of the conflict, focusing on the Palestinian-
Israeli dimension and on evolving strategies of violent and non-violent resistance. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Jewish immigration into Palestine led Zionism and 
Palestinian nationalism to increasingly clash over “the ownership of the land, the right for 
self-determination, and statehood” (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998:762). Communal violence 
erupted in 1929 (Tessler, 1994:235), and after the United Nations declared the partition of 
Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian state in 1947, the clashes evolved into full-blown war 
(Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998:762). The conflict took on a strong inter-state dimension. Israel 
expanded its borders, while the remaining Palestinian territories came under Jordanian and 
Egyptian control, until they were occupied by Israel in 1967 (Ibid). The wars created an 
immense number of Palestinian refugees, both internally and in neighboring Arab countries 
(Brynen, 2000:34). Their potential return soon became one of the most contentious issues in 
the conflict. Meanwhile, Israel began a process of Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, the 
West Bank and around East Jerusalem (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998:762), the expansion of 
which continues to this day.  
The internal dimension of the conflict gradually returned to the fore. Palestinian resistance to 
the occupation first peaked in 1987, in a popular uprising – the First Intifada – that lasted for 
six years (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998:762-763). The uprising involved grassroots mobilization 
of all segments of the Palestinian population, engaging in demonstrations and non-violent 
civil disobedience (Allen, 2008:454), but also widespread use of more violent forms of 
resistance. According to Morris (1999), it was “a massive, persistent campaign of civil 
resistance, with strikes and commercial shut-downs, accompanied by violent (though 
unarmed) demonstrations against the occupying forces. The stone and, occasionally, the 
Molotov cocktail and knife were its symbols and weapons, not guns and bombs” (Morris, 
1999:561). The activists avoided the use of firearms from the beginning. It was better to 
“fight the enemy with what they weren’t equipped for, and what was at hand in every 
alleyway and hillside village – stones, bricks, and slingshots” (Morris, 1999:580). The rioting 
started in refugee camps, and turned the refugees and urban poor into a dominant force in 
Palestinian society (Ibid:574). 
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The Israelis responded in various ways. According to Morris “[a]lmost everything was tried: 
shooting to kill, shooting to injure, beatings, mass arrests, torture, trials, administrative 
detention, and economic sanctions” (Morris, 1999:587). Still the end result was a stalemate. 
The Palestinians could not eject the Israelis from the territories, and the Israelis were unable 
to stop the violence. Consequently both sides revised their policies fundamentally. Eventually 
both Israel and the PLO opted for recognition and peace negotiations (Ibid:596).  
The first Oslo Agreement was signed in 1993, after a round of secret negotiations between 
Israel and the PLO, paralleling the official peace process. It was a declaration of principles, 
marking the beginning of an interim period of negotiations for transitional arrangements 
before “permanent status” negotiations were to start in 1996 (Brynen, 2000:55). In 1995 the 
second Oslo Agreement extended both the territorial and functional control of the newly 
established Palestinian Authority (PA) (Ibid:57). Most of the Gaza Strip had come under PA 
control in 1994, but Israel retained full control in areas surrounding settlements and security 
control in some additional areas (“yellow areas”) (Ibid:56). The West Bank came to be 
divided into areas A, B and C. In area A the Palestinian Authority assumed full responsibility 
for public order, civil policing and internal security (Ibid:60). Area A included the cities of 
Tulkarem, Qalqilia, Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Bethlehem – comprising 2.7 percent of the 
West Bank and 36 percent of its people. In area B the Palestinian police became responsible 
for public order, but Israel retained the so-called “overriding responsibility for security” 
(Brynen, 2000:60). This area included most Palestinian towns and villages – about 25 percent 
of the West Bank and 60 percent of its people. The rest of the West Bank became area C – 
comprising sparsely populated areas, military areas and Israeli settlements – where Israel 
retained full security control (Ibid).  
But in light of periodic Israeli closure, aggravating economic conditions and the election in 
1996 of a hardline Likud-led Israeli government stepping up settlement activity instead of 
furthering the peace process, Palestinian frustration grew (Brynen, 2000:64-69). Support for 
attacks against Israel, which with the general optimism during the Labor government had 
gone down, rose again, as the domestic position of the Fatah-led PA deteriorated (Ibid:69). 
Terrorist attacks by radical Islamist groups continued (Ibid:68). Hamas, the former Muslim 
Brotherhood in the Palestinian territories, had since its birth during the first Intifada continued 
to define itself in terms of armed resistance to the occupation, in striking contrast to Fatah’s 
support for the peace process (Robinson, 2004). The organization, well known for its 
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extensive network of social and charitable institutions, had become the only significant 
opposition movement in the Palestinian territories. 
In 2000 the peace process ended, having failed to result in a final status agreement and with 
renewed distrust between the parties (Robinson, 2011:379-380). Few months later the Second 
Intifada began. The uprising began as demonstrations and stone-throwing, but escalated to 
more militarized confrontations between Israeli forces and Palestinian police and other 
gunmen (Allen, 2008:455), geographically concentrated around military checkpoints and 
Israeli settlements (Hammami & Tamari, 2001:12-13). The Intifada became characterized by 
various forms of violent resistance to the occupation – “terrorist attacks, guerilla fighting, and 
mutual assassinations” (Kliot & Charney, 2006:354). Perhaps most importantly, as the 
uprising escalated, the violent resistance became increasingly characterized by suicide 
bombings targeting Israeli civilians, committed by Islamic groups such as Hamas’ Qassam 
Brigades, Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Brigades (Kliot & Charney, 2006:361) and the Al Aqsa 
Martyrs’ Brigades, informally affiliated with Fatah. 
The Second Intifada and the breakdown of the peace process led to two major Israeli moves: 
First, the construction of a separation barrier along its border with – and some places cutting 
into – the West Bank; and second, the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 
(Robinson, 2011:380). Despite the withdrawal and dismantling of settlements in the Gaza 
Strip, Israel retained its complete control with its economy and borders and did not halt efforts 
to eliminate Gazan activists they considered a threat (Tamimi, 2007:222). 
During this same period, Hamas had taken on a new strategy – electoral participation. After 
doing well in municipal elections in 2004 (Tamimi, 2007:210), and as a result of extensive 
deliberation and consultation, the organization announced in 2005 its intention to participate 
in legislative elections (Ibid:211-212). They called a unilateral ceasefire, without thereby 
giving up armed resistance as a strategic option at a later time (Ibid). In 2006 Hamas won the 
legislative elections, with 74 seats against Fatah’s 45 (Tamimi, 2007:218). International 
community outrage and Fatah reluctance contributed to the repeated failure of efforts to form 
a national unity government (Ibid:224-229). Instead, President Mahmoud Abbas issued a 
decree stripping the newly formed Hamas government of control over of its institutional base. 
With the backing of the international community he established a parallel government, 
rendering the Hamas government virtually powerless (Tamimi, 2007:229). The international 
community enforced economic sanctions against Hamas (Ibid:230).  
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Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip experienced a dramatic increase in factional violence (Roy, 
2011:213). In 2006 and 2007 more than 400 Palestinians were killed and thousands injured as 
a result of fighting between Fatah and Hamas and attacks on institutions aligned with each 
faction. Torture, vandalism and extrajudicial killings were committed by both sides (Ibid). In 
May 2007 Gaza City was a patch-work of neighborhoods and blocks under either Fatah or 
Hamas control. In June 2007 Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip (Ibid). Thus the new 
status quo was one of consolidated political and territorial control of Hamas in the Gaza Strip 
and Fatah in the West Bank. The isolation of the Gaza Strip, resulting from both Israeli and 
international community siege policies, worsened (Ibid). The economic situation deteriorated 
further. 
These developments were paralleled by continued Israeli assassinations and firing of shells 
into the Gaza Strip, which, combined with popular pressure, led Hamas to end the unilateral 
truce in June 2006. They resumed armed resistance and kidnapped several Israeli soldiers, 
resulting in almost daily Israeli bombings, claiming many lives and destroying Gaza’s 
infrastructure (Ibid:239-245). While the separation barrier appears to have prevented further 
suicide bombings, armed resistance in the form of rocket attacks were increasing in scope. 
From 2006-2008 alone, an estimated 6000-7000 Qassam rockets and mortars were fired from 
the Gaza Strip into Israel (Cordesman, 2009:13). There is considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the exact numbers, but consensus that the number and range of rockets increased 
considerably during the period (B'Tselem, 2012; Cordesman, 2009:13-14; ISA, 2009:8-9). 
Most of the rockets were fired by Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Flibbert, 2011:55).
1
 Alongside 
this increase in rocket attacks, public support for violent strategies of resistance increased as 
well. Fafo survey data shows a decrease of 32 percentage points in the share of Palestinians 
opposing attacks, and a 29 percentage point increase in the share of people strongly 
supporting attacks between 2005 and 2008 (Fafo, 2005:48; 2008:51).
2
 This popular support is 
essential, as Hamas employs a system of consultation (Mishal & Sela, 2006:xxv) and is 
known to be sensitive to public opinion (Roy, 2011:205-206; Tamimi, 2007:243). 
                                                 
1
 The Fatah leadership has been attempting to halt the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades attacks on Israel since 2002, 
and in 2006-2008 they started to forcibly disarm remaining members (Bhavnani, Miodownik, & Choi, 
2011:156). Given this, and the fact that the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) has been cooperating 
closely with Israeli authorities after the Oslo Accords (Bhavnani et al., 2011:151), Fatah should no longer be 
considered part of the violent resistance. 
2
 Some of this difference might be due to a change in the phrasing of the Fafo survey question. In 2005 the 
relevant question was phrased “All Palestinian factions must stop military operations from Gaza” while in 2008 
it was “Palestinians factions must stop firing rockets against Israel” (Fafo, 2005:48; 2008:51). 
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On December 27 2008, Israel launched a massive attack on the Gaza Strip (Roy, 2011:226) – 
Operation Cast Lead. The operation involved “a complex combination of airstrikes, naval and 
artillery bombardment, and eventual ground fighting led by an armored incursion” (Flibbert, 
2011:56). While the Israeli motivation is contested – the immediate pretext claimed by Israel 
was self-defense against a surge in rocket attacks (Cordesman, 2009:9), but some observers 
have suggested destroying Hamas as a political force might have been the ultimate motive 
(Flibbert, 2011; Roy, 2011:227) – the human toll was unquestionable. In the three weeks the 
assault lasted, as many as 1400 Palestinians might have been killed and more than 5000 
injured (Roy, 2011:227). Homes, schools, mosques, factories and hospitals were destroyed. 
The data analyzed in this study were collected in February 2011. This was a period of relative 
calm in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The number of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, as 
reported by the Israel Security Agency, had shown a sharp decline following operation Cast 
Lead; 2048 rockets in 2008, 569 in 2009, and 150 in 2010. The trend was on the verge of 
shifting, however. During 2011 419 rocket attacks were reported, and in 2012 the number 
rose to 2327 (ISA, 2009, 2010, 2012). Fafo survey data show a corresponding trend in public 
opinion. In 2010 the percentage of respondents supporting rocket attacks was 38 (Liu & 
Tiltnes, 2010:21), down from 58 in 2008 (Fafo, 2008:51). In the 2011 survey it was back up 
to 46 percent. These corresponding shifts in public opinion and number of rockets make early 
2011 a particularly interesting point in time for studying determinants of support for such 
strategies of violent resistance.  
At the same time, the last years have seen a growing revival of traditional practices of non-
violent resistance against the occupation – so-called “popular resistance” (Christophersen et 
al., 2012:17). The revival can be seen in boycott campaigns and the organization of weekly 
protest marches against the military zone in the Gaza Strip and the separation wall in the West 
Bank (Christophersen et al., 2012:17; Ehrenreich, 2013). This broad and decentralized 
movement has also provided an umbrella for a small but dedicated group of youth activists – 
al-Harak al-Sahabi (the youth movement) – that organizes exhibitions, lectures, and local 
boycott teams at the Universities and village youth centers (Christophersen et al., 2012:17). 
The non-violent resistance strategy might be considered a “third way between Hamas’s 
strategy of violence and the negotiations paradigm prevalent in the [Fatah-controlled part of 
the] PA” (Christophersen et al., 2012:17). In the 2011 Fafo survey, 66 percent of respondents 
agreed more emphasis should be put on non-violent forms of resistance. 
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In sum, ever since the first Intifada, Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation, while 
varying in intensity, has encompassed both violent and non-violent strategies. The modus 
operandi of violent resistance strategy has shifted, however. It has ranged from stone-
throwing, via guerilla tactics and suicide bombings, to rocket attacks originating in the 




The grievance-opportunity debate dates back to the 1960s (Cederman et al., 2011:478), when 
authors like Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) argued that inequality, conceptualized as relative 
deprivation, increases the risk of internal conflict through frustrated expectations. Thirty years 
later, such grievance arguments were forcefully challenged by opportunity theorists. They 
argued that insurgent actors’ opportunity to rebel matters more for the decision to start an 
insurgency than their motivation for doing so. Following the influential large-N studies of 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), a consensus started to emerge that 
largely discarded grievance-based explanations. But more recently this consensus has been 
challenged by researchers arguing that grievances were prematurely rejected. They have 
found that the non-discovery of statistically significant relationships between grievances and 
conflict is due to inappropriate conceptualization and imperfect measurement, rather than the 
absence of any causal effect (Cederman et al., 2011; Stewart, 2008). 
The focus of this thesis is on testing theories that explain civil war as a function of individual 
and group grievances against theories that emphasize the feasibility of rebellion. Answering 
my research questions – determining which of the two theories fit the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict better – can contribute to armed civil conflict research by operationalizing and testing 
some of the mechanisms put forth in the macro level conflict research on the micro level. I 
begin this chapter by briefly reviewing the advantages of adopting a micro-level approach 
when testing the theories of opportunities and grievances against each other and proceed by 
outlining a framework for testing important strands of the grievance and opportunity theories 
against each other. In the second section, I present the most important grievance arguments, 
focusing on relative deprivation, vertical inequality and horizontal inequality. In the third 
section, I present the two most important mechanisms proposed in the opportunity literature – 
opportunity costs and state capacity – of which I am only able to test the former. In the final 
section, I discuss the problems and potential of applying attitude data to a debate where the 
dependent variable should be participation. In this case, such an approach is dictated by 
pragmatic concerns of data availability. While this is not unproblematic, a look at the social 
psychology literature on the subject of attitude-behavior consistency in general, and social 
movement participation in particular, leads me to conclude that such an approach can be 
justified in cases where data on participation are not readily available. 
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3.1 Micro dynamics 
“At a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals’ behaviour and their interactions 
with their immediate surroundings, in other words, from the micro-foundations” (Verwimp, 
Justino, & Brück, 2009:307-308). While macro-level factors may correlate with the onset, 
intensity and duration of conflict “only careful examination of the choices, and constraints, 
faced by individuals and groups can reveal the mechanisms linking poverty, resources, and 
identities to the practice of violence” (Weinstein, 2007:339). Still most research programs of 
conflict prevention and resolution are driven by regional, national and international 
perspectives. The data applied are often aggregated to the country-level.
3
 This is particularly 
true of the theories of opportunities and grievances to be tested in this study. The theoretically 
influential contributions of Cederman et al. (2011), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) are all developed and tested on the macro level.  
Such macro-level studies should be supplemented by systematic research on the mechanisms 
that link the behavior of individuals, households and groups with conflict processes.  
“Crosscountry analyses are not equipped to capture nuanced triggers or stops of violence only 
visible at the micro level.” (Verwimp et al., 2009:308). Attempting to infer on-the-ground 
dynamics from the macro-level “will likely generate biased inferences, in a way that parallels 
the well-known problem of ecological fallacy” (Kalyvas, 2006:391). Rigorous theoretical and 
empirical analysis of civil war warrants close attention to micro-level dynamics (Ibid). Most 
of the aggregated proxies applied – in particular per capita national income – are pretty far 
removed from the lives of individuals. They are insufficiently attentive to potential 
homogeneity between individuals and groups within countries. Also, many of the economic 
measures can, when applied at the country level, be interpreted as proxying both grievance 
and opportunity factors (Hendrix, 2010:283; Kalyvas, 2006:391). 
In the introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Peace Research designed to address 
this important gap in the literature, Verwimp et al. (2009) argue that “in order to understand 
conflict dynamics and its effects on society, we have to take seriously the incentives and 
constraints shaping the interaction between the civilian population and the armed actors” 
(Verwimp et al., 2009:307). Conflicts shape and are shaped by the behavior of individuals, 
households and communities. A micro-level approach advances our understanding of conflict 
                                                 
3
 This is partially a result of the traditional focus of security studies on the state and state agency, but there are 




by accounting for individual and group heterogeneity within a country or conflict (Verwimp 
et al., 2009:308). Still few systematic attempts to supplement the macro level research with 
such micro level studies have been made. This is where studies like this one can make an 
important contribution. By operationalizing the macro-theories on the regional and individual 
level in one particular country, I aim to begin to fill the gap, by introducing national survey 
data to attempt to get closer to the mechanisms proposed by macro theory. More such studies 
are needed to improve our understanding of the micro foundations of aggregated civil war 
theory. 
3.2 Grievance theory 
Grievance theorists like Gurr (1970) have argued that frustration arising from different types 
of relative deprivation can explain rebellion. The core idea is that aggression is a response to 
frustration (Gurr, 1970:33). Relative deprivation theory holds that participation in violence is 
a response to frustration triggered by the discrepancy between what a person expects and what 
he is able to accomplish (Ibid). Violence results from the feeling of being deprived of 
something one feels entitled to. 
3.2.1 Relative deprivation 
Relative deprivation (RD) is defined by Gurr (1970) as the «actors’ perception of discrepancy 
between their value expectations and their value capabilities» (Gurr, 1970:24). Value 
expectations refer to the conditions and goods people believe they are rightfully entitled to 
(Ibid). Value capabilities refer to the conditions and goods they believe themselves capable of 
attaining and keeping (Gurr, 1970:24). It should be noted that relative deprivation is a 
subjective phenomenon. This means that cases of objectively defined absolute deprivation 
might not be cases of relative deprivation as long as those who experience such deprivation 
do not themselves consider it unjust (Gurr, 1970:24).  
Values are defined as the objects, events and conditions men strive for (Gurr, 1970:25). Three 
categories of values should be considered. Welfare values are values that contribute directly 
to physical well-being and self-realization, such as food, shelter, health and development of 
mental and physical abilities. Economic and self-actualization values are the two most 
important sub-categories. Power values are values that “determine the extent to which men 
can influence the actions of others and avoid unwanted interference by others in their own 
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actions” (Gurr, 1970:25). This includes participation in collective decision-making, but also 
self-determination and security, in particular freedom from oppressive political regulation and 
disorder (Gurr, 1970:26). Interpersonal values are values that give psychological satisfaction 
through interaction with others (Gurr, 1970:26).  
The intensity with which relative deprivation is felt will vary. The same is true for its scope – 
the “proportion of people in any collectivity that feels deprived with respect to any specified 
class of values” (Gurr, 1970:29). Collective violence becomes more likely the more 
widespread the discontent (Ibid). 
When it comes to the sources of human aggression, Gurr (1970:36) argued that what provides 
the basic motivational link between relative deprivation and the potential for collective 
violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. The theory was first framed by Dollard, 
Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) whose core idea was that aggression is always a 
response to frustration (Gurr, 1970:33). Since then the theory has been qualified somewhat, as 
it has been pointed out that frustration does not always lead to violence and that violence can 
also be motivated by expected gain. But the main point holds – the anger induced by 
frustration is a “motivating force that disposes men to aggression […]. If frustrations are 
sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely, if not certain, to occur” (Gurr, 
1970:37). A number of other variables influence behavior (beliefs, inhibitions, social 
environment), but frustration must be accounted for in any theory of political violence. The 
explanatory element that frustration-aggression theory contributes to the analysis of political 
violence is the idea that anger functions as a driver (Gurr, 1970:34). As reformulated by 
Berkowitz (1965), the theory states that frustration triggers anger, but an aggressive response 
occurs only when the angered person sees an “attackable object or person that he associates 
with the source of frustration” (Gurr, 1970:34).  
Because relative deprivation is psychologically uncomfortable, people tend to adjust their 
value expectations to their value capabilities in the long run. But three distinct patterns of 
disequilibrium are possible and may lead to political violence (Gurr, 1970:46). First, 
decremental deprivation is a situation where value capabilities are perceived to decline while 
expectations remain constant (Gurr, 1970:46). This is RD “by reference to their own past 
condition” (Ibid). It could result from declining production of material goods in society or the 
declining ability of political elites to keep order (Gurr, 1970:47). Second, aspirational 
deprivation occurs when expectations increase or intensify, while capabilities are fairly 
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constant (Gurr, 1970:46). Sources can be exposure to and knowledge of a better material way 
of life, demonstration effects of other groups’ improving conditions (Gurr, 1970:51-52). 
Expectations can rise under conditions of increased schooling and literacy, an announcement 
of reform programs, the articulation of ideologies of modernization by political leaders, and 
the political and associational mobilization of citizens that were previously non-participants 
(Gurr, 1970:56-57). Third, progressive deprivation occurs when there is an increase in 
expectations and a simultaneous decline in capabilities (Gurr, 1970:46). This is the case 
emphasized by Davies (1962) in his J-curve theory: “[r]evolutions are most likely to occur 
when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short 
period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively fear that ground gained with great effort 
will be quite lost; their mood becomes revolutionary” (Davies, 1962:5). A typical source 
would be economic depression in a growing economy (Gurr, 1970:53). In any given society at 
any time some groups are likely to experience each type of relative deprivation (Gurr, 
1970:56). It is also possible for one group or individual to simultaneously experience different 
patterns of relative deprivation with respect to different classes of values (Ibid:57).  
Sønsterudbråten (2009:21-22) argues that in the case of Palestine relative deprivation should 
be felt particularly acutely by well-educated Palestinians in poor segments of the population. 
From an opportunity cost point of view, higher levels of education would reduce the risk for 
conflict, as educated men have better income-earning opportunities and therefore face a 
higher opportunity cost of joining rebellion (Urdal, 2004:4). But while it is true that education 
increases the value of a person’s labor, higher education also leads to higher expectations 
(Ibid). And among well-educated Palestinians in poor segments of the population their 
upward mobility is restricted by dismal economic conditions, high unemployment rates and 
an unpredictable and fluctuating economy. This is an example of aspirational deprivation 
concerning the welfare values of economy and self-realization. A discrepancy between 
welfare value expectations and welfare value capabilities develops because expectations 
increase while capabilities remain fairly constant. Hypothesis 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Hypothesis 1: Highly educated individuals in the lower economic segments of the 






     Figure 3.1: Hypothesis 1 
 
The grievance argument can be extended to other areas than economic deprivation. Common 
grievance indicators in cross-country studies are measures of social and political exclusion 
and ethnic and religious fragmentation. The mechanisms are the same as with relative 
economic deprivation. A discrepancy between value expectations and capabilities creates 
frustration that may trigger aggression. But the values concerned are different. With political 
exclusion the values in question are power values, as such exclusion means restricted access 
to participation in decision-making procedures. 
According to Fearon and Laitin (2003:79), the mechanism of these kinds of arguments is that 
state or societal discrimination along cultural lines gives rise to the grievances that motivate 
rebellion. Such political grievances are difficult to measure directly, but more indirect proxies 
can be used. Fearon and Laitin (2003:79) argue that other things being equal, political 
democracy should be associated with less discrimination along any lines. More directly, the 
observance of civil rights should be associated with less repression and thus lower grievances 
(Ibid). As stated by Gurr (1993b:137), “the calculus of communal action in democracies 
favors protest over rebellion”. Conversely, non-democracy and non-observance of civil and 
political rights should increase the risk of favoring rebellion over non-violent protest. Krueger 
and Maleckova (2003:141) found that lack of civil liberties at the country level was associated 
with higher participation in terrorism. Because relative deprivation is a subjective state (Gurr, 
1970:24), it is the perception of exclusion that matters (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:564; 
Hirshleifer, 2001:25-31), which implies the following hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 3.2: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher perceived status of civil and political rights is associated with 
lower levels of support for violent resistance 
               Figure 3.2: Hypothesis 2 
 
As discussed earlier, the “relative” in relative deprivation implies a comparison between 
actual conditions and conditions an individual feels entitled to. According to Gurr an 
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individual’s point of reference may be an abstract ideal, his own past condition, the standard 
articulated by a leader, or a “reference group” (Gurr, 1970:25). For Palestinians, I expect that 
the implicit reference group when considering human rights will often be the Israelis. This is 
an assumption I am unable to verify empirically, however, and it should be treated with 
caution. Palestinians may also compare their situation to the one of Jordanians, and highly 
educated Palestinians, many having received their degrees abroad, will be familiar with 
Western democratic systems. 
3.2.2 Vertical inequality 
As the previous discussion illustrates, inequality has played a central role in classical theories 
of conflict (Cederman et al., 2011:479). Statistical studies have often used country-level 
measures of vertical inequality when studying this relationship. Vertical income equality 
means inequality between households or individuals, often within a country. In using upper-
income quintile shares to measure country-level income inequality, Muller (1985) found that 
such inequality increased the number of deaths from internal political conflict significantly. 
More recently, influential statistical studies using vertical measures of income inequality 
found little or no effect on civil war onset, however (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger, & Gleditsch, 2003). This became an emerging consensus 
(Østby, 2008:143). 
An important problem with studies using such country level measures is that they are likely to 
involve ecological fallacies (Buhaug & Rød, 2006:316). Conflicts rarely involve entire 
countries. More often most of the conflict activity takes place in limited areas within 
countries. Still analysis has relied almost exclusively on country-level data (Buhaug & Lujala, 
2005:399). County-level measures may mask important regional differences, and thereby lead 
to invalid inferences. Buhaug and Rød (2006:316) argue that the study of civil war often 
suffers from “a disturbing mismatch between theory and analysis. While standard statistical 
investigations are conducted exclusively at the country level, most hypotheses actually pertain 
to sub-national conditions” (Buhaug & Rød, 2006:316). Spatial disaggregation of the study of 
civil war is therefore needed (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Buhaug & Rød, 2006; Raleigh & 




Early geographically disaggregated studies focused mainly on natural resources and 
demographic factors. Yet the need to spatially disaggregate socioeconomic inequalities is 
equally acute (Østby, Nordås, & Rød, 2009:303). If high income inequality heightens the risk 
of civil war onset, the existence of one region with large income differences might be enough 
to start a civil war. But if all the other regions in the country have small income differences, a 
country level measure of inequality would mask the region with large income differences and 
the heightened conflict risk stemming from inequality in that region. Østby et al. (2009) found 
that intra-regional income differences increased the risk of conflict. One might hypothesize 
that studies like Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) missed the effect of 
income inequality because they used county-level measures.  
Due to insufficient data availability, I am unable to measure vertical inequality on the regional 
level. I will focus instead on recent studies that point to the possibility vertical income 
measures, such as Gini or differences between income quintiles, are not that well suited to 
capture the mechanism through which inequality increases the probability of conflict. 
3.2.3 Horizontal inequality 
In addition to level of aggregation, there is a second critique to be made of the dominant 
studies that have rejected grievance-based explanations. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) both rely on a series of individual-level proxies, including the Gini 
coefficient, when they find no evidence that economic inequality increases the risk of conflict 
(Cederman et al., 2011:480). But in recent years a suspicion that this rejection of grievances 
and inequalities is premature has surfaced.  
There are two main reasons why grievance arguments cannot be so easily dismissed. First, 
inequality continues to occupy a prominent place in the qualitative civil war literature 
(Cederman et al., 2011:478; Sambanis, 2005:315-317). Wood (2003:232) describes the 
reasons for the participation of the campesinos in collective violence in El Salvador. 
Resentment of their poor life conditions (absolute deprivation) was not enough to motivate 
rebellion until the new belief that social justice is the will of God became widespread. This 
can be considered a situation of aspirational deprivation. Petersen (2002:173) argues that a 
sudden reversal in group position was a typical trigger for political violence in Eastern 
Europe. This can be considered a situation of decremental deprivation.  
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A similarity between qualitative studies like the two summarized above is that they focus on 
group positions, rather than individuals, when describing how deprivation may lead to 
collective violence. This leads me to the second, and related, reason why grievance arguments 
should not be so easily dismissed. A possible explanation for the discrepancy between 
qualitative and quantitative analysis in the field could be that the statistical studies have 
largely missed their theoretical target when it comes to inequality (Cederman et al., 
2011:480). The problems of conceptualization and measurement are severe, and revolve 
around the point that statistical studies have focused mainly on individuals rather than groups 
when measuring inequality (Cederman et al., 2011:478).  
It can be argued that conflict-inducing grievances are about the “visible and felt inequalities at 
the local level rather than the extremes of the Gini coefficient and the ratio between earnings 
of the richest and poorest quintiles of the population” (Cramer, 2003:405). Cramer (2003) 
therefore called for a relational alternative to the individual and household-level measures 
commonly applied. In a thorough review and robustness test of the statistical civil war 
literature, similar concerns over measurement, interpretation and level of aggregation were 
voiced by Sambanis (2005:316-324).  
The alternative that emerged was the theory of “horizontal inequalities” (HIs). Stewart defines 
HIs as “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between 
culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2008:3) and contrasts them to the vertical, individual-
level inequalities discussed so far. The argument is that scholars have missed inequality’s 
war-causing effect largely because they have used individual-level measures, when the 
majority of internal conflicts are organized group conflicts where “people with particular 
shared identities or goals attack others in the name of the group” (Stewart, 2008:11). Group-
level measures are needed (Stewart, 2008; Østby, 2008:144).  
The broad conceptualization of Stewart and her colleagues includes political, economic, social 
and cultural dimensions of HI. The political dimension has to do with restricted access to 
central decision-making authority (Cederman et al., 2011:480). The social dimension is about 
groups’ uneven social access, e.g. to education and societal status. The cultural dimension has 
to do with group-level inequality of cultural policies and symbols (Ibid). Finally, the 
economic dimension is about the economic distribution of wealth among groups. This line of 
argument is not inconsistent with the argument of Gurr (1970), as outlined earlier. His relative 
deprivation argument applies just as well to groups as to individuals. The HI dimensions are 
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also closely related to the different kinds of values Gurr described. Horizontal inequality is 
perhaps best seen as a sub-category of relative deprivation, the sub-category in which the 
reference point each individual compares its own value capabilities to is in fact a reference 




Cederman et al. (2011:481-482) outline the two mechanisms they perceive as underpinning 
the HI argument. First, HIs are transformed to grievances by a process of group comparison 
driven by collective emotions. This presupposes well-defined groups (Stewart, 2000:9-10). 
While horizontal inequalities are objective conditions of political and economic asymmetry, 
grievances are “intersubjectively perceived phenomena” (Cederman et al., 2011:481). They 
are hard to measure directly, but Cederman et al. rely on an extensive and experimentally 
supported literature in social psychology when describing the mechanism. They hold that 
grievances become cognitively linked to social identities through self-categorization (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988:22-26) and that once group identities become salient, group members tend to 
make social comparisons that hinge on the distinction between in-group and out-group 
categories (Turner, 1981:80-84). These processes of social comparison are far from 
emotionally neutral and will typically lead to feelings of anger and resentment among 
members of the disadvantaged group (Cederman et al., 2011:481). 
Second, grievances are transformed into violent collective action through a process of group 
mobilization (Cederman et al., 2011:482). Cederman et al. (2011:482) suggest that the 
collective action problem might have been overstated in context of civil war. The existence of 
such a dilemma hinges on the assumption that staying away from fighting is a less costly 
option than participating. This is often not the case (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). Moreover, 
several studies suggest that collective identities facilitate collective action (Cederman et al., 
2011:82). In sum, Cederman et al. (2011:482) see inequality as a grievance factor, but not 
exclusively so, as it is also a mobilizational resource. 
Most of the studies on horizontal inequalities seem to operationalize identity groups as ethnic 
groups. But there is little use in talking about different ethnic groups within Palestine. The 
population is ethnically homogenous (Robinson, 2011:383-384). Still, the logic of the 
“horizontal inequalities” argument need not be limited to ethnic groups. It merely presupposes 
                                                 
4
 In later works Gurr (1993a:124-127) himself contributed to what was to become horizontal inequality theory, 
by pointing to the centrality of what he called collective disadvantage and the salience of group identity, in 
addition to group cohesion and mobilization, in shaping a group’s sense of grievance and ability to act on it. 
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the existence of strong shared group identities (Stewart, 2000:9-10). Ethnic groups are often 
ideal candidates, as ethnic identities tend to be strong and deep-rooted. But in principle some 
other kind of group could have the same function within an HI argument. Stewart (2000:10) 
exemplifies with class identity in Latin America, clan identity in Somalia, and religious 
identity in Northern Ireland. Regional location could be another source of identity 
differentiation (Ibid). 
In line with this argument, Østby et al. (2009) focused on first-level administrative units when 
analyzing horizontal inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa. They found empirical support for the 
hypothesis that “relative socioeconomic deprivation of a region is positively associated with 
the risk of civil conflict” (Østby et al., 2009:306). The authors argued that regions are suited 
for horizontal inequality analysis because of the shared history and overlapping cultural 
cleavages often associated with them. Regions often structure the distribution of state 
patronage, political influence and welfare. They can be important because “both cultural 
communalities and socio-economic and political realities can reinforce or even construct 
regions as relevant identity units” (Østby et al., 2009:304). In Africa regions also tend to 
overlap with ethnic group demarcations. 
Such arguments are suitable when studying African countries, but do not transfer well to the 
Palestinian situation. Regions are relevant units for the kind of analysis undertaken by Østby 
et al. (2009) only to the extent that they function as strong identity groups. This is not a trivial 
precondition, and there is little evidence that it is met in the case of Palestinian first-level 
administrative units – the governorates. Also, it is abundantly clear that the ethnic and 
religious cleavage between Palestinians and Israelis is a far more salient cleavage than any 
internal regional divisions for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The ethnic, religious or 
communal «reference group» or “out”-group for group comparison in this case should be the 
Israelis.  
Because my unit of analysis sits below the national level and only two ethnic groups are 
relevant for my analysis, I am unable to apply conventional measures of horizontal inequality, 
comparing characteristics of ethnic groups as wholes. The HI measures will have to be 
located on the governorate level instead. I will argue that for group comparison between 
Palestinians and Israelis, the difference between conditions in each Palestinian governorate 
and the closest Israeli border area provides relevant variation in horizontal inequalities. 
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Horizontal inequality is therefore measured as socio-economic differences between each 
Palestinian governorate and the Israeli sub-district
5
 it has the longest border with.
6
  
It might be argued that the measure does not capture the mechanism properly, for at least two 
reasons. First, the Palestinian Arabs within the Israeli sub-districts are measured on the 
“wrong side” of the ethnic divide. This is problematic, but there is little I can do about it, 
given that my individual level data include only Palestinians in the occupied territories. The 
problem is reduced somewhat by the fact that as a group, Arabs in Israel are socio-
economically disadvantaged. They earn less, consume less, and own fewer durables than 
Jewish citizens and receive disproportionately few university degrees (CBS, 2012c: table 
3.14; 2012d: tables 6.1, 6.2 & 14; 2012e: tables 2 & 25). Assuming that this holds for all sub-
districts (such statistics are not publicly available), the problem might not bias my measure 
much, as it will make the measures of horizontal inequality smaller for all governorates. 
Given that I cannot test this assumption, and that the Arab proportion of the population varies 
significantly across the sub-districts in question (CBS, 2010b: table 2.7), I cannot be sure that 
my measures are not to some degree biased. This should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results of the analysis, but I will argue the measures in question are still the best 
alternatives available. 
Second, some might argue that any HI measure should reflect that the Palestinian group as a 
whole compares itself to the Israeli people as a whole. Still it is not an unreasonable 
assumption that Palestinian individuals compare themselves mostly to the group of Israelis 
with which they have most contact, and that they have most contact with people just across 
the border. If we accept this assumption it follows that the intensity with which grievances 
stemming from HIs is felt should be less strong for individuals seeing that Israelis across the 
border are economically or socially not that different from them, than for individuals seeing a 
huge difference in economic and social conditions.  
                                                 
5
 I use the division into sub-districts applied by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in the 2008 census (CBS, 
2012b). 
6
 In the case of Nablus and Jericho, the governorates that do not share a border with Israel at all, I pair them with 
the sub-district whose border is geographically closest to the border of the governorate in question. Thus the 
governorates and sub-districts are paired as follows: Jenin - Yizre’el; Tubas - Yizre’el; Tulkarm - Sharon; 
Nablus - Sharon; Qalqilya - Peta Tiqua;  Salfit - Peta Tiqua; Ramallah - Ramla; Jericho - Jerusalem; Jerusalem - 
Jerusalem; Bethlehem - Jerusalem; Hebron - Be’er Sheva; Gaza North - Ashqelon; Gaza - Be’er Sheva; Deir 
al_Balah - Be’er Sheva; Khan Yunis - Be’er Sheva; Rafah - Be’er Sheva. This pairing might be criticized as 
entailing an element of arbitrariness (especially in the cases of Jericho, Nablus, Hebron, Jenin and Tulkarm), but 
I find it is the best option available. 
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Hypothesis 3:  Individuals are more likely to support violent resistance the larger the 
difference in socio-economic conditions between their own governorate 
and the closest Israeli sub-district 
    Figure 3.3: Hypothesis 3 
 
3.3 Opportunity theory 
Analogous to the classic principles of murder detection, rebellion needs both motive and 
opportunity. The political science literature explains conflict in terms of motive: the 
circumstances in which people want to rebel are viewed as sufficiently rare to constitute the 
explanation. […] [W]e contrast this with economic accounts which explain rebellion in terms 
of opportunity: it is the circumstances in which people are able to rebel that are rare (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004:563). 
In the 1970s the relative deprivation theorists that had dominated the field up to that point 
were challenged by the “resource mobilization” school (Gamson, 1975; Jenkins & Perrow, 
1977; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978). They 
questioned the assumption of a direct and strong relationship between discontent and political 
violence and argued instead that the central explanatory variable should be the organization of 
discontent, the extent to which “dissident groups are able to acquire control of the resources 
necessary to develop strong and effective organization for the purpose of obtaining collective 
goods” (Muller, 1985:48). The argument was heavily influenced by rational choice theorists 
like Olson (1965), highlighting the problem of collective action and the conditions under 
which it can be overcome (Snyder, 1978:504-505). Group mobilization became a central 
concern, in the study of social movements in general (non-violent resistance), and collective 
violence in particular. In the 1990s a new wave of ethno-nationally motivated conflict led to 
new influential theory that ethnic grievances contributed to collective violence, but indirectly 
so, through ethnic mobilization (Gurr, 1993b:124-129). The debate remained unresolved 
(Cederman et al., 2011:479). 
The civil war literature at the turn of the millennium became dominated by scholars arguing 
that the ubiquity of frustration around the world deprives grievance theories of explanatory 
value (Cederman et al., 2011:479). Grievances are widespread but rebellion is rare, so 
motivation cannot be the determining factor for decisions to rebel. Instead, the opportunity to 
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rebel is crucial in explaining the decision to take part in rebellion. Decisions to participate are 
a result of rational cost-benefit analysis. To understand why particular countries experience 
civil war, we need to understand the logic of insurgency (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:79). The 
focus is on broader conditions that favor insurgency, as better predictors of participation than 
grievances (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:79). Societies experiencing civil war are distinguished first 
and foremost by the atypical viability of rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:564).  
In the following sections I outline the two most important opportunity mechanisms proposed 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) – opportunity costs and state 
capacity.
7
 Both use the highly aggregated proxy GDP per capita to test mechanisms that 
ultimately rest on the individual level and therefore should be tested with micro-level data. 
Unfortunately, the case under study permits micro level testing only of the opportunity cost 
mechanism. 
3.3.1 Opportunity costs 
The much-cited article by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is best known for its explanation of 
civil war by reference to what is often referred to as the “opportunity costs” of rebellion. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) themselves called the mechanism “opportunities arising from 
atypically low cost” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:569) or “forgone income”. Rebellions may 
occur when the income forgone by enlisting as a rebel is unusually low. The Russian civil war 
is an illustrative example. As pointed out by Figes (1997), the desertion rates of both rebel 
armies were ten times higher in summer than in winter – the recruits were peasants, so the 
income forgone was much higher at harvest time (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:569).  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) used three proxies for forgone income – male secondary 
schooling, income per capita, and the growth rate of the economy – and found them all to be 
both statistically and substantially significant. In a more recent study their core results on 
these economic characteristics all survived renewed and improved analysis (Collier et al., 
2009:24). The level and growth of income matters, also when income is instrumented to 
check for endogeneity (Ibid:20).  
Sønsterudbråten (2009:23) argued that there is no reason to expect the opportunity cost 
argument to transfer from studies of participation in rebellion to studies of attitudes of 
                                                 
7
 Other opportunity factors much cited in the literature include rough terrain, rural bases, access to natural 
resources, large populations, mixed regimes and a local population that can be induced not to denounce 
insurgents (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). 
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ordinary people towards resistance, unless resistance organizations are distributing benefits to 
their supporters. In a study testing deprivation versus opportunity theory in the West Bank, 
Khawaja (1995) found that the more resources people possess the more risk they can afford to 
take (Khawaja, 1995:151). She turns the opportunity cost argument on its head. Contrary to 
the individual level opportunity cost mechanism Collier and Hoeffler (2004) presuppose, this 
argument implies that wealthier individuals are more likely to take part in rebellion. This is 
because they can afford the increased risk involved. As the increased risk associated with 
resistance, e.g. the risk of Israeli retaliations, applies to large parts of the Palestinian 
population, the argument might be transferable to support for resistance in the general 
population (Sønsterudbråten, 2009:24-25). Sønsterudbråten (2009) found empirical support 
for this mechanism. 
Justino (2009) offers a theoretical counterargument. Her hypothesis is consistent with the 
opportunity cost argument of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), but the theoretical mechanisms 
underpinning it might be seen as an extension of the pure opportunity cost mechanism. Her 
reasoning applies to households and covers a wider range of supportive actions. Household 
participation is defined as ranging from the provision of members as fighters, via the supply 
of material support, shelter and information to any of the fighting groups, to deliberate non-
denunciation of activities of armed groups (Justino, 2009:317).
8
 
The literature on insurgency that emphasizes the collective action problem, including the 
opportunity cost strand, makes the implicit assumption that non-participation is relatively 
costless (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007:179). As Kalyvas and Kocher (2007:179) have pointed out, 
the collective action problem applies only to the degree that participation is risky relative to 
non-participation. Accordingly, Justino (2009) broadens the theoretical scope to look not only 
at the costs and benefits of participation, but also the costs of non-participation. Like in the 
pure opportunity cost argument, she presupposes an element of rational choice. Individuals 
weigh the costs and benefits of the alternatives available to them, before choosing whether to 
support insurgents or not. Her main argument is that vulnerability to poverty helps determine 
the probability of a household participating and supporting an armed group because it affects 
the cost of non-participation relative to the cost of participation (Justino, 2009:324). Such 
vulnerability increases the risk associated with non-participation, providing mechanisms 
                                                 
8
 See Petersen (2001) on distinctions between different levels of participation. 
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whereby armed groups can both recruit fighters and extend their support basis in the civilian 
population (Justino, 2009:324).  
The costs of non-participation and non-support of rebels increase with household 
vulnerability to poverty. When everything else is constant the amount of assets held by a 
household will influence its ability to draw on savings and accumulated assets if household 
members die or are injured (Justino, 2009:324). Wealthier households will be in a better 
position to adapt to losses in productive assets. They are better able to protect themselves 
against the negative economic transformations associated with conflict. If they have to, they 
can relocate and use their assets to overcome the barrier to creating a new livelihood 
elsewhere. For poorer households both the costs of staying neutral and the costs of outside 
options are higher (Justino, 2009:324). Non-participation increases the risk of being identified 
with the other side and punished for this (Justino, 2009:319). In some cases rebels even 
punish non-supporters deliberately, as part of a strategy to secure population support by 
manipulating the costs of support relative to non-support (Justino, 2009:319). This might 
mean that non-supporters are forced to migrate. If so, the barriers to accessing a new 
livelihood after relocation are higher for poor households. 
Non-participation also means being excluded from benefits the rebels can provide for their 
supporters. Such benefits are of greater relative importance the poorer a household is. Recent 
empirical literature suggests that most people support and cooperate with armed groups not 
for opportunistic reasons, but rather to guarantee survival and the fulfillment of basic 
economic needs (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). Poverty may drive individuals into conflict 
because being fighters can give them the opportunity to earn enough to fulfill basic needs 
when peacetime activities cannot, e.g. when productive activities are scarce or unemployment 
high (Justino, 2009:318). For supportive households armed groups may offer both physical 
and economic protection and privileged access to resources, information and skills needed in 
conflict zones. They can often provide employment for young household members. In some 
cases rebels even take over or supplement the provision of public goods and social services 
(Justino, 2009:323). A prominent example is the role of Hezbollah in providing social 
services for Shi’ites in Lebanon during the civil war (Norton, 2009:108-112). Both in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Hamas has a long history of providing social services through 




In sum, poor people not only have less to loose from supporting an insurgency, they also have 
more to loose from not supporting it, and more to gain from supporting it. Justino (2009:324) 
therefore hypothesizes that the poorer a household is at the start of a conflict, the higher the 
probability that the household will participate and support an armed group. The hypothesis is 
consistent with evidence that poorer individuals constitute the bulk of soldiers (Humphreys & 
Weinstein, 2008), that poor peasants participate in insurgencies (Scott, 1976; Wood, 2003), 
and that price reductions in labor-intensive sectors, where most of the poor are employed, 
encourage conflict because they increase incentives for mobilization by lowering the 
opportunity costs of participation  (Dube & Vargas, 2006:2). 
Because the opportunity cost mechanism described by Justino applies to a wider range of 
supportive action, it might transfer more easily to attitudinal support than does the pure 
opportunity cost argument. While Justino’s hypothesis regards the wealth at the start of the 
conflict, I see no theoretical reason that the mechanism should not apply also during a long-
standing conflict like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I therefore hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals from less wealthy households are more likely to support 
violent resistance than others  
    Figure 3.4: Hypothesis 4 
 
The opportunity cost argument might also apply to the regional level. People from poorer 
regions generally have less to loose from joining an insurgency, because the local economy 
and infrastructure that is likely to be harmed by the fighting and disruption insurgency entails 
is less developed to begin with. Provided that opportunity cost arguments transfer to the study 
of attitudinal support for armed resistance, it follows that people in less wealthy regions are 
more likely to support such resistance as well as to join it. This also makes the potential 
recruitment pool in such a region larger and thereby the potential for maintaining a rebellion 
in such an area lager, thus creating an incentive for strategic rebels to target these less 
developed regions for mobilization purposes (Østby et al., 2009:305). 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals from less wealthy governorates are more likely to support 




       Figure 3.5: Hypothesis 5 
 
Østby et al. (2009:313) did not find statistical support for proposition that regional wealth 
should negatively affect the risk of conflict. Sønsterudbråten (2009:72-79), on the other hand, 
reported tentative qualitative findings that supported the extension of the Khawaja (1995) 
argument to the regional level in the Palestinian case. Her findings indicate the opposite of my 
hypothesis. She found that people from richer regions were more likely to support violence, 
and argued it was because richer regions can more easily afford to handle the risks associated 
with Israeli retaliation, e.g. rebuilding destroyed infrastructure. 
3.3.2 State capacity 
Fearon and Laitin (2003:80) acknowledge that recruiting young men to the guerilla life is 
easier when alternatives are worse, and that per capita income might proxy this mechanism. 
Still they hold that the strong results reported for per capita income are due largely to another 
mechanism, the mechanism of state capacity. They believe GDP per capita proxies state 
military and police strength relative to potential insurgents. Higher per capita income marks 
more developed states with terrain more penetrated by roads and rural society more penetrated 
by central administration. It also proxies a state’s overall financial, police, military and 
administrative capabilities. 
“Most important for the prospects of a nascent insurgency, […] are the government’s police 
and military capabilities and the reach of government institutions into rural areas” (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003:80). The logic of the argument is that proxies for the relative strength or 
weakness of insurgents – their odds of being captured or killed – should be associated with 
the likelihood of civil war onset in a country. Insurgents are better able to survive and prosper 
if the military and government they are fighting are relatively weak – badly financed, corrupt, 
politically divided, organizationally inept, and poorly informed about what is going on at the 
local level (Ibid). Government forces need to distinguish rebels from noncombatants, which is 
an extremely complex and difficult political, military and organizational task.  
To investigate the state capacity argument on the micro level, I could use a regional state 
capacity variable. In many parts of this chapter I have argued for the need to disaggregate the 
study of civil war from country level to using first-level administrative units. In the case of 
29 
 
state capacity it is less clear that such a disaggregation is warranted. After all, most countries 
only have one central government, police and military, so one might think the state capacity 
variables constant within each country. This need not be true, however. In practice a state can 
have very different levels of control in different parts of a country. This is particularly true in 
large countries. In principle, one might argue that distance to the administrative center of a 
country or to a government military installation could proxy geographical variance in state 
capacity within a country. In the Palestinian case the military state strength to consider would 
be that of Israel and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
9
 But I will argue that Israeli military 
capacity should be considered constant across Palestinian regions. In the occupied territories, 
the Israeli military can intervene forcefully whenever and wherever they want.  
Alternatively, one might argue that brute military strength is unlikely to capture the aspect of 
state capacity that affects the decision to rebel and government capacity to respond most 
(Hendrix, 2010:274). In line with Fearon and Laitin’s description of the logic of insurgency, 
the state’s ability to collect and manage information is also crucial. This bureaucratic and 
administrative capacity might be a more direct determinant of feasibility of rebellion than 
military capability (Hendrix, 2010:274). Bureaucratic effectiveness captures a “government's 
effective penetration into all of its territory and its ability to provide goods and services even 
in times of regime change” (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004:307). This should increase the 
probability of government victory, or at least decrease the odds of a rapid rebel triumph 
(DeRouen & Sobek, 2004:307). In a comprehensive analysis of the state capacity concept, 
Hendrix (2010) found that the most theoretically and empirically justified measures of the 
concept were measures of tax capacity and survey measures of bureaucratic quality. I 
considered using survey questions about household access to water and electricity or 
individual satisfaction with services to proxy perceived bureaucratic capacity. These are not 
good measures of Israeli state capacity, however. The Palestinian Authority and Hamas, not 
Israel, are responsible for service delivery in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively. 
In sum, I am unable to test the state capacity argument on the micro level. This is unlikely to 
bias my results, however, as Israeli state capacity should be fairly constant across Palestinian 
governorates. 
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 The largest regional difference in Israeli state capacity is probably between Gaza and the West Bank. The 
police in the West Bank have tended to function as an extended arm of Israel if asked to. The police in Hamas-




3.4 The dependent variable: Support for resistance 
When testing theories of civil war onset and duration directly on the individual level, the 
dependent variable should be actual participation in insurgency. My dataset has no variable 
measuring such participation. This means I will be unable to study the determinants of 
participation directly. Instead, I will look at variation in attitudinal support for resistance in 
the general population.  
Resistance can be both violent (rebellion) and non-violent (e.g. social movements employing 
demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, social and political non-cooperation). Stephan and 
Chenoweth (2008:8) have argued for analyzing “nonviolent and violent insurgencies as 
analogous resistance types” when studying the effectiveness of such insurgencies. A similar 
argument might be made about attitudes towards violent and non-violent resistance. In both 
violent and non-violent movements mobilization is central for the success of the resistance, 
and one might plausibly ask if some of the same determinants are at play in determining 
attitudes towards both forms of resistance.  Petersen (2001:8-9) found that people often go 
through a two-stage process on their way to participation in insurgency – a first stage from 
neutrality to non-violent resistance, then a second stage to participation in rebel organizations. 
A similar process might apply for attitude formation. 
The importance of popular support for the success of armed rebellion and the survival of 
insurgent movements is well recognized in the civil war literature (Justino, 2009:316; 
Kalyvas, 2006:91-92). 
At a fundamental level, the outbreak and viability of violent armed conflicts is closely linked 
to the conduct and motivations, not only of rebel groups, elites and the state army, but also of 
ordinary members of society living in (potential) combat areas (Justino, 2009:316) 
The decision to start a civil war depends crucially on the participation and support of local 
populations, providing fighters, material support, shelter and information (Kalyvas, 2006; 
Petersen, 2001; Weinstein, 2007:163). The establishment of relationships between armed 
groups and households and individuals living in areas they control or wish to control is 
therefore important (Justino, 2009:316).
10
  
Ordinary citizens also draw on armed groups to protect their economic status. The result is a 
symbiotic association that helps determine the “strength of armed groups and the feasibility of 
                                                 
10
 Justino (2009:317) includes deliberate non-denunciation of insurgents as a form of participation. Non-betrayal 
to the enemy can be considered the minimal core of collaboration (Kalyvas, 2006:104).  
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their strategies before and during the conflict” (Justino, 2009:328). The higher the level of 
popular support and participation, the more likely the strategic objectives of the armed group 
are to succeed, both during and after the conflict.  
In sum, the support of the population merits study in its own right, as it is central for the 
success of rebellion. But to serve this function, support must be behavioral as well as 
attitudinal. Moreover, the dependent variable in the mechanisms outlined above is actual 
participation in insurgency, rather than popular support. An important question is therefore 
whether I am able to contribute to the opportunity-grievance debate when studying attitudes 
instead of participation. To answer this I look to social psychology and the study of attitude-
behavior consistency, after first providing a brief definition of the attitude concept. 
3.4.1 Defining attitudes  
A comprehensive and much cited definition of attitudes was provided by Ailport: 
An attitude is a mental or neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a 
directive or influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is 
related (Ailport, 1935:810). 
Such a definition might seem unduly complex, but on close inspection each element makes 
specific and important contributions to the understanding of the concept (Oskamp, 1991:6-7).11 
Later definitions of attitudes have stressed various aspects, but a central feature of the 
majority is the idea of attitudes as a “readiness for response” (Oskamp, 1991:7). It is not 
behavior, but rather a “predisposition to respond in a particular way to the attitude object” 
(Oskamp, 1991:7). Such objects may include things, places, people, ideas, actions or 
situations. Three other points should be emphasized. First, attitudes function as a driving 
force, a motivating factor. Second, they are relatively enduring. Finally, there is always an 
evaluative aspect involved. An attitude is increasingly seen as a disposition to “respond in a 
favorable or unfavorable manner to a given object” (Oskamp, 1991:8).1213 
                                                 
11
 See McGuire (1969:142-149) for detailed description and implications. 
12
 There is also a long-standing tradition for dividing attitudes into a cognitive, an affective (emotional) and a 
behavioral component, but its empirical validity and usefulness is debated. I will take the view of McGuire 
(1969:157) that the dimensions seem to be so highly inter-correlated that separating them does not seem 
worthwhile. 
13
 Attitudes must be distinguished from the broader category of values. Values have to do with an individual’s 
ideas about basic goals for one’s life and society and how best to achieve these goals (Hellevik, 2002:12). Values 
are assumed to be general in nature and therefore to affect attitudes, which are more specific to objects and 
situations (Hellevik, 2002:13). 
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3.4.2 The attitude-behavior relationship 
The debate on whether and to what extent attitudes influence behavior is particularly 
important for this study, as I am attempting to contribute to a debate on determinants of 
participation in collective action by studying attitudes towards such action. I therefore look to 
the social psychology debate on attitude-behavior consistency. 
The link between attitudes and behavior used to be taken for granted by social psychologists, 
but by the end of the 1960s this firm belief in the predictive validity of attitudes was shaken 
by a range of studies showing wide inconsistencies between verbal attitudes and overt action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005:175). The inconsistencies were of two kinds: first, inconsistency 
between expressed intentions and actions, and second, inconsistency between general 
attitudes and actions towards an object (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005:178). Because I am studying 
general attitudes towards resistance, not intentions to participate in such resistance, the last 
type of inconsistency will be my focus here. 
The answer of the many social psychologists to the inconsistency evidence was to propose 
that attitudes can have a substantial effect on behavior, but only under certain conditions 
(Ibid). Different factors were assumed to moderate the link, among them self-monitoring 
tendency and self-awareness. Of particular importance to my study is that it was found that 
people who have a vested interest in a topic and for whom the attitude object was important 
were more likely to act in accordance with their general attitudes (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; 
Franc, 1999; Krosnick, 1988; Regan & Fazio, 1977). There is good evidence that direct 
experience with or vested interest in the attitude object in question tends to improve 
prediction of specific behavior from general attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005:179; Regan & 
Fazio, 1977). This is relevant for my study because the conflict with Israel is central in the life 
of most Palestinians, which might suggest that in the Palestinian case we can expect a certain 
level of attitude-behavior consistency. 
The consistency between attitudes and actions is conditional upon a valid operationalization 
of the concepts. Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) emphasize that people with the same general 
attitude can behave in different ways to “act on” this attitude. For instance two individuals 
with equally favorable attitudes towards the church can express it differently – one chooses to 
donate money, while the other contributes time (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005:180). This means 
that we cannot expect a strong relationship between a general attitude towards an object and 
one of many possible courses of action directed at that object. The correct operationalization 
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would be to include a wide range of such actions. In fact, when “the behavioral criterion is 
broadly representative of the behavioral domain, rather than a single, arbitrarily selected 
action, strong relations between attitudes and behavior are observed” (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
2005:181). The correlation relevant for the contribution of my study to the opportunity-
grievance debate is between attitudes towards resistance and participation in such resistance. 
The correlation cannot be expected to be as strong as those found by Ajzen and Fishbein 
(2005:181) because direct participation as a combatant (which is the implicit dependent 
variable when the applied theories are tested on the individual level) is only one of several 
way individuals may choose to express their attitude of support through action. Other actions 
may include giving money, shelter or information to combatants. 
3.4.3 The socio-psychological social movement literature 
Klandermans (1997:208) proposed a four step model to explain an individual’s movement 
towards participation in a social movement: first, becoming a sympathizer; second, being 
targeted for mobilization; third, becoming motivated to participate; and finally, moving from 
intentions to actual participation. Studying attitudes means focusing on Klandermans’ first 
step – how individuals come to identify with a specific group, define a common enemy and 
decide their situation is unjust but changeable. This is about the social construction and 
individual appropriation of collective action frames – “systems of shared beliefs that justify 
the existence of social movements” (Klandermans, 1997:62). Klandermans holds that it is at 
this point relative deprivation matters, for understanding why, at a specific moment, a group 
acts collectively in social movement (Klandermans, 1997:209). He also points out, however, 
that it has become clear that social networks – previously considered by resource mobilization 
proponents primarily as “mobilizing structures” – also play a crucial role in this phase of 
meaning construction and identity formation (Ibid). 
In the social movement literature collective action has been operationalized in a variety of 
ways at the individual level – including attitudes towards it, intentions and tendencies to 
participate, and actual or self-reported participation (Saab, 2011:15). Operationalizing 
collective action as attitudes might be seen as a weakness for a study of collective action, but 
it has also been argued that the diversity of measures in the field is a strength (Van Zomeren 
& Iyer, 2009:650-651). The different operationalizations correspond roughly to the four steps 
in Klandermans’ model, and research on all these different steps are crucial for understanding 
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the individual’s path to collective action. Studying attitudinal support helps us understand 
how people become part of the mobilizational potential for a social movement.  
In the majority of social-psychological research on collective action the focus has been on 
non-violent collective action (Saab, 2011:72). How does violent collective action relate to 
non-violent forms of resistance? Is it a two-stage process where participation in rebel 
organizations follows non-violent resistance, as suggested by Petersen (2001:8-9)? If so, we 
might imagine a model combining the insights from Petersen (2001) and Klandermans 
(1997), where the four steps of Klandermans takes an individual from neutrality to 
participation in non-violent resistance in Peterson’s model. It is less clear in the social 
psychology literature, however, what it takes for a person to take the final step and participate 
in violent resistance. My data are neither longitudinal nor behavioral, so I have no way of 
testing such a model directly.  
The traditional assumption about the primacy of non-violent means was questioned by Saab 
(2011:133-136). Her findings indicate that violence is not only relevant as a last resort, when 
non-violence is perceived as likely to fail. Instead, the two are often considered 
complementary strategies by participants. Moskalenko and McCauley (2009:255-256) found 
readiness to participate in non-violent political action and readiness to participate in violent 
political action to be two correlated but distinguishable concepts, better conceptualized as 
competing responses than by a “conveyor belt” metaphor where the former might lead to the 
latter.  
I am unable to directly test the link between my dependent variable proxy – attitudes towards 
resistance – and the dependent variable most relevant to the debate I want to contribute to – 
participation in resistance. As the previous discussion indicates this is problematic, as we can 
safely assume that many of the people declaring support for resistance will never get from 
attitudinal support to actual participation. It is not unreasonable to expect that some of the 
same dynamics are in play in determining support as in predicting actual participation. But 
my research design provides a somewhat “easy” test for the grievance theory – one would 
expect it is much easier to find support for the hypothesis that grievances lead to support than 
that grievances lead to actual participation. In fact research has shown that more generally 
non-behavioral measures produce stronger effects than behavioral ones for classical 
antecedents of collective action (e.g. injustice and identification) (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & 
Spears, 2008:523). For the opportunity arguments, however, my design provides a very 
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“tough” test. Individual rational consideration of opportunities and constraints to participation 
might not come into play until the later stages of Klandermans’ model, which means I am less 
likely to find that such considerations constrain attitudes towards resistance than they would 
actual participation. 
Measures of actual behavior are rare in the psychological social movement literature, given 
the difficulties of obtaining them (Van Zomeren et al., 2008:510). Mapping behavior in civil 
war is even more difficult, and such data are usually lacking (Kalyvas, 2006:100). But the 
social movement literature has shown that intentions to participate are good predictors of 
behavior (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009:242; Saab, 
2011:142). In line with the attitude-behavior models discussed, intentions are “more proximal 
predictors of actions than attitudes” (Saab, 2011:137). Attitudes are considered relatively 
unrealistic; intentions take more account of practical constraints. But as we have seen in the 
models discussed, attitudinal support is a precondition for intentions to participate. Saab 
(2011:142) found that attitudinal support is an important predictor of more proximate 
measures of behavior. Attitudinal support for violent action played the role of intervening 
variable between independent variables like violence and non-violence efficacy and more 
proximal measures of support for violent action and participation in violent action on the 
other hand, like financial support for violence and violent action tendencies. This adds some 
empirical weight to the view of Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) that there is value in studying 
attitudinal forms of collective action because they may influence behavioral tendencies and 
ultimately behavior” (Saab, 2011:166). 
In sum, support for collective action is a first step towards participation. The results of Saab 
(2011:143) also underscore the importance of studying support for violent collective action in 
its own right – even if it does not lead to direct participation in such action – because 
“attitudinal support can translate into material support for groups that use violent collective 
action strategies, which can help sustain these groups and their activities” (Ibid). 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have argued that there is a need for micro level conflict studies such as this 
one to supplement the largely macro level research that has characterized the opportunity-
grievances-debate so far. A micro-level approach provides an opportunity to get closer to the 
actual mechanisms at work and to operationalize the concepts of opportunity and grievance so 
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as to better test the positions of the debate against each other. Micro-level hypotheses derived 
from the macro-oriented theories of grievances and opportunity are summarized in Table 3.1. 
Because my data only allows looking at attitudes towards rather than actual participation in 
resistance my analysis will provide a somewhat easy test for the grievance argument and a 
tough test for opportunity theory. 
 
          Table 4.1: Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Theory Mechanism
Hypothesis 1 Grievance Highly educated individuals in the lower
economic segments of the population are more
likely to support violent resistance than others
Relative 
deprivation
Hypothesis 2 Grievance Higher perceived status of civil and political




Hypothesis 3 Grievance Individuals are more likely to support violent 
resistance the larger the difference in socio-
economic conditions between their own governorate 
and the closest Israeli sub-district
Horizontal 
inequality
Hypothesis 4 Opportunity Individuals from less wealthy households are 




Hypothesis 5 Opportunity Individuals from less wealthy governorates are 






4 Research design 
In this chapter, I outline the research design of the study. I first present the dataset and 
sampling procedures applied. Second, I describe the multiple imputation technique I use to 
impute missing values. Third, I describe the variables I include in my model. I briefly discuss 
the content validity of this operationalization and provide descriptive statistics for the 
variables in question.  Finally, I describe the rationale behind the multinominal logistic two-
level model I use in the analysis. 
4.1 The Dataset 
The individual-level data analyzed in this study comes from a survey organized by the Fafo 
Institute for Applied International Studies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) in 2011 
(Fafo, 2011a). The data was collected between 8 and 13 February 2011 in the West Bank and 
between 16 and 21 February 2011 in Gaza. The interviews were conducted face-to-face by 
female interviewers locally recruited and trained by Fafo. A total of 1805 interviews were 
completed, 899 in Gaza and 906 in the West Bank. 
In addition to the individual level data I use regional level data on the 16 administrative 
regions (governorates) of the Palestinian territories from sources external to the WBG dataset. 
Governorate-level data on casualties were retrieved from the Casualties Database of the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)14. Governorate-
level socio-economic data were retrieved from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS)
15
 and its Israeli counterpart – the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).16 
4.1.1 Sampling17 
Fafo’s sample design targeted a total of 1002 households in WB and 1040 in the Gaza Strip, 
chosen from a sub-selection of clusters from a stratified cluster sample drawn for Fafo by the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The original sample was stratified by 
governorate and type of locality (urban/rural/refugee camp). 








 Information about the sampling procedure was obtained from the Fafo webpage (Fafo, 2011b) and through 
various internal Fafo-documents and correspondence with the Fafo employees responsible for planning and 
organizing the data collection. 
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In the Gaza Strip, 76 clusters (enumeration areas) were selected from the 132 clusters drawn 
by the PCBS, using systematic Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling.
18
 Households 
were then selected from each cluster proportional to cluster size (minimum 10 households) by 
mapping and listing households in each cluster and drawing from the list. Adjusted sampling 
weights were calculated (see Appendix 2). This design was a probability design in all stages. 
In the West Bank, 82 clusters (enumeration areas) were selected from the sample frame of 
144 clusters drawn by the PCBS, using systematic Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) 
sampling. Households were selected from each cluster proportional to cluster size (minimum 
10 households) by use of a random walk procedure. In each selected cluster a starting point 
was chosen by assigning numbers to all buildings on a sketch map of the cluster and using a 
random number list to choose which building to start in front of. The fieldworker then walked 
to the left and included every 20
th
 dwelling on the random walk path in the sample, using 
another random number table to decide which direction to walk in road crossings and the like. 
There are two main problems with such random walk procedures. First, the field staff 
unavoidably gets some discretion in deciding who to interview. Second, the procedure poses 
problems for assigning inclusion probabilities. Still I will argue that the procedure was 
sufficiently random not to pose any severe threat to the statistical validity of my inferences. 
The survey questions were divided into three thematic parts. First, a responsible adult in each 
household was asked about housing and infrastructure. This person was chosen by asking first 
for the household head. In many cases the male household head would be at work. In these 
cases the wife was interviewed. Second, the same responsible adult was asked questions about 
demographic characteristics of each household member. Third, in what was called the RSI 
questionnaire, a randomly selected household member aged 18 or more were asked questions 
about satisfaction with services, confidence in institutions, voting preferences and political 
attitudes. This household member was chosen by listing first all male household members 
over 18 female members by decreasing age, and selecting one from a Kish-selection table.
19
 
The governorate-level data comes from several different sources, with somewhat different 
procedures for sampling. The sampling procedures of PCBS are very similar to those of Fafo, 
                                                 
18
 Systematic PPS sampling is implemented as follows: First, all households are listed by cluster and clusters by 
cumulative size (number of households). Second, a sampling interval (SI) is chosen by dividing the total number 
of households by the number of clusters wanted in the sample. Third, a random start is chosen between 1 and the 
SI. Third, the households are counted through, using the sample interval. The clusters in which the households 
chosen are located make up the cluster sample. 
19
 For details on the procedure see Kish (1965:398). 
39 
 
with probability designs in all stages (PCBS, 2010a, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012c). The 
sample is a two-stage stratified cluster sample. First a sub-sample of clusters is selected by 
probability sampling from a sampling frame of all enumeration areas from the 2007 census, 
stratified by governorate and type of locality. Then a systematic random sample of households 
is drawn from each selected cluster and sampling weights calculated. The sample sizes are 
usually more than 4000 households and response rates are around 80-90 percent. The 
Palestinian 2007 census covered all individuals living in the Palestinian territories on the 
night of 30 November 2007 (PCBS, 2012b). 
The Israeli CBS also applied a design of two-stage cluster sampling in the 2008 expenditure 
survey (CBS, 2010a). First, a sample of localities was selected from a stratified list of 
localities. Then dwellings were sampled from each locality in accordance with its size. In the 
Israeli 2008 census two independent samples were investigated. In the field cluster sample the 
country was divided into geographical cells of approximately 50 households. A random 
sample of cells was chosen and all residents in these cells interviewed. The information is 
then compared to results from a sample of individuals whose address in the Improved 
Administrative Files is found in the sampled field cells (CBS, 2012a). 
4.1.2 Sampling issues            
Design effects come with all designs that are more complex than simple random ones (Häder 
& Gabler, 2003:122). Such effects need to be accounted for in my analysis because my sample 
was derived from a complex sampling design, including both cluster sampling and stratification. 
In practice, this means that the variance estimator used should be “the estimator based on simple 
random sampling multiplied by the design effect” (Häder & Gabler, 2003:123). Researchers 
often use probability weighting to adjust for such biases in sampling methods, attempting to 
compensate for departures from random sampling and give a more realistic picture of population 
characteristics and sampling variability (Hamilton, 2009:393). 
A second sampling issue of relevance to my study is that of unit non-response. In this case the 
actual sample size of completed interviews consisted of 1805 households, which is equivalent 
to a response rate of 88.4 percent. Response rates and types of non-response are presented in 
detail in Table 4.1. Of the households targeted but not included in the effective sample, 1.6 
percent was accounted for by frame errors (targeting of empty houses and ineligible 
households) and 10.2 percent by non-response. Most of the non-response (173 households) 
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was due to interrupted interviews because of time constraints. Only 18 households refused to 
participate.  
           Table 4.1: Response rates 
 
Even small non-response rates like this one may bias results to the degree that respondents 
and non-respondents differ significantly from each other on variables of interest (Couper & de 
Leeuw, 2003:165-166). Because I do not have that much information about the non-
respondents, this cannot be tested empirically. The best available option for reducing such 
bias is to use weighting methods to adjust the data to reflect the population on selected 
variables (e.g. sex and age), assuming that respondents belonging to the same weighting class 
would respond in similar ways (Hamilton, 2009:395; Häder & Gabler, 2003:123-124). This 
assumption might not hold in all cases, meaning that some bias could remain. But weighting 
the data in this manner will in most cases help reduce potential bias.
20
 
Fafo calculated weights for the sample of 1805 respondents with completed interviews. 
Household expansion weights were calculated to account for the two-stage stratified cluster 
sampling procedure used in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively. These were 
calculated as the inverse of the inclusion probabilities. RSI weights were then calculated by 
multiplying the household expansion weight by the number of household members eligible. 
The RSI weights are of most interest to me, as my units of analysis are the individuals asked 
the RSI questions, not households. Finally, the RSI weights were adjusted to reflect the mid-
                                                 
20
 To incorporate design effects and the need for weighting in my analysis, I use the survey commands in Stata 
11 when estimating the one-level model. This allows me to set my data as cluster sampled and weighted, to be 
able to account for this in analysis and variance estimates. In the multilevel models this is not an option. 
 
Interview status Frequency Percent Cumulative
Interview completed 1790 87.66 87.66
Refusal converted 15 0.73 88.39
Partly completed 173 8.47 96.87
Refusal 18 0.88 97.75
Selected dwelling vacant 24 1.18 98.92
Selected structure does not exist 2 0.10 99.02
No dwelling in selected structure 4 0.20 99.22
Not eligible 3 0.15 99.36




year population size estimated by the PCBS for each governorate, and age and gender 
composition. For a detailed description of the procedure, see Appendix 2. 
4.1.3 Multiple imputation of missing data   
On average, about half of respondents to political science surveys do not answer at least one 
survey question (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001:49). Contrary to recommendations 
of the statistics community, political scientists have often met this challenge by filling in 
educated guesses for some items or applying listwise deletion, eliminating entire observations 
and thereby losing on average about one-third of their data (Ibid). The result is “loss of 
valuable information at best and severe selection bias at worst” (King et al., 2001:49). 
King et al. (2001) have shown how multiple imputation will normally perform better than 
listwise deletion and never worse than it. In fact the point estimate in the average political 
science article is about a standard error “farther away from the truth because of listwise 
deletion” (King et al., 2001:52). Omitted variable bias will often be preferable to listwise 
deletion, although social scientists would rarely choose it. Fortunately, better methods make 
this choice between suboptimal methods unnecessary. 
I therefore use multiple imputation to replace the missing values in my dataset. The method 
involves “imputing m values for each missing item and creating m completed data sets. […] m 
can be as small as 5 or 10” (King et al., 2001:53). Across the datasets the missing values are 
replaced with different imputations to reflect uncertainty levels. “The multivariate normal 
specification implies that the missing values are imputed linearly. Thus, we create an imputed 
value the way we would usually simulated from a regression” (King et al., 2001:54).  
I use Amelia II software to conduct the imputation.
21
 In the imputation model I include all the 
variables I use in my analysis and robustness checks. I also include variables identifying the 
individual respondent, cluster number and stratum. To improve the model further I add a 
selection of socioeconomic and political variables that are likely to correlate with the 
variables I want to impute. These include variables measuring indebtedness, household and 
living area characteristics, attitudes towards the human rights situation in the area, trust in 
institutions and voting pattern in the 2006 election.  
To evaluate the fit of the imputation model, I perform overimputation diagnostics available in 
Amelia. This involves “sequentially treating each of the observed values as if they had 
                                                 
21
 Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia.The program applies the EM computational algorithm. 
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actually been missing. For each observed value in turn we then generate several hundred 
imputed values of that observed value, as if it had been missing”, which allows construction 
of a confidence interval of what the imputed value would have been if any of the observed 
data had been missing. We can then graphically evaluate whether the observed data tends to 
fall within the range it would have been imputed in, had it been missing (Honaker, King, & 
Blackwell, 2012:30). Figure 4.1 displays the result of overimputation on key variables 
graphically for the dataset with 1805 respondents. On the x-axis are the observed values and 
on the y-axis the imputed alternatives. The figure shows that the imputation model does fairly 
well for the dependent variable and for the economic variables, in particular the wealth index. 
The model is less able to predict values on the civil and political rights variable, however. 
This is not ideal, but having included all the variables in the dataset that could possibly be 
thought to correlate with the variable, it is the best fit I am able to achieve with this dataset. 
Figure 4.1: Overimputation diagnostics for the 1805 respondent sample 
 
 
When calculating sampling weights, Fafo used the 1805 respondents that completed all three 
parts of the interview. To be able to use these weights in analysis, I therefore run one 
imputation for the 1805 completed interviews only. In addition to this, I run an imputation 
where I add the 173 partly completed interviews discarded by Fafo. This results in a sample 
Figure 4.1: Overimputation diagnostics 
       
     a. Support for resistance    b. Civil rights status 
        
     c. Self-evaluted wealth       d. Wealth index 
Notes: The x-axis denotes observed values and the y-axis imputed values 
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size of 1978 respondents, accounting for 96.9 percent of the targeted sample. As a robustness 
test, I run the analysis on this dataset as well.  
 
4.2 Dependent variable: Support for resistance 
The most straight-forward option for measuring support for violent resistance would be to use 
the question “All Palestinians factions must stop/refrain from firing rockets against Israel. Do 
you… Strongly agree/ Agree/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree”. The fact that support for other 
forms of violence is not included is not a major threat to content validity, as rockets fired from 
the Gaza Strip have been the most important tool of violent resistance since the mid-2000s, 
when suicide bombings disappeared almost entirely.  
I want to combine the previously discussed measure of support for violent resistance with a 
measure of attitudes towards less violent forms of resistance, measured by the question “Some 
claim that Palestinians should put more emphasis on civil, non-violent resistance. To what 
extent do you agree? Do you… Strongly agree/ Agree/ Disagree/ Strongly disagree”. One 
way this could be accomplished is by creating a simple additive index ranging from strong 
support for non-violent measures to strong support for violent resistance (in the form of rocket 
attacks). The problem with this approach is that individuals who support both violent and 
non-violent resistance would end up with a medium value on such an index, which makes it 
unclear what we are actually measuring with the index and whether we can call it a 
continuous concept. 
A second, and preferable, alternative is to follow Lundervold (2012) – to dichotomize the two 
variables and make a simple index with four categories comprising those who (i) supported 
neither form of resistance, (ii) supported only non-violent resistance (iii) supported only 
violent resistance, and (iv) supported both forms of resistance, respectively. While 
dichotomizing the variables entails a loss of information, this is the measure best suited for 
capturing the complexity of Palestinian attitudes towards violent and non-violent resistance, 
as it explicitly accounts for the possibility that individuals can support both violent and non-
violent resistance at the same time. The distribution of the variable is shown in Figure 4.1. I 
choose “non-violence only” as the reference category, as I am particularly interested in 
comparing respondents that support only violence to those that support only non-violence. 
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The ordinal support for rocket attacks variable and the summated scale are included as 
alternative dependent variables in robustness testing.  
      Figure 4.1 Support for violent resistance  
 
      Notes: 0 = “Neither”; 1 = “Non-violent resistance  
        only”; 2 = “Violent resistance only; 3 = “Both” 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
In addition to dividing the occupied territories into areas A, B and C, the Oslo Accords 
established 16 administrative units under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PA) – 11 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip (UNEP, 2003:17).22 Dummies for these 
administrative units – the Palestinian governorates – serve as regional controls in the one-
level model and as the grouping variable in the two-level models presented in Chapter 5. 
23
  
4.3.1 Relative deprivation 
When testing hypotheses 1 and 5, I use the question “Consider the total economic situation of 
your household. Please tell me if the following statements describe your situation?” The 
respondents replied yes or no to the statements: “We feel among the well-offs”; “We are not 
rich, but we manage to live well”; “We are neither rich nor poor”; “We are among the 
poor”. The answers were combined in one variable measuring self-evaluated wealth. 
                                                 
22
 West Bank: Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm, Salfit, Qalqilya, Nablus, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, 
Hebron. Gaza: Gaza North, Gaza, Deir al Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah. 
23
 In the Palestinian case, regions can mean several things. Perhaps the most important division is between the 
West Bank and Gaza, as these areas are both physically and politically separated. Another common division in 
the literature on Palestinian regions is between the northern, central and southern part of the West Bank 
(Sønsterudbråten, 2009:75-76), and sometimes the North and South of Gaza. In this thesis, I operationalize the 
concept of regions as the 16 administrative units in the occupied Palestinian territories called governorates. The 
reason is two-fold. First, I find the governorates most closely resemble the concept of regions as administrative 
units applied by Østby et al. (2009). Second, to be able to conduct a two-level analysis to test the regional-level 
hypotheses, I need a certain amount of level-two units, for statistical reasons of possible overdetermination and 
bias. In any case, the difference between the larger regions, such as West Bank and Gaza, should be captured 
fairly well by the governorate variable. 
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The economic status of the entire household should work fairly well as a measure of 
economic grievances, but is less ideal for testing opportunity arguments. First, the mechanism 
of opportunity costs (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) relies on considerations of the future income 
an individual would have to forgo by choosing to participate in insurgency, so ideally I would 
want to measure personal income, not the economic status of the household as a whole. 
Second, the questionnaire design described earlier, with three thematic parts and usually two 
different respondents per household, means that the household questions were often not 
answered by the same person that was interviewed for the political attitude (RSI) part of the 
survey. This makes the advantages of having a measure of self-evaluated wealth less clear, 
given that the wealth evaluation of the person that answered household wealth question might 
differ from the evaluation of the person answering the questions about attitudes towards 
resistance. In cases where such evaluations differ, any mechanism of opportunity cost might 
not be captured by the wealth measure. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that in most 
households, members will assess the economic situation of the household fairly similarly.  
The variable has two important advantages, making it the best choice available. First, it 
overcomes issues of potential systematic measurement error due to short-term economic 
fluctuations that short-term income or consumption measures may suffer from (Øvensen, 
2006:9). Second, it measures perceived economic status. This is an advantage because it is the 
subjective perception of one’s own and others’ economic situation, rather than objective 
economic wealth, that underpins both the grievance and opportunity cost mechanisms I aim to 
test (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:564; Hirshleifer, 2001:25-31). The distribution of the variable 
is shown in Figure 4.2. 
For robustness testing, I construct a more objective wealth measure, an asset-based wealth 
index based on durable consumer goods and dwelling qualities. Its distribution is shown in 
Figure 4.3. Measuring income in developing countries is fraught with difficulties – including 
seasonal variability of earnings and the fact that large shares of income often stem from self-
employment (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:464). Combined with the frequent use of short reference 
periods for income questions in surveys and frequently changing labor market conditions, this 
indicates that we should use other questions than employment-related ones to measure the 
long-term economic situation of households (Øvensen, 2006:7). Income data are prone to 
systematic measurement error, usually due to underreporting, and they tend to fluctuate 
(Øvensen, 2006:9). The occupied Palestinian territories are particularly prone to income 
fluctuations because of Israeli checkpoints and blockades. Using an asset index to measure 
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long-term wealth in developing countries minimizes the problems of underreporting and 
fluctuations. Additional advantages are that assets in developing countries are fewer and easy 
to measure, and that problems connected to recall period and other forms of reporting bias are 
minimized (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:466). In short, the measure is even more long-term oriented 
than the self-reported economic status, while avoiding many of the drawbacks of self-reported 
current income or expenditures (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003).  
Figure 4.2: Self-evaluated wealth              Figure 4.3 Wealth index 
      
Notes: 1 – “Poor”; 2 – “Neither rich nor poor”;  
3 – “Not rich, but live well”; 4 – “Well-off”      
 
To test Hypothesis 1, I interact the wealth variables with education. To measure education I 
use a recoded version of the question “What is the most advanced education […] has 
COMPLETED”. Its distribution is shown in Figure 4.4. 
           Figure 4.4: Education 
 
Notes: 1 – “Never attended school”; 2 – “Never finished elementary”;  
3 – “Elementary”; 4 – “Intermediate”; 5 – “Secondary/Vocational”; 
6 – “Diploma/University” 
I measure perceived status of civil and political rights with a reversed version of the question 
“Everything considered, how would you rate the status of public freedom and human rights in 
47 
 
the West Bank and the Gaza strip? Would you say it is… 1.Very satisfactory/ 2.Satisfactory/ 
3.Poor/ 4.Very poor/ 5.DK/ 6.NA” (Fafo, 2011a). Its distribution is shown in Figure 4.5. The 
operationalization is not unproblematic. First, there is the problem of reference group. 
Different people may implicitly compare the human rights situation to different groups or to 
more abstract ideal situations. Given the conflict situation, however, it is not unreasonable to 
expect most Palestinians to compare their own rights to the rights of Israelis when asked the 
question. To the extent that this is the case, the relative aspect of relative deprivation is 
captured fairly well by the measure. 
            Figure 4.5: Civil and political rights status 
 
Notes: The status of public freedom and human rights is:  
1 – “Very poor”; 2 – “Poor”; 3 – “Satisfactory”;  
4 – “Very satisfactory” 
A more serious problem is that people might associate different things with the somewhat 
ambiguous term “human rights”. Some will include social and economic rights in this, others 
might not. This makes the content of the variable less clear and means that what I am able to 
actually measure might not overlap equally well with the theoretical concept of civil and 
political rights for all the individuals asked. This is a substantial challenge to the content 
validity of the measure. Still I would argue that the measure captures the concepts better than 
a similar questions about the ambiguous term “democracy” (open to even more 
interpretations) or questions about only freedom of expression (too narrow to capture the 
concept properly). For robustness testing I include a reversed version of the question 
“Everything considered, how would you rate the status of democracy in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip? Would you say it is ... 1.Very satisfactory/ 2.Satisfactory/ 3.Poor/ 4.Very poor 
(Fafo, 2011a)”. The relevant questions about freedom of expression are less suitable, as they 
were asked separately for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.       
48 
 
To measure horizontal inequality (HI) between Palestinians and Israelis in neighboring 
regions, I construct three measures – two alternatives for measuring economic and one for 
measuring social HIs. The first economic measure is an index of horizontal inequality 
between neighboring Palestinian and Israeli regions in ownership of a set of consumer 
durables. The reasons for using this alternative on the governorate level are similar to the 
reasons for using an asset index as a robustness test on the individual level. I use the result 
from the Israeli 2008 expenditure survey (CBS, 2010a: table 16) and the 2007 Palestinian 
census (PCBS, 2012b: table 18) to calculate the share of households in each Palestinian 
governorate and corresponding Israeli sub-district that had at least one refrigerator, 
microwave, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, phone line, car.
24
 I then construct a combined 
consumer durable measure by using a somewhat simplified version of the formula 
recommended by Østby (2008:151): 
HI = 1 –  
where M is the number of asset types (i) included in the index, Ai1 is the share of Palestinian 
households in each region that owns asset i, and Ai2  is the share of households in the 
corresponding Israeli sub-district that owns the same asset. Figure A.1 in Appendix 4 shows 
the distribution of governorates on this variable.  
The second economic measure compares household expenditure levels. For each Palestinian 
governorate, household expenditure is divided by household expenditure in the closest Israeli 
sub-district and subtracted from 1, using 2008 estimates for Israel (CBS, 2010a: table 9.2) and 
2009 estimates for the Palestinian territories (PCBS, 2010a: table 2.28).
25
 Figure A.2 in 
Appendix 4 shows the distribution of governorates on this variable.  
The third measure is more social in character. It measures horizontal inequality in educational 
attainment and is constructed using data from the 2007/2008 censuses (CBS, 2012b; PCBS, 
2012b) to estimate the share of the regional population with higher education (which in both 
countries means having completed 13 years of education or more) in Palestinian governorates 
and the corresponding Israeli sub-districts.
26
 A measure of social HIs is constructed by 
                                                 
24
 I exclude owning a tv, as many orthodox Jews choose not to buy them for religious reasons. 
25
 To make comparison possible I convert the consumption estimates into 2008 US dollars (American-Israeli 
Cooperative Enterprise, 2012a, 2012b). 
26
 The Palestinian estimates are calculated from the total population aged above 10, while the corresponding 
Israeli estimates use the total population aged above 15. 
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subtracting the Palestinian estimate divided by the Israeli estimate from 1. Figure A.3 in 
Appendix 4 shows the distribution of governorates on this variable.  
4.3.2 Opportunity cost 
When testing Hypothesis 4, I use the measures of household wealth described for Hypothesis 
1 – self-evaluated wealth as the main indicator and wealth index as a robustness test. Using 
household level measures to test the individual-oriented opportunity cost mechanism is not 
ideal, but as discussed in Section 4.3.1, this is the best alternative available in my dataset. The 
variable also has the advantage of measuring subjectively perceived economic status. 
To test whether absolute level of regional wealth affects individual attitudes towards 
resistance (Hypothesis 5), I include a variable measuring the average per capita monthly 
expenditure in each Palestinian governorate in 2010 (PCBS, 2011b: table 2.30). For 
robustness testing, I construct two alternative variables. First, a measure of average daily 
wage for Palestinian wage workers by governorate (PCBS, 2012a: table 18). Second, a 
consumer durable index measuring the share of household in each governorate that owned at 
least one refrigerator, microwave, washing machine, vacuum cleaner, phone line, and car in 
2007 (PCBS, 2012b: table 18).  
4.3.3 Controls 
Governorate level 
An important variable to control for is the intensity of the conflict, which is often measured as 
the number of casualties. Gartner (2008:96) has argued that level of recent casualties in times 
of war affect both mass opinion and individual attitudes. He found that both higher monthly 
casualties and increasing casualty trends negatively affected support for military action 
(Gartner, 2008:103). This is often referred to as the “body bag effect”. He also emphasized 
that monthly casualties lack clear meaning without the context of casualty trends. Casualty 
trends are very important when individuals decide whether or not to support military action, 
as their cost-benefit analysis involves projecting future losses from previous trends (Gartner, 
2008:97). It is crucial to hold such trends constant when examining the effect of recent 
casualty levels.  
The opposite argument was made by Jaeger, Klor, Miaari, and Paserman (2008). They found 
that during the Second Intifada, Israeli violence against Palestinians had a radicalizing effect 
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on their attitudes towards the conflict. The effect was temporary – it disappeared after ninety 
days. It was also stronger the more geographically proximal the casualties. This would lead us 
to expect a positive effect of an increasing regional casualty trend, as opposed to the negative 
effect expected by Gartner. In any case, the intensity of the conflict, as measured by casualties 
and casualty trend, should be controlled for, as it can be expected to affect both support for 
resistance and independent variables like wealth (Justino, 2009:320).  
I use casualty data from the “protection of civilians” database of the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to measure intensity. I operationalize the 
concept on the regional level, by measuring how many Palestinians were reported killed in 
each governorate (by the IDF, Israeli border police, police, private security forces, Israeli non-
settlers or settlers) in incidents directly or indirectly related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
in the period 01.02.2010-31.01.2011 (OCHA-oPt, 2012). I also include a simple trend 
variable measuring how the casualty count differed for January 2011 as compared to 
December 2010 in each governorate.
27
  As robustness checks, I use proxies for conflict 
intensity based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), even though 
the definitions and sources used for these statistics are neither very clear nor well-
documented. The first variable measures the percentage of households in each governorate 
that have been “exposed to violence from Israeli occupation forces and settlers during the 
period that proceeded July/ 2010” (PCBS, 2012c: table 19).28 The second variable measures 




As a third governorate-level control variable, I include the proportion of young men (age 15-
29) residing in each governorate. This is relevant for a strand of opportunity arguments 
pertaining to potential for recruitment. The idea is that a larger pool of young men makes 
recruitment easier for insurgents (Collier et al., 2009:22). It has been tested on the national 
level, but should be transferable to regional circumstances as well. It can also be argued that 
youth bulges can cause grievances, however, because the expansion in education that often 
                                                 
27
 Three people were killed in Gaza North in the period when interviews were taking place (February) – so the 
negative trend variable probably gives the wrong impression for this governorate. In the other governorates 
nobody was killed in the period 01.02-21.02.2011, so the variable should capture the trend well. 
28
 Definition: “a form of violence against the husband or wife or children, whether they are males or females or 
any family members by occupation or settlers and it includes several forms, martyrdom, injury, beatings, arrests, 
raids, demolitions of a family members.” (PCBS, 2012c:40). 
29
 E-mail correspondence with Fafo employees in the Palestinian territories with contacts in the PCBS indicate 
that any Palestinian killed by an Israeli is considered a martyr, including Palestinians that are shot by settlers or 
die in prison. 
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follows a youth bulge cannot easily be matched by a corresponding expansion in employment 
opportunities, and therefore often results in a large pool of young unemployed and frustrated 
people experiencing relative deprivation (Urdal, 2004:2-3). The corresponding opportunity 
cost argument would be that the less likely people are to get a job, the more likely they are to 
engage in violent conflict, because they have less to loose when income-earning possibilities 
are low. It can also be combined with a more general opportunity argument, stating that youth 
are more available to participate in violent conflict, both because they are more easily drawn 
to new ideas and have a natural urge for change, and because they have fewer responsibilities 
for both families and careers (Urdal, 2004:5).  
Demographic controls 
An individual’s position in the political landscape might be expected to influence his or her 
attitudes, and the political platforms of Palestinian parties are closely linked to the armed 
resistance debate (Sønsterudbråten, 2009:32). Attitudinal studies have suggested that Fatah 
supporters are more supportive of a conciliatory line and peace negotiation (Shamir & 
Shikaki, 2002:197). Hamas supporters have been found to be more supportive of rocket attack 
and Fatah supporters are less supportive of such attacks than those that will not vote 
(Sønsterudbråten, 2009:59-60). When controlling for political affiliation I use the question 
“Who would you vote for today?”. Due to low levels of support for parties other than Hamas 
and Fatah I include them all in the category “Others” and recode my variable to include 
dummy variables for the categories “Fatah”; “Hamas”; “Others”; “Don’t know”; and “Will 
not participate in the election”. “Will not participate in the election” serves as the reference 
category. The less than clear-cut causality of this relationship is discussed in Section 6.4.  
Sønsterudbråten (2009:55) found that higher perceived personal security was associated with 
higher support for rocket attacks, as people who feel secure have better prospects to handle 
potential consequences of resistance. I therefore control for perceived security with the 
question “Do you generally feel that you, your family and properties are safe” (Fafo, 2011a). 
I also control for gender. Sønsterudbråten (2009:55) found that women were more supportive 
of rocket attacks than men, somewhat contrary to what one might expect due to earlier 
findings of women in general being less supportive of the use of force in foreign policy (Fite, 
Genest, & Wilcox, 1990) and Palestinian women being more supportive of peace than men 
(Nachtwey & Tessler, 2002:277). Lundervold (2012:54), on the other hand, found that women 
52 
 
are significantly more likely than men to support non-violent resistance only rather than 
support neither violence nor non-violence. 
It is often assumed that young people are more radical than older people. Tessler and Robbins 
(2007:322) found that support for terrorism decreased with age in Jordan and Algeria. I 
therefore control for age, expecting younger respondents to be more supportive of violent 
resistance. In some studies, however, the effect of age has been found to disappear when 
education is brought into the equation. Somewhat counter-intuitively, higher education has 
been found to decrease support for reconciliation (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002:194). Employment 
status may also influence attitudes. Sønsterudbråten (2009:59) found that the unemployed 
were more supportive of rocket attack than the working. Shikaki (1996:6) has argued that 
students is the most hardline group in the Palestinian community. To control for both students 
and unemployment I recode the employment status variable B13 into dummy variables, 
representing the categories “Working”, “Attending school”, “Housewife”, “Unemployed” and 
“Other”, with “Working” as the reference category.  
Finally, whether a respondent is living in an urban or rural area or a refugee camp might 
affect support for violence, particularly because refugee camps can become breeding grounds 
for militancy. Socio-economic explanations often involve poor living conditions combined 
with a large number of young men (Lischer, 2005:9). I therefore control for type of living area 
(“Urban”; “Rural”; “Camp”). Whether the respondent has refugee status is likely to affect the 
intensity of his or her feelings towards the conflict, and is controlled for by a dichotomous 
variable.  
4.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for individual-level and governorate-level variables are shown in Table 
4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. For interpretation purposes and to minimize potential 
problems of multicollinearity, I standardize all non-dichotomous independent variables so that 
their means equal zero and their standard deviations equal one.
30
 The governorate 
distributions of governorate-level variables are shown in Table 4.4 and the distribution of 
governorates on the dependent variable in Table 4.5. 
        
                                                 
30
 Descriptive statistics for the unstandardized variables for imputations and the unimputed dataset are available 
in Appendix 1. 
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       Table 4.1: Individual-level variables 
 
         
              Table 4.2: Governorate-level variables  
 
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Explanatory
Self-evaluated wealth 1805 0 1 -1.45 2.51
Civil and political rights 1805 0 1 -1.34 2.52
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah 1805 .314 .464 0 1
Political affiliation: Hamas 1805 .122 .327 0 1
Political affiliation: Other 1805 .086 .280 0 1
Political affiliation: Will not participate 1805 .353 .477 0 1
Political affiliation: Don't know 1805 .125 .331 0 1
Personal security: Feel safe 1805 .684 .465 0 1
Gender: Woman 1805 .541 .498 0 1
Age 1805 0 1 -1.25 3.88
Education completed 1805 0 1 -1.05 1.22
Employment status: Working 1805 .260 .439 0 1
Employment status: Attending school 1805 .121 .326 0 1
Employment status: Housewife 1805 .407 .491 0 1
Employment status: Unemployed 1805 .134 .341 0 1
Employment status: Other 1805 .077 .267 0 1
Living area: Urban 1805 .408 .491 0 1
Living area: Rural 1805 .262 .440 0 1
Living area: Refugee camp 1805 .330 .470 0 1
Refugee 1805 .590 .492 0 1
Robustness tests
Support for rocket attacks 1805 0 1 -1.50 1.53
Resistance attitude index 1805 0 1 -2.80 3.36
Wealth index 1805 0 1 -2.61 3.90
Human rights situation 1805 0 1 -1.23 2.65
Note: Non-dichotomous variables are standardized.
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Explanatory
HI durables index 1805 0 1 -1.84 1.49
HI household expenditure 1805 0 1 -2.80 1.10
HI education 1805 0 1 -2.30 2.52
Regional expenditure level 1805 0 1 -0.82 2.96
Controls
Per capita casualties 1805 0 1 -1.05 2.69
Casualty trend 1805 0 1 -2.89 1.22
Proportion of young men 1805 0 1 -2.66 1.16
Robustness tests
Household durables index 1805 0 1 -1.47 2.01
Wage level 1805 0 1 -1.28 2.50
Exposure to Israeli violence 1805 0 1 -3.16 1.46
Per capita martyrs 1805 0 1 -1.32 1.96
Note: All variables are standardized.
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Table 4.3: Distribution of governorates on governorate-level variables 
 
 
                  Table 4.4: Distribution of governorates on dependent variable 
 
4.4 Statistical models 
Because my dependent variable is categorical, I use a multinominal logit regression model. I 
first construct a one-level model using the individual level variables only, then add the 
governorate-level variables in a random intercept two-level model.  
Governorate HI expenditure HI durables HI education Expenditure level Casualties Casualty trend Young men
Jenin 0.51 0.45 0.68 136.5 0.000004 1 0.14
Tubas 0.51 0.50 0.66 133.9 0.000040 2 0.13
Tulkarm 0.64 0.43 0.66 159.4 0.000006 0 0.14
Nablus 0.62 0.39 0.68 191.2 0.000016 1 0.14
Qalqilia 0.63 0.46 0.79 167.5 0.000000 0 0.14
Salfit 0.67 0.43 0.75 167.5 0.000017 0 0.14
Ramallah 0.53 0.32 0.66 195.0 0.000007 1 0.13
Jericho 0.46 0.43 0.80 133.9 0.000000 0 0.12
Jerusalem 0.35 0.41 0.72 284.3 0.000014 0 0.12
Bethlehem 0.55 0.35 0.72 138.3 0.000015 0 0.14
Hebron 0.62 0.40 0.74 125.5 0.000067 2 0.14
Gaza North 0.56 0.52 0.72 100.3 0.000020 -1 0.15
Gaza 0.68 0.40 0.66 106.8 0.000035 0 0.14
Deir Al Balah 0.68 0.52 0.57 101.7 0.000102 -6 0.15
Khan Yunis 0.70 0.54 0.66 97.7 0.000044 -3 0.15
Rafah 0.62 0.54 0.64 104.8 0.000035 0 0.14
Notes: Unstandardized variables. The HI variables are measured from 0 to 1, with increacing values indicating increasing 
inequality. Expenditure level is measured in Jordanian Dinars (JOD). Casualties are measured per capita and the casualty 





only Both Neither Percent
Jenin 46.0 14.9 27.6 11.5 100
Tubas 35.5 29.0 16.1 19.4 100
Tulkarm 37.4 31.9 24.2 6.6 100
Nablus 33.1 29.1 29.1 8.8 100
Qalqilia 41.2 11.8 26.5 20.6 100
Salfit 50.0 27.3 18.2 4.5 100
Ramallah 34.9 34.9 22.0 8.3 100
Jericho 30.8 35.9 20.5 12.8 100
Jerusalem 47.3 24.1 17.0 11.6 100
Bethlehem 65.7 17.1 11.4 5.7 100
Hebron 52.1 34.4 8.0 5.5 100
Gaza North 51.6 19.8 20.3 8.3 100
Gaza 48.9 24.3 16.9 9.9 100
Deir Al Balah 51.7 16.7 18.3 13.3 100
Khan Yunis 36.4 33.3 21.6 8.6 100
Rafah 25.9 42.0 27.7 4.5 100
Notes: Row percentages reported.
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4.4.1 Mulitnominal logistic regression 
The dependent variable of this study is categorical. When the dependent variable is not 
interval-scaled logistic regression is more suitable than OLS. Logistic regression is based on 
odds and odds ratio (=relative measures of effect). The odds of an outcome is given by the 
probability of the outcome occurring divided by the probability of the same outcome not 
occurring ( 
 
   
 ). Odds ratios are relative odds (  
 
   
   
 
   
  ). In logistic regression the odds 
are transformed into logits by applying the natural logarithm, to achieve an unbounded scale, 
so as to be able to use a linear regression model (Skog, 2005:355-361). The logit estimates the 
regression produces have no intuitive interpretation, so we usually interpret the odds ratios 
(the antilogarithm of the regression coefficients) instead (Skog, 2005:362-363). Each odds 
ratio estimate measures the relative difference in odds on the dependent variable that 
corresponds to a difference of one unit of measurement on the independent variable in 
question (Skog, 2005:369). These are relative rather than absolute measures of effect. 
In this study a multinominal logistic regression model is required. The dependent variable 
index has four categories, with no natural ordering. This precludes binominal and ordinal 
logistic regression models, respectively. As the dependent variable has more than two 
categories, several different odds can be calculated. In a multinominal logistic regression 
model we therefore have to choose a baseline category, to be able to calculate baseline-
category odds and baseline-category logits (Hegre, 2011:29-30). We are estimating not only 
one equation, but one equation for each category relative to the baseline category (Hegre, 
2011:31). In this study the dependent variable has four categories. It follows that three 
equations are estimated, resulting in three sets of coefficients to interpret. If the A possible 
dependent variable categories (alternatives) are indexed by a = (1, …, A), and X represents all 
independent variables, the probability of an individual i choosing category f is given by 
Pr(fi)  =  exp(Vi
f





 +  b1
f 
X) / ∑      exp(b0
a
 +  b1
a 




is a linear predictor for category a, consisting of an intercept b0
a
 and a coefficient 
b1
a 
describing the slope of X. One such equation is estimated for each category except the 
baseline category, which in this case means three equations. I choose the category “support 
for non-violence only” as baseline category, as I am particularly interested in what separates 
those that support violent resistance from those that only support non-violence. 
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4.4.2 Multilevel analysis 
The governorate-level variables measure characteristics of the governorates rather than of 
individuals. The individuals are grouped or nested within governorates. Simply including 
governorate-level variables in a regular one-level model would be problematic for two 
reasons. First, I would be using too many degrees of freedom by using individual-level 
degrees of freedom to evaluate a governorate level coefficient. The standard errors of 
regression coefficients are likely to be inflated (Bickel, 2007:145), thus increasing the 
probability of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis (Bickel, 2007:110). Second, I might 
be violating the preconditions of independent observations and uncorrelated residuals, to the 
degree that a significant part of the variability of in the dependent variable is accounted for 
simply by the fact that individuals are grouped within governorates. Nesting of individuals 
within governorates might give rise to a consequential degree of homogeneity among 
individuals within each governorate. Because the correlation among residuals implied by this 
is not temporally patterned, but rather occasioned by a nominal-level variable, time series 
procedures cannot fix the problem (Bickel, 2007:111). Instead a random coefficient or 
multilevel regression model is necessary to deal with the intraclass correlation (Bickel, 
2007:112).  
By permitting coefficients to vary across groups, random coefficient models acknowledge that 
homogeneity caused by nesting may give rise to varying intercepts and slopes (Bickel, 
2007:105). We may then construct intervals to enable estimating how much coefficients vary 
across groups due to this nesting-engendered homogeneity (Ibid:106). The model becomes a 
multilevel model once we add contextual variables in order to explain the group-to-group 
variability in intercepts and slopes (Bickel, 2007:105-106). 
I choose a model with a random intercept only. This is most relevant for my hypotheses 
because I am interested in the variability of the intercept and have no theoretical reason to 
expect variability in slopes and cross-level interaction between the level one and level two 
variables in my model. For a model of i individuals and j governorates, the level one linear 
predictor can be specified as: 
  Vi
a




 X1 +  eij      (4.2) 
where b0j
a 
 represents the now random and therefore governorate-specific intercept, b1
a
 the 
fixed slope of X1 and eij the individual- and governorate-specific residual. When including 
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level two contextual variables Z in the random intercept model we can specify the level two 







 Z1 + u0j
a
   




a   
is the fixed component of the random intercept,  g01
a 
the fixed slope of level two 
variable Z1 and u0j
a
 is the governorate-specific level two residual. Combining the two levels, 








 Z1 + g10
a
 X1 +  ( eij + u0j
a 
)    (4.4) 
 





To estimate a two-level multinominal logistic multilevel model the basic multilevel model 
must be combined with the multinominal logistic model described above. In the multilevel 
multinominal logistic model, the probability of an individual choosing category f is specified 
as  




 Z1 + g10
f




 Z1 + g10
a
 X1 ) (4.5) 
One such equation and corresponding intercept variance is estimated for each dependent 
variable category except the baseline category. To execute the analysis, I use the Stata 
program for Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (“gllamm”), written by Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh (2003). The program provides maximum likelihood estimation “using 
adaptive quadrature to approximate the integrals involved” (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2008:248).  
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have outlined the research design of the study. I first presented the main 
dataset and its sampling and weights, and then described how I have dealt with missing data 
by using multiple imputation. Second, I presented operationalizations of the theoretical 
concepts in my model. I discussed potential challenges to content validity and presented 
summary statistics and distributions for central variables. Finally, I described the statistical 
models I intend to apply in the analysis. In the following chapter I conduct the analysis and 




In this chapter I conduct the analysis and discuss the results. My findings indicate support for 
the grievance theory. In particular the strands of grievance theory that emphasize the group 
comparison element seem to contribute a great deal to explanations of support for violent 
resistance. Hypothesis 1, that highly educated individuals in the lower economic segments are 
more likely to support violent resistance, is not supported. But the hypotheses most clearly 
operationalizing the mechanism of political and economic horizontal inequality are 
confirmed. The better an individual considers the civil and political rights situation 
(Hypothesis 2) and the larger the difference in economic conditions between the individual’s 
own governorate and the closest Israeli sub-district (Hypothesis 3), the more likely he or she 
is to support violent resistance. Opportunity factors seem unimportant in explaining attitudinal 
support for violence. Neither coming from a less wealthy household (Hypothesis 4) nor a less 
wealthy governorate (Hypothesis 5) significantly increases support for violent resistance 
among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
5.1 Results 
5.1.1 The multinominal logistic model (Model 1) 
Model 1 is a one-level multinominal logistic regression model including only the level-one 
variables. The results are reported in Table 5.1. The only explanatory variable that appears to 
have a significant effect on support for violence is the civil and political rights status variable. 
A difference of one standard deviation on this variable corresponds to a 21 percent decrease in 
the odds for supporting only violent resistance rather than only non-violent resistance. The 
effect is significant at the 5 percent level. This lends preliminary support to the relative 
deprivation argument of Hypothesis 2, the proposition that lower perceived status of civil and 
political rights is associated with higher levels of support for violent resistance.
31
 The 
                                                 
31
 What makes this finding particularly interesting is that it differs from the result of Lundervold (2012:54), who 
used the same dataset and the same operationalization of civil and political rights status and support for 
resistance. This is most likely due to the fact that we control for different variables – either she controls for 
something that makes this effect go away because it was spurious or I control for something that makes it come 
out. It seems most likely that I have omitted variable bias and that one of her variables makes the effect 
disappear, because the effect is significant even in a bivariate multinominal model and in the unimputed dataset 
– it is even stronger and more significant in both of these bivariate tests, suggesting OVB that some of the 
variables I later introduce lessen. Of the variables Lundervold controls for that are not included in my model, 
trust in the political leadership and nationalism seem like the most likely candidates to be responsible for omitted 
variable bias in my model. But including them in my model does not make the effect of civil and political rights 
disappear.   
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perceived status of civil and political rights does not, however, significantly affect the odds of 
supporting neither form of resistance or both forms of resistance rather than non-violence 
only. 
Table 5.1: Model 1 – Multinominal logistic regression model 
 
The economic explanatory variables were chosen specifically to be able to separate the 
mechanisms of economic grievances from economic opportunities in the analysis, but neither 
of them seems to have any discernible effect on support for resistance.  
The only control variable that is significant across all dependent variable categories is the 
political affiliation variable. It is clear from the estimates in Table 5.1 that stating that one 
would vote for Fatah if there was an election today is highly correlated with supporting non-
violent resistance only. Supporting Hamas rather than Fatah corresponds to a higher odds for 
being in all other dependent variable categories – for supporting violence only, supporting 
exp(b) z exp(b) z exp(b) z
Intercept 0.12*** (-3.44) 0.04 0.40 0.54 (-1.41) 0.23 1.27 0.26** (-2.23) 0.08 0.85
Grievances
Wealth*education 0.77 (-0.60) 0.33 1.79 0.99 (-0.02) 0.39 2.49 0.42 (-1.37) 0.12 1.45
Civil and political rights 0.79** (-2.30) 0.65 0.97 1.02 ( 0.18) 0.82 1.27 0.80 (-1.57) 0.61 1.06
Opportunity
Self-evaluated wealth 1.27 ( 0.86) 0.73 2.20 0.99 (-0.03) 0.53 1.85 1.84 ( 1.45) 0.81 4.19
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah
Political affiliation: Hamas 9.87*** ( 6.94) 5.17 18.86 3.86*** ( 4.09) 2.02 7.37 4.26*** ( 3.63) 1.95 9.34
Political affiliation: Other 4.10*** ( 4.27) 2.15 7.82 1.82* ( 1.76) 0.94 3.55 1.51 ( 0.89) 0.61 3.71
Political affiliation: Will not participate 4.22*** ( 4.97) 2.39 7.45 2.44*** ( 3.56) 1.49 3.97 1.35 ( 0.88) 0.69 2.63
Political affiliation: Don't know 4.18*** ( 4.61) 2.28 7.67 2.29*** ( 2.77) 1.27 4.13 1.39 ( 1.00) 0.73 2.66
Personal security: Feel safe 0.82 (-0.95) 0.54 1.24 0.63** (-2.42) 0.44 0.92 1.25 ( 0.59) 0.60 2.57
Gender: Woman 0.81 (-0.70) 0.45 1.46 1.39 ( 1.03) 0.74 2.60 0.47 (-1.60) 0.19 1.19
Age 0.92 (-0.73) 0.74 1.15 0.97 (-0.23) 0.75 1.25 1.08 ( 0.57) 0.82 1.43
Education completed 0.99 (-0.04) 0.57 1.71 1.03 ( 0.11) 0.61 1.75 1.63 ( 1.17) 0.72 3.72
Employment status: Working
Employment status: Attending school 0.94 (-0.17) 0.47 1.87 1.25 ( 0.67) 0.65 2.38 1.11 ( 0.24) 0.49 2.52
Employment status: Housewife 1.20 ( 0.51) 0.60 2.38 0.84 (-0.58) 0.45 1.53 1.55 ( 0.88) 0.58 4.14
Employment status: Unemployed 1.27 ( 0.75) 0.68 2.38 1.32 ( 0.80) 0.67 2.63 0.70 (-0.64) 0.23 2.09
Employment status: Other 0.86 (-0.41) 0.42 1.78 1.05 ( 0.13) 0.50 2.21 0.32 (-1.63) 0.08 1.26
Living area: Urban
Living area: Rural 0.96 (-0.14) 0.54 1.70 0.99 (-0.03) 0.56 1.75 1.08 ( 0.21) 0.50 2.33
Living area: Refugee camp 1.39 ( 1.22) 0.82 2.36 1.38 ( 1.23) 0.83 2.29 0.97 (-0.09) 0.51 1.85
Refugee status 0.76 (-1.23) 0.50 1.17 1.04 ( 0.16) 0.64 1.70 1.07 ( 0.19) 0.53 2.17
Observations
Violence only Both Neither





Notes: Dependent variable reference category "Non-violence only". z-values in parantheses. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 
level are marked with *, ** or ***, respectively. Continous variables are standardized. All independent variables are on the individual 
level. Governorate dummies are controlled for but not reported in table.
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both forms of resistance or supporting neither form of resistance. Supporting other parties 
than the two dominant ones, answering “don’t know” or not wanting to participate in election 
rather than supporting Fatah also increases the odds for supporting violence only or both 
forms of resistance significantly, though to a lesser degree.  
Having the feeling that one and one’s family are generally safe corresponds to a significantly 
reduced odds of supporting both forms of resistance rather than only non-violence. None of 
the other control variables are found to significantly affect support for violent resistance. This 
is particularly surprising, given that many of these have been firmly established in the 
literature in general and the Palestinian context in particular. 
The governorate dummies are not reported in the table, but several of them are highly 
significant.
32
 In line with the findings of Sønsterudbråten (2009), there are significant regional 
differences in support for resistance that the individual-level explanatory variables cannot 
account for. It therefore makes sense to extend the model to a multilevel model to be able to 
quantify and attempt to explain the governorate-level variance.  
In sum, the results for the explanatory variables in this preliminary model suggest that what 
affects support for violent resistance most is relative political deprivation and that the 
economic aspects of both deprivation and opportunity are not important for determining 
support for resistance in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at this point. 
5.1.2 Random intercept model (Model 2) 
Model 2, as shown in Table 5.2, is a random intercept model.
33
 The model is identical to the 
simple multinominal model (Model 1) except that intercepts are allowed to vary across 
governorates. Results remain pretty much the same as in Model 1. Higher perceived status of 
political and civil rights still appears to reduce the risk of supporting violence only rather than 
non-violence only. Effects of supporting other parties than Fatah, in general, and Hamas, in 
particular, are still significant across the board. The effects of both variables are still strong, 
but they become a little smaller when intercepts are allowed to vary across governorates. The 
largest difference between Models 1 and Model 2 is that being a woman rather than a man or 
having the employment status “other” rather than “working”, both significantly reduce the 
                                                 
32
 Governorate dummies are reported in table A.7 in Appendix 6. 
33
 The gllamm program is not supported by the Stata command for estimation in multiply imputed datasets. I 
therefore run the analysis on each of the five imputed dataset and combine the results myself. The procedure is 
described in detail in Appendix 5. 
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odds of supporting neither form of resistance rather than non-violence only in Model 2. 
Employment status “other” also affects the risk of supporting violence only rather than non-
violence only, though to a smaller degree.  
Table 5.2: Model 2 – Random intercept model 
 
For the outcome “violence only”, the fixed part of the random intercept, 0.35, is the expected 
odds that an individual with zero on all dummy variables and mean value on all other 
variables will support violent resistance only, rather than non-violent resistance only, when all 
independent variables in the model are held constant. It is a weighted average over all 
governorates. The random component of the intercept, the level-two (governorate-level) 
variance, has a logit-form value of .13 and a standard error of .066. It is statistically 
exp(b) z exp(b) z exp(b) z
Intercept 0.35*** (-4.21) 0.22 0.57 0.29*** (-4.70) 0.17 0.48 0.20*** (-4.72) 0.10 0.39
Grievances
Wealth*education 0.81 (-0.64) 0.43 1.53 1.13 ( 0.37) 0.58 2.22 0.65 (-0.86) 0.24 1.74
Civil and political rights 0.84** (-2.34) 0.72 0.97 0.98 (-0.28) 0.85 1.13 0.86 (-1.62) 0.71 1.03
Opportunity
Self-evaluated wealth 1.12 ( 0.51) 0.72 1.74 0.89 (-0.50) 0.56 1.42 1.28 ( 0.72) 0.65 2.54
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah
Political affiliation: Hamas 7.80*** ( 8.64) 4.90 12.43 3.80*** ( 5.00) 2.25 6.40 4.00*** ( 4.27) 2.12 7.57
Political affiliation: Other 3.33*** ( 4.64) 2.00 5.54 1.86** ( 2.27) 1.09 3.18 1.56 ( 1.18) 0.74 3.27
Political affiliation: Not participate 2.73*** ( 4.87) 1.82 4.09 2.02*** ( 3.92) 1.42 2.88 1.33 ( 1.16) 0.82 2.14
Political affiliation: Don't know 3.00*** ( 5.00) 1.95 4.61 2.13*** ( 3.14) 1.33 3.41 1.58 ( 1.38) 0.82 3.04
Personal security: Feel safe 0.88 (-0.86) 0.65 1.18 0.75* (-1.95) 0.56 1.00 1.29 ( 1.05) 0.80 2.09
Gender: Woman 0.78 (-1.19) 0.51 1.18 1.33 ( 1.32) 0.87 2.02 0.56* (-1.71) 0.29 1.09
Age 0.95 (-0.71) 0.81 1.10 0.93 (-0.83) 0.78 1.11 1.12 ( 0.98) 0.89 1.41
Education completed 1.05 ( 0.25) 0.71 1.54 0.90 (-0.50) 0.60 1.35 1.46 ( 1.18) 0.78 2.72
Employment status: Working
Employment status: Student 0.86 (-0.57) 0.52 1.43 0.93 (-0.25) 0.56 1.57 1.00 (-0.01) 0.48 2.06
Employment status: Housewife 1.01 ( 0.04) 0.63 1.63 0.72 (-1.27) 0.44 1.19 1.29 ( 0.71) 0.63 2.64
Employment status: Unemployed 0.85 (-0.70) 0.55 1.33 0.90 (-0.42) 0.56 1.46 0.67 (-1.19) 0.34 1.30
Employment status: Other 0.61* (-1.72) 0.35 1.07 0.85 (-0.54) 0.47 1.53 0.21*** (-2.86) 0.07 0.61
Living area: Urban
Living area: Rural 0.97 (-0.16) 0.70 1.35 1.08 ( 0.37) 0.73 1.60 0.98 (-0.08) 0.61 1.57
Living area: Refugee camp 1.26 ( 1.31) 0.89 1.77 1.20 ( 0.97) 0.83 1.74 0.84 (-0.64) 0.49 1.43




Violence only Both Neither
Conf.int.95% Conf.int.95% Conf.int.95%
Notes: Dependent variable reference category "Non-violence only". z-values in parentheses. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 
level marked with *, ** or ***, respectively. Grouping variable "governorate". All independent variables are on the individual level. 









significant on the 5 percent level, indicating that intercepts do in fact vary between 
governorates.  
To get a better idea of the amount of variation, I construct a variance interval for the intercept. 
The random component variance for the intercept is normally distributed when in logitform, 
so 95 percent of the distribution should be included in an interval covering 1.96 standard 
deviations above and below the mean (Bickel, 2007:123). In this case the mean is the fixed 
component of the intercept. To estimate the variance interval correctly, I need to use the logit-
form estimate of the intercept. I can then find the odds-form interval by calculating the 
antilogarithm of the upper and lower boundary of the logit-form interval. The logit-form of 
the fixed component of the intercept is -1.05. Following the description of Bickel (2007:123), 
I use the square root of the intercept variance (the random component) as standard deviation. 
The square root of 0.13 is 0.36. Thus, I use the intercept estimate of -1.05 and the standard 
deviation of 0.36 to calculate a logit-form 95 percent variance interval for the intercept. The 
interval is defined by -1.05 ± 1.96 × 0.36, giving a lower boundary of -1.75 and an upper 
boundary of -0.34. Translating this into odds I conclude that the intercept for 95 percent of 
governorates lie between an odds of 0.17 and one of 0.71. The magnitude of this variation is 
best interpreted in comparison with the magnitudes of the effects estimated in the model. In 
this case a variance interval width off more than .50 is clearly of substantial interest when 
compared to the effect of civil and political rights and employment status, but less so in the 
case of political affiliation.    
5.1.3 The full two-level model (Model 3) 
The statistically and substantially significant variation in intercepts across governorates makes 
it all the more interesting to include governorate-level variables to try to account for this 
variation. This is done in Model 3 and results are displayed in Table 5.3, by introducing 
governorate-level variables measuring horizontal inequality in household durables, 
expenditure and education, the absolute expenditure level, per capita casualties the previous 
year, casualty trend the previous two months and the proportion of young men in each 
governorate.  
In the following discussion I primarily interpret the results for the category “Violence only”, 
which is the category I am most interested in comparing to the base outcome of “Non-
violence only”. For this outcome the variables measuring horizontal inequality in household 
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durables and expenditure, the casualty trend and the proportion of young men have 
statistically significant effects. Horizontal inequality in education, absolute expenditure level 
and per capita casualties appear statistically insignificant. I consider it a given that all effect 
estimates are controlled for the other independent variables, and will not point this out in each 
specific interpretation. 
Table 5.3: Model 3 – Full two-level model 
 
 
exp(b) z exp(b) z exp(b) z
Intercept 0.31*** (-4.90) 0.20 0.50 0.27*** (-5.04) 0.16 0.45 0.19*** (-5.18) 0.10 0.35
Grievances
[1] Wealth*education 0.81 (-0.64) 0.43 1.54 1.11 ( 0.29) 0.56 2.17 0.65 (-0.88) 0.25 1.71
[1] Civil and political rights 0.83** (-2.37) 0.72 0.97 0.97 (-0.36) 0.85 1.12 0.86 (-1.62) 0.71 1.03
[2] HI durables index 1.52*** ( 3.31) 1.19 1.95 1.52*** ( 3.22) 1.18 1.96 1.32 ( 1.60) 0.94 1.85
[2] HI household expenditure 1.76*** ( 3.04) 1.22 2.53 1.20 ( 1.01) 0.84 1.71 1.17 ( 0.69) 0.75 1.85
[2] HI education 0.93 (-0.69) 0.75 1.15 0.79** (-2.15) 0.63 0.98 0.94 (-0.43) 0.72 1.24
Opportunity
[1] Self-evaluated wealth 1.12 ( 0.50) 0.72 1.76 0.91 (-0.40) 0.57 1.45 1.27 ( 0.71) 0.65 2.48
[2] Regional expenditure level 1.16 ( 1.05) 0.88 1.54 1.17 ( 0.94) 0.85 1.60 1.06 ( 0.35) 0.75 1.51
Controls
[1] Political affiliation: Fatah
[1] Political affiliation: Hamas 8.03*** ( 8.74) 5.03 12.80 3.79*** ( 5.02) 2.25 6.37 4.02*** ( 4.43) 2.17 7.45
[1] Political affiliation: Other 3.34*** ( 4.55) 1.98 5.61 1.82** ( 2.20) 1.07 3.10 1.53 ( 1.11) 0.72 3.24
[1] Political affiliation: Not participate 2.82*** ( 5.06) 1.89 4.20 2.00*** ( 3.88) 1.41 2.85 1.26 ( 0.92) 0.77 2.04
[1] Political affiliation: Don't know 2.94*** ( 4.91) 1.91 4.53 2.18*** ( 3.28) 1.37 3.47 1.54 ( 1.27) 0.79 2.97
[1] Personal security: Feel safe 0.89 (-0.71) 0.66 1.21 0.76* (-1.83) 0.56 1.02 1.34 ( 1.21) 0.84 2.13
[1] Gender: Woman 0.78 (-1.15) 0.51 1.19 1.32 ( 1.28) 0.86 2.00 0.55* (-1.74) 0.29 1.08
[1] Education completed 0.95 (-0.68) 0.81 1.11 0.92 (-0.94) 0.77 1.10 1.12 ( 0.98) 0.89 1.41
[1] Education completed 1.05 ( 0.26) 0.71 1.55 0.91 (-0.45) 0.61 1.37 1.47 ( 1.23) 0.80 2.72
[1] Employment status: Working
[1] Employment status: Student 0.85 (-0.62) 0.52 1.41 0.95 (-0.21) 0.56 1.59 1.02 ( 0.05) 0.49 2.10
[1] Employment status: Housewife 1.01 ( 0.04) 0.62 1.64 0.73 (-1.22) 0.45 1.21 1.31 ( 0.74) 0.64 2.68
[1] Employment status: Unemployed 0.87 (-0.61) 0.56 1.36 0.92 (-0.36) 0.57 1.48 0.70 (-1.06) 0.36 1.36
[1] Employment status: Other 0.63 (-1.57) 0.36 1.12 0.86 (-0.49) 0.48 1.56 0.22*** (-2.86) 0.08 0.62
[1] Living area: Urban
[1] Living area: Rural 1.04 ( 0.24) 0.75 1.45 1.11 ( 0.53) 0.75 1.65 1.05 ( 0.21) 0.65 1.70
[1] Living area: Refugee camp 1.37* ( 1.76) 0.96 1.94 1.26 ( 1.22) 0.87 1.82 0.84 (-0.63) 0.49 1.44
[1] Refugee status 0.94 (-0.41) 0.70 1.26 1.17 ( 0.92) 0.83 1.65 0.99 (-0.06) 0.63 1.53
[2] Per capita casualties 1.06 ( 0.29) 0.72 1.55 0.82 (-1.08) 0.58 1.17 1.02 (0.08) 0.66 1.57
[2] Casualty trend 1.60*** ( 3.09) 1.19 2.15 1.21 ( 1.27) 0.90 1.64 1.17 (0.79) 0.79 1.73




Notes: Dependent variable reference category "Non-violence only".  Individual and governorate level variables marked with [1] and 
[2], respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 level marked with *, ** or ***, 







Table 5.3: Model 3 - Two-level model




To evaluate how much the chosen governorate-level variables explain, I look at the intercept 
and the governorate-level variance. The fixed component of the random intercept for the 
outcome “violence only”, 0.31, is the expected odds that an individual with zero on all 
dummy variables and mean value on all other variables will support violent resistance only, 
rather than non-violent resistance only, when all independent variables have the value zero. It 
is a weighted average across all governorates. What is interesting to note here, is that the 
reported level-two variance is not even close to statistically significant. Unlike in the random-
intercept model (Model 2), none of the governorates have “violence only”-intercepts that are 
significantly different from the fixed intercept of 0.31. Intercepts no longer vary significantly 
across governorates. This means that the level-two variables included in the full multilevel 
model (Model 3) jointly account for all the governorate-level variance observed in the 
random-intercept model (Model 2). 
Table 5.4: Model 4 – Reduced two-level model 
 
exp(b) z exp(b) z exp(b) z
Intercept 0.53*** (-3.47) 0.37 0.76 0.40*** (-4.48) 0.27 0.60 0.18*** (-6.53) 0.11 0.30
Grievances
[1] Wealth*education 0.77 (-0.80) 0.41 1.45 1.10 ( 0.29) 0.58 2.10 0.58 (-1.10) 0.22 1.54
[1] Civil and political rights 0.79*** (-3.32) 0.69 0.91 0.94 (-0.93) 0.82 1.07 0.85* (-1.84) 0.71 1.01
[2] HI durables index 1.55*** ( 3.60) 1.22 1.96 1.51*** ( 3.34) 1.19 1.93 1.32* ( 1.71) 0.96 1.82
[2] HI household expenditure 1.70*** ( 3.32) 1.24 2.32 1.34* ( 1.79) 0.97 1.84 1.18 ( 0.80) 0.78 1.79
[2] HI education 0.94 (-0.63) 0.78 1.14 0.85* (-1.65) 0.69 1.03 0.98 (-0.19) 0.75 1.26
Opportunity
[1] Self-evaluated wealth 1.14 ( 0.58) 0.73 1.77 0.90 (-0.47) 0.57 1.41 1.37 ( 0.92) 0.70 2.69
[2] Regional expenditure level 1.19 ( 1.27) 0.91 1.56 1.19 ( 1.07) 0.86 1.64 1.09 ( 0.48) 0.77 1.53
Controls
[1] Political affiliation: Hamas 4.07*** ( 6.58) 2.68 6.19 2.49*** ( 3.80) 1.56 3.99 3.59*** ( 4.40) 2.03 6.35
[1] Personal security: Feel safe 0.94 (-0.39) 0.69 1.27 0.79 (-1.55) 0.59 1.06 1.38 ( 1.36) 0.87 2.18
[1] Gender: Woman 0.93 (-0.58) 0.72 1.19 1.20 ( 1.27) 0.91 1.58 0.83 (-0.92) 0.56 1.23
[1] Education completed 1.11 ( 0.54) 0.76 1.62 0.96 (-0.20) 0.66 1.40 1.54 ( 1.38) 0.84 2.82
[1] Employment status: Unemployed 1.02 ( 0.08) 0.69 1.49 1.08 ( 0.37) 0.72 1.63 0.80 (-0.70) 0.42 1.51
[1] Living area: Urban
[1] Living area: Rural 1.02 ( 0.12) 0.74 1.40 1.11 ( 0.54) 0.75 1.65 1.08 ( 0.31) 0.67 1.74
[1] Living area: Refugee camp 1.21 ( 1.23) 0.89 1.65 1.25 ( 1.31) 0.89 1.75 0.81 (-0.79) 0.48 1.36
[2] Casualty trend 1.51*** ( 3.57) 1.21 1.90 1.32** ( 2.29) 1.04 1.68 1.16 ( 0.92) 0.85 1.59






Notes:  Dependent variable reference category "Non-violence only". z-values in parentheses. Individual and governorate level variables 
marked with [1] and [2], respectively. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 level marked with *, ** or ***, respectively. Level 2 
variance reported in logit form with standard error in paranthesis.
Violence only Both Neither
1805.00




5.1.4 The reduced two-level model (Model 4) 
The full two-level model (Model 3) has many parameters, and many of the control variables 
are statistically insignificant. As a final and more efficient model to base my interpretation 
and discussion on, I run a model where I exclude the statistically insignificant variables 
measuring age, refugee status and governorate-level casualties per capita. I also reduce the 
number of dummies measuring political affiliation and employment status to one for each 
concept, one dichotomy for voting Hamas and one for being unemployed, respectively. The 
results for Model 4 are displayed in Table 5.4. As expected, results are almost identical to the 
results of Model 3.  
5.2 Discussion: Grievance theory 
5.2.1 Horizontal inequality  
The coefficient estimates for the variables measuring economic horizontal inequality are both 
highly significant. This indicates support for the economic aspect of Hypothesis 3. Individuals 
are more likely to support violent resistance the larger the economic difference is between 
their own governorates and the closest Israeli sub-district. More specifically, in the reduced 
two-level model (Model 4) one standard deviation increase on the index measuring horizontal 
inequality in ownership of household durables corresponds to a 55 percent increase in the 
odds of supporting violent resistance rather than non-violent resistance. Similarly, a 
difference of one standard deviation on the variable measuring horizontal inequality in 
household expenditure corresponds to a 70 percent increase in the odds of supporting only 
violent resistance rather than only non-violent resistance.  Higher horizontal inequality in 
household durables also increases the risk of simultaneously supporting both forms of 
resistance, rather than only non-violence.  
To better illustrate the results, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 graphically represent predicted 
probabilities for the different outcomes when each economic horizontal inequality variable is 
allowed to vary while all other variables are held constant at zero.
34
 For the standardized 
variables this equals their mean. The figures are constructed so as to show predicted 
probabilities for the observed range of each variable only. 
 
                                                 
34
 In making these figures I rely on the description of Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012:673-676). 
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Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for the HI household durables variable 
 
  
 Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities for the HI expenditure variable 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that higher levels of governorate wealth correspond to a higher probability 
of support for violent resistance and a reduced probability of support for only non-violence. 
The reduced two-level model (Model 4) predicts that individuals in the governorates with the 
highest observed horizontal inequality in household durables ownership (Khan Yunis and 
Rafah) have an approximately 40 percentage points lower probability of supporting only non-
violent resistance than individuals in the governorate with the lowest HI in durables 
(Ramallah). This holds for individuals with all other dependent variables at zero. These same 
individuals in Khan Yunis and Rafah have an approximately 15 percentage points higher 
probability than the individuals in Ramallah of supporting either violent resistance only or 
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both forms of resistance. While an individual in Khan Yunis or Rafah is as likely to support 
violent resistance as non-violent resistance, an individual in Ramallah is approximately 55 
percentage points less likely to support violent resistance than non-violent resistance. This is a 
large difference in predicted probability. The same pattern is visible for the HI expenditure 
variable in Figure 5.2. The largest difference is that for this variable the probability of 
supporting “both” forms of resistance does not to the same degree rise in parallel with the 
probability of supporting “violence only”. In this figure the governorate with the lowest HI is 
Jerusalem, while Khan Yunis still has the highest HI. 
These results point to the ethnic group element as central in an individual’s decision to 
support violent resistance. They fit well with the proposal of Cederman et al. (2011:481-482) 
that horizontal inequalities are transformed into grievances by a process of group comparison 
driven by collective emotions. This is the first of the two mechanisms Cederman et al. 
proposed to connect horizontal inequalities to violent collective action.  
Like Cederman et al., I measure the objective economic asymmetries the disadvantaged group 
experiences, not the subjective grievances this horizontal inequality inspires. I am unable to 
measure the subjective group deprivation directly. But the fact that the probability of 
supporting violent resistance increases the higher the economic horizontal inequality of a 
governorate, suggests a process along the lines described in the social psychology literature. 
Group identities become more salient the higher the horizontal inequalities. Incorporating the 
framework of Gurr (1970): Objective horizontal inequality leads to a subjective state of 
relative group deprivation via a process where group identities become salient through 
comparison between in-group and out-group categories. This emotional process creates the 
frustration and anger that often leads to support for violence and in some cases actual 
participation in violence. 
The second mechanism in the chain proposed by Cederman et al. (2011:482) describes how 
grievances are transformed into actual collective action via group mobilization. This 
mechanism hinges critically on the assumption that the collective action problem has been 
overstated in the context of civil war. This is not an unproblematic assumption, but it is one I 
am unable to test empirically. The dependent variable of this study is attitudinal support for 
violent resistance, not actual participation in such resistance. The attitudinal dependent 
variable roughly corresponds to the first step of Klandermans (1997) model for participation 
in collective action, becoming a sympathizer. The group mobilization process proposed by the 
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second mechanism of Cederman et al. (2011:482) is more relevant for the later stages of the 
collective action model. A good test of this mechanism would demand a dependent variable 
measuring actual participation in violent resistance, or at the very least an intention to 
participate. 
The interpretation that the economic horizontal inequality measures capture the central ethnic 
group dimension well is strengthened by the non-finding of any significant effect of the 
absolute level of governorate expenditure. The horizontal inequality measures clearly capture 
something more than the absolute level of poverty. The non-significance of governorate 
wealth per se indicates that while comparison with neighboring members of the other ethnic 
group specifically does produce increased support for violence, economic comparison with 
neighboring geographical areas in general does not. 
Social horizontal inequality, operationalized as inequality in higher education, does not affect 
the risk of supporting violence rather than non-violence. It might be the case that when trying 
to capture the mechanism of social horizontal inequality, comparing the share of people with 
higher education is an arbitrary threshold. Maybe differences in more basic education could 
have a larger effect. But in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict such differences are 
almost non-existent. When looking at the numbers for secondary education, the difference in 
regional percentages between Israeli sub-districts and neighboring Palestinian governorates 
are very small. Some Palestinian governorates even have a higher percentage of the 
population with secondary education than the corresponding Israeli sub-districts.  
Larger horizontal inequalities in higher education do, however, reduce the risk of supporting 
both forms of resistance, rather than non-violence only. And if Jericho is excluded from the 
estimation there is a similar significant and negative effect of HI education on support for 
violence only (Table 6.4, Chapter 6). This is somewhat puzzling. 
5.2.2 Relative deprivation 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported by the evidence. The interaction between education and wealth 
is statistically non-significant in all models. Highly educated individuals in poor segments of 
the population are no more likely to support violent resistance than others.  
If the interaction term captures the individual relative deprivation better than it captures 
relative group deprivation, the finding might serve to further strengthen the argument about 
the centrality of group comparison. I am unable to test empirically what reference point or 
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reference group the highly educated individuals in question compare their situation to. On one 
hand, the point of reference could be an ideal situation of better economic conditions that they 
believe their education makes them entitled to. If so, the measure captures the individual 
element of relative deprivation. Its non-significance would indicate support for the 
proposition that grievances lead to violent collective action in societies where inequality 
between ethnic groups is rampant, not societies where inequality between individuals is large. 
On the other hand, I cannot discard the possibility that the implicit reference point of the 
respondents is the economic situation of Israelis with similar levels of education. The conflict 
is strong in the national consciousness and could easily be blamed for the dismal economic 
situation and the lack of upward social mobility that follows from it. If Israelis are the 
reference group for most Palestinians, the wealth-education interaction measure should 
capture the group comparison element of relative economic deprivation, which would make 
its non-significance more puzzling. 
In line with the argument about the centrality of group comparison, the wealth-education 
interaction term as a measure of grievances might have had a more discernible effect if tested 
on Palestinians within Israel proper. These people are competing more directly for the same 
jobs as Israelis with comparable levels of education, at the very least in principle. When they 
are discriminated against and see their upwards mobility blocked, group comparison should 
be more direct, and the feeling of frustration arising from the situation of relative deprivation 
would be more directly directed at Israeli Jews as a group. 
Hypothesis 2, the proposition that higher perceived status of civil and political rights should 
reduce support for violence, is supported by all models. In the reduced two-level model 
(Model 4) I find that a difference of one standard deviation on the civil and political rights 
status variable corresponds to a 21 percent decrease in the odds of supporting only violent 
resistance rather than only non-violent resistance. Figure 5.3 graphically represents predicted 
probabilities for the different outcomes when the civil and political rights status variable is 
allowed to vary while all other variables are held constant at zero. For the standardized 
variables this equals their mean. The figure is constructed so as to show predicted 
probabilities for the observed range of the variable only. It suggests that the individuals that 
rate the status of civil and political right highest have an approximately 13 percentage points 
lower probability of supporting violent resistance than the individuals that rate the status 
lowest. The probability is reduced from .30 to about .17, in other words almost halved. The 
corresponding difference in the probability for supporting non-violence is about the same 
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size, but with a positive sign. Thus, for the individuals with all other variables at zero, the 
difference in predicted probability for supporting non-violent resistance rather than violent 
resistance increases with approximately 26 percentage points over the observed range on the 
civil and political rights status variable.  
   Figure 5.3: Predicted probabilities for the civil and political rights status variable 
 
The mechanism of the relative political deprivation argument is tied to power values, as 
conceptualized by Gurr (1970:25).  Such values include participation in collective decision-
making (participation values), but also self-determination and security, the freedom from 
oppressive political regulation and disorder (security values). The mechanism proposed by 
Gurr is that frustration arises when people feel there is a discrepancy between the power 
values the political conditions allow them and the conditions they feel rightfully entitled to. 
The frustration gives rise to anger, and an aggressive response may occur when the angered 
person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the cause of frustration 
(Gurr, 1970:34).  
Since its establishment by the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is the national 
authority in the occupied Palestinian territories. One might therefore expect that the 
frustration stemming from a perceived lack of civil and political rights would be directed at 
the PA – Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Especially when in Fatah 
hands, the PA has been associated with financial irregularity and corruption (Brynen, 2000:160). 
Clientelism and neo-patrimonial distribution of resources and positions has been widely used to 
reward loyalty to the regime and co-opt the opposition (More, 2005:985). The significant effect 
of perceived civil and political rights status on support for violent resistance suggests another 
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story, however. It would seem that many Palestinians lay the ultimate blame for their dismal 
political situation on Israel. Qualitative interviews by Lundervold (2012:67-68) indicate 
support for this assumption. In ten out of thirteen interviews respondents stated that the Israeli 
occupation contributed to (four people) or was the main reason for (six people) the dismal 
civil and political rights situation. Only three respondents did not blame the occupation at all 
and put all the blame on the PA and the split between Hamas and Fatah. In both 2009 and 
2010, polls found that more than thirty percent of Palestinians blamed Israel rather than 
Hamas or Fatah for the failure to hold elections on time (PSR, 2009, 2010). 
The reality created by the Oslo Accords was not one of an independent, viable Palestinian 
national authority (Roy, 2011:194). The PA was given responsibility for day-to-day life, but 
with limited authority and agency to manage it properly. In fact the political reality of the 
occupation is that the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are effectively 
excluded from decision-making when it comes to issues of paramount importance to them, 
issues concerning the political and economic future of the land and the people. Decisions to 
build more settlements, for instance, changing the facts on the ground in a way crucial for the 
future of the occupied areas, are made by Israeli authorities. These are bodies that Palestinians 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have no access to; elected through elections they have no 
vote in. It follows from the relative deprivation mechanism that the discrepancy between (i) 
the power value reference point of participation and self-determination and (ii) the actual 
situation of powerlessness in the face of important decisions about the future, leads to 
frustration and anger directed towards Israel, the ultimate source of deprivation.  
The objective discrepancy between a reference point and reality may lead to violence only to 
the degree that the people experiencing the conditions in question themselves perceive the 
situation as unjust (cf. Gurr, 1970:24). The test of Hypothesis 2 is designed to capture this 
subjectivity, by measuring the effect on support for violence of perceived status of civil and 
political rights. Still there are two important challenges to the validity of the question as a 
measure of relative political deprivation. First, we cannot be sure that all respondents include 
the same aspects in their conception of “civil and political rights”. The question measuring the 
concept is phrased “public freedoms and human rights”. Most people, given a certain 
minimum level of knowledge about democracy and human rights, are likely to associate it 
with at least some participation rights in addition to classical freedoms like the freedom of 




The second challenge is whether the question captures the relative element of relative 
deprivation sufficiently well. Unlike with the horizontal inequality measures, I am not 
measuring any objective asymmetry that might lead to grievances. Instead, I am trying to 
capture the grievance aspect more directly, to measure the perception of relative deprivation 
itself. Still, with the question about the status of civil and political rights I am unable to 
directly capture the reference point that each respondent measures his own situation against. 
As discussed earlier, this could be a former situation, an ideal situation or a reference group. I 
have argued that the reference point for most Palestinian is likely to be the situation of Israeli 
Jews as a group. For some of the more educated Palestinians the reference point might be the 
“Western” ideal democracy. But while the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions were under way 
at the time of the survey, the closest example the Middle Eastern had of an embodiment of the 
democratic values of civil and political rights was the freedoms enjoyed by Israeli Jews in 
Israel proper. I therefore consider Israeli Jews the group that Palestinian respondents were 
most likely to compare their political status to.  
The civil and political rights variable (Hypothesis 2) seems to capture the group comparison 
element better than the income-education interaction (Hypothesis 1) does. This might be 
because the Israelis are more likely to be the implicit reference group for the political 
measure. Civil and political rights and liberties is something you receive as a group, making 
group comparison natural. The Israeli Jews experience high levels of civil and political rights, 
and as a group they are a natural point of reference for Palestinians that feel that as a people 
their rights are not fulfilled in the same way. The Israelis are therefore more likely to be 
considered the source of frustration when group comparison is widespread. While group 
comparison could also be implicit for many of the highly educated individuals that do not see 
their education transformed into higher income because of restricted social mobility, such 
comparison is less obvious than for the civil and political rights measure. 
To the degree that Israelis are the political reference group for most of my respondents, 
Hypothesis 2 is in fact an operationalization of the mechanism of political horizontal 
inequality. Frustration arises from the perception that the access to political decision-making 
authority of one’s group is restricted compared to another group. The statistical significance 
of the civil and political rights variable can therefore be interpreted as indicating the operation 
of the political horizontal inequality mechanism in the Palestinian case. But, as in the case of 
economic horizontal inequality, the mechanism tested in this study is the effect of HIs on 
attitudinal support for violent resistance, not on actual participation in violence. 
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5.2.3 Political and economic HIs combined 
Political and economic horizontal inequality is often linked (Cederman et al., 2011:481). 
Cederman et al. hypothesized that “economic and political HIs contribute jointly to the 
outbreak of civil war” (Cederman et al., 2011:482). These expectations were in line with 
those of Stewart (2008:18), that political mobilization is most likely where political and 
economic HIs run in the same direction.  
Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities for all grievance variables combined 
 
Figure 5.4 graphically represent predicted probabilities for the different outcomes when all 
grievance variables are allowed to vary together, while all other variables are held constant at 
zero. A value of one on the x-axis means all grievance variables have the standardized value 
of 1 standard deviation from their mean, a value of 2 means they are all two standard 
deviations from their mean, and so on. At zero all grievance variables equal their mean. I have 
reversed the civil and political rights variable so all variables work in the same direction. 
In the reduced two-level model (Model 4) illustrated in Figure 5.4, grievance factors appear 
very important in determining attitudinal support for violent and non-violent resistance. While 
an individual scoring minus one standard deviation from the mean on all grievance variables 
is about 60 percentage points more likely to support only non-violent resistance than only 
violent resistance, individuals scoring plus one is about 15 percentage points more likely to 
support violent resistance than non-violent resistance. Individuals scoring half a standard 
deviation above the mean on all grievance variables and mean value on all other variables are 
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as likely to support violence as non-violence. These are values within the observed range on 
all grievance variables.  
In sum, political and economic grievances appear central in determining support for violent 
and non-violent resistance. But it is important to keep in mind that Figure 5.4 depicts the 
predictions of the reduced two-level model (Model 4) only for individuals with mean values 
on all other variables. It does not take into account the fit of the model or its ability to classify 
respondents on the outcome variable. To be better able to evaluate how much the grievance 
variables explain, the predictive power of the model is considered in Section 5.5. 
5.3 Discussion: Opportunity explanations 
The purest form of the opportunity cost argument is the one proposed by Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004:569). The mechanism is simple: The less money an individual has and can expect to 
earn, the less he has too loose by joining a rebel force. Hypothesis 4 was inspired by, and is 
consistent with, this pure opportunity cost argument. I hypothesized that individuals from less 
wealthy households would be more likely to support violent resistance. But I proposed an 
opportunity cost mechanism modified according to the reasoning of Justino (2009:317). She 
focuses on the whole range of actions supportive of insurgents, all the way from participation 
in armed resistance to non-denunciation. Thus it is less far-fetched to hypothesize that the 
mechanism she proposed could transfer to attitudinal support as well as supportive action. The 
mechanism proposed takes into account both the cost of non-support for insurgents and the 
benefits of such support for a household. Poverty increases both the risks associated with non-
support for insurgents and the benefits accruing from support, relative to the costs of 
supporting insurgents. This facilitates both recruitment of new fighters and extension of the 
insurgents’ support base in the civilian population. Neither the pure opportunity cost 
mechanism nor the Justino mechanism seem present in the case of Palestinian attitudinal 
support for violent resistance, however. The effect of the household wealth variable is both 
positive and non-significant. Hypothesis 4 is not supported by my findings. 
At this point it is reasonable to ask how well the conflict situation Justino presupposes when 
describing the mechanism fits the Palestinian case. If the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
atypical in some regards because of the special situation of occupation and blockade, the non-
finding of any Justino mechanism in the Palestinian case might not be expected to hold for 
other, more representative conflicts. In the following discussion, the focus is on Hamas. 
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Considering Hamas the most important insurgent organization is in line with Palestinian 
public opinion. Polls suggest the public credits Hamas with playing the leading role in the 
armed resistance (Gunning, 2009:177). I will not attempt to distinguish between the military 
and the political elements of Hamas. While the Qassam Brigades are believed to be under the 
control of the political leadership in the Political Bureau, the exact leadership structures and 
who controls the overall strategy of Hamas at the moment is concealed (Jewish Policy Center, 
2012). 
First I consider the cost of non-participation. According to Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) non-
participation increases the risk of being identified with the other side and punished for it. The 
costs of being suspected of collaborating with the other side are reportedly high in the 
Palestinian territories. “In the West Bank, individuals accused of informing the Israelis have a 
hard time finding lawyers when they are arrested; often, they are simply murdered, and 
hospitals have turned away their corpses” (Kalyvas, 2006:177). During the Second Intifada, 
Palestinian authorities held hundreds of Palestinians without charge or trial, sometimes 
arrested arbitrarily and without sufficient evidence, based on rumors and popular 
denunciations. Suspected collaborators were often tortured. Trials were inherently and grossly 
unfair and many resulted in death sentences. Vigilante killings of suspected collaborators 
went unpunished (HRW, 2001).  
The scope of such detentions and death sentences has been reduced since then, but the 
practice still exists, both in the Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza 
Strip (Alhelou, 2013; HRW, 2008; Tauber, 2009). Collaboration is still one of the most 
contentious issues in Palestinian society (Bhavnani et al., 2011:153). The high costs 
associated with being suspected of collaboration probably increases the potential cost of not 
explicitly supporting resistance. While I cannot be sure that non-support of violent resistance 
actually increases the chance of being suspected of collaboration, it is not unlikely that the 
possibility that it might is taken into account by Palestinians when deciding whether to 
vocally support such resistance. 
Justino (2009:319) argued that poor people are less capable than rich people of protecting 
their economic status and starting a new life if forced to relocate due to allegations of 
collaboration or destruction of their livelihood. This logic should transfer well to the 
Palestinian context. All else equal, people with more assets will be better able to access a new 
livelihood if forced to migrate. The fact that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
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Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) supports the poor refugees economically, might serve to 
attenuate this dynamic somewhat for the very poorest by making the extreme effects of 
poverty less acutely felt. Still the main argument should hold.  
Second, I turn to the benefits of support and participation. There have been reports of Hamas 
privileging loyal individuals (ICG, 2007:8) and that social service institutions of Hamas and 
Fatah began discriminating against non-supporters after Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip in 
2007 (Roy, 2011:192). This seems more related to loyalty as expressed in electoral voting and 
the conflict between Fatah and Hamas than to support for resistance against Israel directly, 
however. While support for armed resistance is highly correlated with support for parties 
other than Fatah, the two do not overlap completely. Still the fact that loyalty to Hamas is 
rewarded might act as an incentive for supporting violent resistance as well as for voting for 
Hamas. The fact that Hamas is sufficiently well organized on the local level to know who 
voted for them or not (ICG, 2007:8), might very well mean they also know who supports their 
strategy of armed resistance and who does not, and that there is at least a possibility that they 
reward such support.  
Third, the costs of non-support and benefits of support are weighed against the costs of 
participation and support. The costs of actual participation should be of the same nature in the 
Palestinian conflict as in other civil conflicts. The most import aspect would be the 
heightened risk of being detained or assassinated by Israeli security forces. The strength of 
Israeli military control might mean this risk is higher in the Palestinian territories than in civil 
conflicts of similarly low intensity. Whether attitudinal support for armed resistance increases 
these risks is less clear, however. It is not unlikely that openly proclaiming support for armed 
resistance increases the risk of being denounced to Israeli intelligence by collaborators. But 
not all that report such support in an anonymous survey will openly proclaim it. And in any 
case the risk of attitudinal and vocal support should be much less pronounced than the risk for 
people providing material support or actually participating in resistance.  
In sum, despite some special traits of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict situation, there is little 
reason not to expect the mechanism described by Justino to apply to this conflict. The 
individual and household-level incentives for poor people to support resistance should be 
about the same here as in other civil conflicts. The cost of non-support and benefits of support 
seem as likely to outweigh the cost of support for poor people here as elsewhere. The strength 
of the different incentives will probably vary across periods of intense conflict (the Second 
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Intifada, the Gaza Wars) and periods of relative calm, however. The Fafo survey data were 
collected in 2011, a period of relative calm, so testing the Justino and Collier and Hoeffler 
mechanisms with data from this period presumably provides a particularly hard test for the 
propositions. Thus the non-finding of any effect of household poverty on support for violent 




Sønsterudbråten (2009:23-25) might have been justified in suggesting that classical 
opportunity cost arguments do not transfer well to the study of attitudes. Leaning on the 
qualitative work of Khawaja (1995:151), she suggested instead an opportunity mechanism 
turning the opportunity cost argument on its head. She found that Khawaja’s argument that 
more wealthy individuals to a larger degree could afford to take the risks associated with 
participation, transferred well to the study of attitudinal support for rocket attacks. The 
positive sign in Model 4 of the wealth variable might suggest a similar interpretation. The 
effect is far from statistically significant, however, so I find this alternative mechanism 
unsupported by the evidence.
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Building on the reasoning of Østby et al. (2009:305), I hypothesized that the opportunity cost 
argument could transfer to the regional level (Hypothesis 5). People from poorer regions have 
less to loose from the destruction associated with insurgency and might therefore be more 
likely to support armed resistance. The effect of governorate expenditure level on support for 
violence in Model 4 does not have the expected negative sign (odds ratio below 1). The sign 
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 Following the argument that Hamas are the insurgents in the Palestinian case, one might also argue that after 
2007 the Justino mechanism should be more relevant for Gaza than for the West Bank. Only in the Gaza Strip 
does Hamas have territorial and political control, almost all rockets are fired from Gaza, and Israeli retaliation 
periodically rises to the level of outright war only in Gaza. During the first Gaza war the Israeli strategy changed 
from “targeted killings” of known Hamas militants to targeting the entire Hamas organization (Flibbert, 
2011:67), even arguing that all Palestinians in Gaza supported Hamas, so there were no true civilians in the area 
(Roy, 2011:227). The constant threat of forceful Israeli retaliation, and the widespread civil suffering that comes 
with it, represents a narrowing of the gap between the risks faced by combatants and those faced by civilians that 
should intensify the Justino mechanism in the Gaza Strip. Still I will not run the analysis on Gaza only to test this 
proposition, however, as this would result in a two-level model with only five clusters, which is highly 
problematic from a statistical point of view. 
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 Sønsterudbråten (2009) found support for the mechanism using Fafo data very similar to mine. Differences in 
methods could explain the discrepancy. She used a dependent variable measuring only support for rocket attacks, 
in an one-level ordinal logit model, operationalized wealth using a wealth index similar to my robustness check 
index, and did not impute missing data. I did not find any positive and significant effect of wealth in my one-
level model (Model 1), however, and the robustness tests reported in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1 and Table 6.3) show 
that the wealth variable remains insignificant both when the welath index is used, when support for rocket attack 
is the dependent variable and on the unimputed dataset. This indicates the difference in results might be due to 
actual changes in the Palestinian situation and opinion after Sønsterudbråten’s data were collected early in 2008, 
rather than differences in research design. 
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is positive (odds ratio above 1), which might have suggested support for the Sønsterudbråten 
(2009:72-79) argument that in richer regions people can afford to take the risks associated 
with Israeli retaliation, had the effect not been statistically non-significant. Thus my finding 
for the study of attitudinal support for violent resistance is more in line with the finding of 
Østby et al. (2009:313) with regards to the incidence of rebellion – no such relationship exists 
in my data. Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
A particular point needs to be emphasized once more. The attitudinal nature of the dependent 
variable in this study provides a very hard test for opportunity theory. Therefore, the non-
finding in this study of a significant effect of regional and household level poverty on support 
for violent resistance does not disprove opportunity theory as such. A relationship might well 
exist between poverty and actual participation in armed resistance that this study is unable to 
capture for methodological reasons concerning the choice of dependent variable. 
The dependent variable in this study corresponds to the first of four steps towards collective 
action proposed in the collective action model of Klandermans (1997:208). According to 
Klandermans, the four stages an individual passes through before actually participating in a 
social movement are: (i) becoming a sympathizer; (ii) being targeted for mobilization; (iii) 
becoming motivated to participate; and (iv) moving from intention to actual participation. By 
operationalizing violent collective action with a dependent variable measuring attitudinal 
support, this study helps us understand the first step in an individual’s path towards such 
action – how people become part of the mobilizational potential for resistance movements. 
The results imply some support for Klandermans’ proposition that relative deprivation is 
shown to influence whether individuals becoming sympathizers. The various mechanisms of 
opportunity cost, however, as envisioned by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Justino (2009) and 
Østby et al. (2009), are less likely to come into play in this first step towards collective action. 
They all imply that individuals – regardless of their motivation – weigh the opportunities 
against constraint associated with different forms of support for violence against each other 
when deciding whether they want to take part in insurgency. These considerations are more 
likely to come into play in the final two stages of Klandermans’ model, when an individual 
decides whether participation is worthwhile and takes the final step to actual participation. 
Thus, operationalizations including the intention to participate, in addition to actual 
participation, would likely have captured the mechanisms better if such data existed (cf. Saab, 
2011). If the debate between opportunity and grievance proponents is to be solved in favor of 
one or the other, good quality micro-level data on actual participation, or at least intentions to 
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participate, is needed to underpin future tests of the micro-level mechanisms proposed by the 
two schools.  
5.4 Control variables 
The political affiliation variables appear to have the strongest effect on support for resistance. 
From the simplified two-level model (Model 4) it is clear that wanting to vote for Hamas 
corresponds to a fourfold increase in the odds of supporting violence only rather than non-
violence only. To get a more nuanced picture we might look at the full two-level model 
(Model 3). Stating that if there was an election today one would vote for Hamas rather than 
Fatah corresponds to a tremendous 803 percent increase in the odds of supporting only violent 
resistance rather than only non-violent resistance. Supporting other parties than Fatah or 
Hamas, not wanting to participate in election or answering “don’t know” rather than 
supporting Fatah all correspond to an approximate threefold increase in the odds of 
supporting only violent resistance rather than only non-violent resistance. Clearly Fatah-
supporters are more in favor of non-violent resistance than everybody else. This is not very 
surprising given the historical role of the PLO and Fatah as proponents of peace negotiations 
and partners to the Oslo Accords (Tamimi, 2007:188-190). Neither is it surprising that 
supporting Hamas is highly correlated with support for violent resistance, given how central 
armed resistance has been in their origins and ideology (Robinson, 2004; Roy, 2011:19-50; 
Tamimi, 2007:147-170) and the central role they have played in suicide bombing campaigns 
in the 1990s (Tamimi, 2007:159-164) and later in sending Qassam rockets into Israel after the 
2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (Flibbert, 2011:55). The direction of any causal effect is 
not clear-cut, however, as will be discussed in Section 6.4. 
Two results change markedly when governorate-level variables are introduced into the 
random-intercept model (Model 3). First, the dummy for employment status “other” no longer 
significantly reduces the risk of supporting violence only rather than non-violence only. It still 
significantly reduces risk of supporting “neither” form of resistance. In the simplified two-
level model (Model 4) this variable is replaced by a simple dummy for unemployment, which 
turns out to be non-significant.  
Second, a new effect appears in Model 3. Living in a refugee camp rather than a non-camp 
area corresponds to a 37 percent increase in the odds of supporting only violent resistance 
rather than only non-violent resistance. This is in line with the traditional centrality of the 
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refugee camps in Palestinian resistance ever since the First Intifada (Morris, 1999:574). It 
might be due to a radicalizing effect of refugee camps, as people in camps presumably feel 
more intensely about the conflict, given that their family was driven from their homes and are 
unable to return. The result might be seen as an extra reinforcement of the relative deprivation 
argument, as these are people that have been deprived of their land and homes. The implicit 
group comparison element is pretty clear, because the land was taken by Israelis. It could also 
be interpreted along opportunity lines, as mobilization is probably made easier in the densely 
populated camps with high availability of young men. But given the attitudinal nature of the 
dependent variable, I find the former interpretation more plausible. In the full two-level model 
(Model 3) the effect is significant at the 10 percent level. In the reduced two-level model 
(Model 4) the effect is no longer statistically significant. As shown by a robustness test in 
Chapter 6 (Model 6, Table 6.2) this is probably because removing the refugee status variable, 
even though it is non-significant, creates omitted variable bias. 
Casualties per capita are not significant in Model 3. In Model 4 the variables is excluded. The 
casualty trend variable is significant in both models. In Model 3 a difference of 1.95 
casualties (one standard deviation) on the variable corresponds to a 60 percent increase in the 
odds of supporting only violent resistance rather than only non-violent resistance. In Model 4 
the corresponding number is 51 percent. In other words, a recent increase in casualties 
(conflict intensity) in a governorate corresponds to a heightened risk of individuals supporting 
violent resistance. It seems that the theory of Gartner (2008), of a body bag effect where 
increases in casualties lead to lower support for military action, does not transfer from inter-
state conflicts to insurgency. In the Palestinian case, short-term increases in casualties merely 
serve to increase support for resistance, probably feeding into negative enemy images and 
hardened narratives. 
A result that is more difficult to interpret is the effect of the regional proportion of young 
men. A difference of one standard deviation on this variable corresponds to a 40 percent 
decrease in the odds of supporting only violent resistance rather than only non-violent 
resistance in both Model 3 and Model 4. This is quite the opposite of my theoretical 
expectations, whether based on opportunity or grievance mechanisms. One explanation might 
be that the population variable should be interacted with a variable measuring governorate-
level unemployment, in line with the argument that youth bulges will create more violence if 
the labor market is unable to absorb the extra people. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, including 
such an interaction term in the model does not alter the sign or size of the young men-
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coefficient and neither the interaction term nor the unemployment variable itself reaches 
statistical significance (Model 3, Table 6.2). They come fairly close to significance, however, 
with z-value of 1.61 and 1.64. The size and sign of the coefficients suggests that the effect of 
governorate proportion of young men does indeed become positive when unemployment 
levels rise above the mean, indicating some limited support for the youth bulge argument. An 
alternative explanation could be that the share of young men acts as a proxy for regional 
conflict intensity. The share of young men might be lower in some governorates because 
more young men have been killed or imprisoned by Israeli security forces.
37
 This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that including a variable measuring regional exposure to 
Israeli violence in the model makes the share of young men-variable insignificant (Model 4, 
Table 6.2).  
Gender significantly reduces the chance of supporting “neither” form of resistance rather than 
non-violence only in Model 3 but not in Model 4. Unlike in earlier studies, Palestinian youth 
is not significantly more radical than others. This is in line with a recent Fafo report 
suggesting a tendency of retreat from politics among Palestinian youth disillusioned with the 
political developments in the occupied territories and doubtful of the ability of the traditional 
political actors to change the situation for the better (Christophersen et al., 2012:18). 
5.5 Model predictive power 
The statistical significance of the governorate-level variables, the disappearance of the 
residual governorate-level variance and the increase in log likelihood, all point to Model 3 
being a well-specified model. To further evaluate the fit of the model I look at how well it 
predicts attitudinal support for violent resistance.  
A good way to estimate how well a model predicts or classifies the dependent variable, is to 
compare the rate of correctly predicted outcomes (true positives) for each dependent variable 
category to the rate of false positive predictions. My model is logistic, estimating the 
probability of an individual belonging to each of the dependent variable category rather than 
the baseline category. I want to compare each individual’s predicted value on the dependent 
variable to his or her actual value on the dependent variable. To do this, I use predicted 
probabilities. The predicted probabilities tell me the probability an individual has of 
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 In 2011, more than 4000 Palestinian security detainees and prisoners were held in Israeli prisons (B'Tselem, 
2013), but statistics on what governorate they came from are not available. 
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belonging in one specific dependent variable category, according to the model estimated and 
the individual’s value on the dependent variables on the model. They are calculated for each 
dependent variable outcome separately. To be able to compare an individual’s predicted 
outcome to his or her actual value on the dependent variable, it must be determined which 
probabilities count as being in the dependent variable category in question and which count as 
falling outside it. A threshold is needed for converting the probabilities into dichotomous 
outcomes for each dependent variable category (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010:366). A 
natural place to start might be to consider all individuals with a predicted probability of above 
0.5 as being predicted to fall within the category in question. The value of such a threshold 
will always be arbitrary, however, and there is a trade-off between correctly predicted 
outcomes and false positives, as both tend to increase when the threshold is lowered (Ibid).  
To avoid arbitrarily choosing a threshold, I will measure predictive power as the area under a 
ROC-curve (AUC). A ROC-curve plots the true positive rate (sensitivity) as a function of the 
false positive rate (1– specificity) across all thresholds. The area under the curve can therefore 
by used as a summary measure of predictive power. An AUC of 1 would mean a model that 
classified outcomes perfectly, while an AUC of 0.5 would be a model that predicted outcomes 
no better than chance.  
In this section I focus almost exclusively on the “violence only” outcome, for pragmatic 
reasons and because this is the outcome of primary interest to my research question. For 
Model 4, the reduced two-level model, the area under the ROC curve for the “violence only” 
outcome is 0.632. This suggests that the model classifies outcomes significantly better than 
chance, but far from perfectly. This reduced two-level model will serve as a baseline model 
for the tests in the next section. 
5.5.1 In-sample predictive power 
Predictive power tests are useful for evaluating the contributions various independent 
variables make to the overall predictive power of a model. Predictive heuristics provide a 
useful supplement to a focus on statistical significance only. Often too much emphasis is 
placed on finding statistically significant variables, which may be overdetermined (Ward et 
al., 2010:372). As demonstrated by Ward et al. (2010), the inclusion of a statistically 
significant variable into a model does not necessarily make a significant contribution to its 
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predictive capability (Ward et al., 2010:365). Predictive heuristics are necessary to improve 
models and be able to make good policy recommendations (Ward et al., 2010:364). 
My research question is about the influence of grievance and opportunity factors on support 
for violent resistance. To go beyond statistical significance in testing the relative power of 
these two strands of theory in my model, I compare the contributions the two groups of 
variables make to the predictive power of the baseline model. I do this by sequentially 
excluding the groups of variables representing each theory, to see whether and how much 
predictive power is reduced compared to the baseline model’s AUC of .632.  
Figure 5.5: Predictive power contribution of grievance variables 
 
                   




Figure 5.5 compares the ROC curves for the baseline model and the model excluding the 
grievance variables. The difference of 0.02 units in the AUC for the two models is significant 
on the 5 percent level (p=0.025). The size of the difference is difficult to interpret 
substantially, but the test proves that the grievance variables improve the predictive power of 
my model. The same cannot be said for the opportunity variables. As shown in Figure 5.6, 
when the ROC curve of the model excluding these variables is plotted against the baseline 
model, the two lines almost completely overlap. A chi-square test of the difference in AUC 
confirms the picture – the opportunity variables do not make any statistically significant 
contribution to the in-sample predictive power of the reduced two-level model.  
In sum, the in-sample predictive power tests confirm the main picture provided by looking at 
statistical significance only. Grievance factors matter for support for violent resistance in the 
Palestinian case, opportunity factors do not. The test also serves to moderate the picture, 
however. While the grievance variables make a statistically significant contribution to the 
predictive power of the model, the contribution is not as large as the significance level of the 
variables and the predicted probabilities might lead us to believe. 
To make the discussion more specific, I take a closer look at the 18 individuals that the 
reduced two-level model (Model 4) classifies as false positives at threshold 0.5. These are the 
individuals that the model predicts as belonging to the “violence only”-category, when their 
observed value on the dependent variable falls within one of the other categories. A 
disproportionately large share of these individuals belong to the observed dependent variable 
category “both”. The fact that they are predicted to support only violence but in reality 
support both violence and non-violence, might suggest that some of the same mechanisms are 
at work in determining the attitude of those supporting both forms of resistance as for those 
supporting only violent resistance. This could indicate that a multilevel binominal logistic 
regression where the category “both” and “violence only” are collapsed might fit the data as 
well or better than the multilevel multinominal model. I run this model as a robustness check 
in Chapter 6.  
There are some visible patterns among the false positives also on other variables in my 
dataset. The least surprising pattern is that they have values on all the significant variables in 
the model that suggest increased probability of supporting violence. That is, they perceive the 
status of civil and political rights as low, support Hamas and come from regions representing 
high economic horizontal inequality. This is unsurprising because this is precisely what leads 
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the model to predict high probability of support for violence for these individuals. In addition 
they are all in the socio-economically lower ranges of the population, both on variables 
included on the model and other economic variables in the dataset. They are all in the lower 
economic and educational ranges. Almost all the false positives have refugee status and live 
in refugee camps. This latter fact might point to a need to control for refugee status. The 
removal of the refugee status variable from the model might have been premature. In Chapter 
6 (Model 6, Table 6.2), I reintroduce the refugee status variable into the model as a robustness 
test. All important results remain the same and the refugee status variable is non-significant. 
The effect of living in a refugee camp becomes more strongly significant, however, indicating 
that removing refugee status from the model created omitted variable bias for this effect.  
A disproportionate share of the respondents falsely predicted as positives come from the 
governorates of Rafah or Nablus. Given that these are the two governorates where the highest 
share of respondents say they support “both” forms of resistance (cf. Table 4.4), this fact 
lends further support to the interpretation that some of the same mechanisms are at play in 
determining who supports “both” forms of resistance as in determining who supports 
“violence only”. 
5.5.2 Out-of-sample predictive power 
Ward et al. (2010) argued that out-of-sample heuristics must become a part of the evaluative 
tools in conflict research in order to go beyond looking at only statistical significance and 
make substantial theoretical progress. The ability to make out-of-sample predictions provides 
an even harder test for the predictive power of a model (Ward et al., 2010:370). But such tests 
are important because we want our models to capture the underlying relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. If the model does not capture the underlying causal 
relation but merely gives a detailed description of relationships that happen to exist in the 
original dataset, it will perform poorly when tested on a new dataset (Ibid). 
I am unable to test the predictive power of my model on a new dataset. A second-best solution 
suggested by Ward et al. (2010:370) is the technique of k-fold cross-validation, which is 
performed within the original dataset. The model is re-estimated on a subset of the dataset, 
setting aside observations to test its predictive ability on. By rotating trough a sufficient 
number of different ways of dividing the sample, estimates of overall predictive power can be 
obtained without using new data (Ibid). To test the out-of-sample predictive power of model 
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4, I randomly divide the sample into 30/70, estimating the model on 70 percent and testing its 
predictive power on the remaining 30 percent. I repeat the procedure five times, using a new 
random division of the sample each time.
38
 I do the same thing for a model excluding the 
opportunity variables and one excluding the grievance variables. Average areas under the 
ROC curves (AUC) are reported in Table 5.5. 
           Table 5.5: Predictive power contributions of opportunity and grievance variables 
 
Because the sample is different for the different estimates, I am unable to chi-square-test the 
difference between the out-of-sample AUCs, but the results seem to confirm the picture from 
the in-sample analysis. Grievance variables contribute to the predictive power of the model, 
but a bit less so than in the in-sample test. Opportunity variables do not contribute to 
predictive power in either test.          
5.6 Conclusions 
The findings of this study indicate support for the grievance theory. In particular, the strands 
of grievance theory that emphasize the group comparison element contribute significantly to 
explanations of support for violent resistance. Hypothesis 1, that highly educated individuals 
in the lower economic segments are more likely to support violent resistance, is not 
supported. But the hypotheses most clearly operationalizing the mechanism of political and 
economic horizontal inequality are confirmed. The better an individual considers the civil and 
political rights situation (Hypothesis 2) and the larger the difference in economic conditions 
between the individual’s own governorate and the closest Israeli sub-district (Hypothesis 3), 
the more likely he or she is to support violent resistance. When combined, the grievance 
variables make a small but important contribution to predictive power.  
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 There is no evidence that the choice of k affects results much as long as the subsample is large enough to 
calculate usual statistics (Ward et al., 2010:370). The reason I do not divide the sample into smaller part is that it 
would leave very few individuals in some of the governorates, thus making some individuals very influential. 
Repeating the procedure only five times might be a bit minimalist, but pragmatic considerations of time 




[A] Baseline: Full model 4 0.632 0.600
[B] Excluding grievance variables 0.611 0.584
[C] Excluding opportunity variables 0.633 0.608
Notes: All AUCs calculated for the outcome "Violence only".  Averages calculated over 
five random divisions of the sample into 70/30, where the model is estimated on 70 
percent and predictive power tested on the remaining 30 percent.
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Opportunity factors appear unimportant in explaining attitudinal support for violence. Neither 
coming from a less wealthy household (Hypothesis 4) nor a less wealthy governorate 
(Hypothesis 5) significantly increases support for violent resistance among Palestinians in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the variables make no significant contribution to 
predictive power. 
While my findings indicate support for group-oriented grievance theory in the Palestinian 
case, the attitudinal nature of the dependent variable in this study provides a very tough test 
for opportunity theory. Therefore, the non-finding in this study of a significant effect of 
regional and household level poverty on support for violent resistance does not disprove 
opportunity theory as such. A relationship might very well exist between poverty and actual 
participation in armed resistance that this study is unable to capture because of the attitudinal 
dependent variable. In order to solve the opportunity-grievance debate more affirmatively, 
good micro level data on actual participation in armed resistance is needed. 
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6 Validity and robustness 
In this chapter I evaluate the robustness of the results and discuss the validity of the inferences 
reported in Chapter 5. I do this in order to consider the degree to which the statistical findings 
actually tell us something about the real world, not just about my specific research design.  In 
discussing threats to the validity of my inferences, I use the distinction of Cook and Campbell 
(1979) between four types of validity: (i) content validity, also called construct or 
measurement validity, (ii) statistical validity, (iii) internal  validity (causality), and (iv) 
external validity (generalizability) (Lund, 2002:104-123). I conclude that the validity of my 
construct-, statistical- and causal inferences is satisfactory, but that attempts at generalizing 
from the Palestinian case to other conflict cases is fraught with uncertainty and should be 
done with caution. 
For pragmatic reasons, the robustness testing is conducted on only one of the five imputed 
datasets. I use the imputed dataset that produced the Model 3 estimates closest to the 
combined Model 3 estimates. The fact that I do not combine results across all imputed 
datasets means that standard errors are not adjusted to account for between-imputation 
variance. Significance levels should therefore be interpreted a bit more strictly. All robustness 
test models are compared a baseline model – the reduced two-level model previously called 
Model 4. Because of space constraints I only report the estimates for the dependent variable 
category of primary interest to me, “violence only”. 
6.1 Reliability 
Reliability concerns issues of consistency of measures (Bryman, 2004:70). Data are reliable to 
the degree that random errors are kept to a minimum, increasing the chance that another 
researcher would get the same results if the study was replicated. Reliable data is a 
precondition for valid inferences. Unsatisfactory reliability is a threat to all forms of validity, 
in particular statistical conclusion validity and content validity (Lund, 2002:115). 
Researchers from Fafo’s Institute for Applied International Studies have extensive experience 
with planning and conducting surveys in developing countries. They have been conducting 
surveys in the occupied Palestinian territories since 2005. Random measurement errors may 
occur, but I must assume that Fafo’s procedures for reducing them to a minimum are 
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satisfactory. I have made sure to document each stage of my analysis, to assure the 
replicability of the study.
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6.2 Content validity 
The content validity of a measure is satisfactory to the degree that the operationalized 
variables measure the theoretical concept well. Ideally each measure should cover all aspects 
of the theoretical concept it operationalizes and no other aspects (Adcock & Collier, 
2001:536). 
An important challenge to construct validity is the danger of social desirability bias. The 
problem is particularly relevant for the questions about support for violent resistance and 
political affiliation. The nature of the interview setting may result in a tendency for subjects to 
“present themselves in socially acceptable terms in order to gain the approval of others” (King 
& Bruner, 2000:81). Such a bias may suppress or obscure relationships among variables and 
even produce artificial relationships and has been documented in studies of attitudes (King & 
Bruner, 2000:81-82). In this study the danger of a social desirability bias is reinforced by the 
fact that (i) interviewers were local, thus themselves embedded in the political landscape, and 
that (ii) it was not always possible to conduct the political attitude-part of the interview (RSI 
questionnaire) with the randomly selected family member without having other family 
members present in the room (Sønsterudbråten, 2009:38-39). The former fact is unlikely to 
create systematic measurement error, as the local interviewers were well trained, came from a 
variety of backgrounds and political affiliations and interviews were assigned randomly. But 
because it was not documented whether the interviews were conducted in isolation from other 
family members, I am unable to control for the latter potential source of bias. 
Potential problems with the content validity of each specific measure in my model were 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. In this section, I demonstrate the apparent 
robustness of the measures by introducing alternative operationalizations of the most 
important concepts, using the reduced two-level model as a baseline model (Model 1, Table 
6.1). Results are displayed in Table 6.1. In Model 2, I introduce the wealth index as an 
alternative to the self-evaluated wealth measure. The effect of the index and its interaction 
with education is non-significant, and other results remain the same. In Model 3, I introduce a 
variable for the perceived status of democracy as an alternative to the perceived status of civil 
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and political rights. The democracy status variable is highly significant, and its effect about 
the same size as that of the civil and political rights status variable. Other results remain 
unchanged. In Model 4 and Model 5, I introduce alternative operationalizations of 
governorate wealth. Both the governorate-level daily wage measure and the household 
durables index return positive but insignificant effect estimates. What is interesting to note in 
these models, is that the magnitude of the effects of the horizontal inequality measures differ 
between the models with different governorate wealth operationalizations, indicating some 
problems of multicollinearity between the HI variables and the different regional wealth 
measures. Multicollinearity is discussed further in Section 6.3. 
In Model 6 through 8, I introduce alternative operationalizations of the dependent variables 
and corresponding alternative statistical models. In Model 6, the dependent variable is the 
summated scale discussed in Section 4.2, ranging from strong support for non-violence only, 
via support for both or neither, to strong support for violence only. Because the variable is 
continuous, I estimate a multilevel regression model. In Model 7, the dependent variable the 
measures support for rocket attacks. Because the variable has few categories, I should have 
estimated an ordinal two-level regression model. But for pragmatic reasons, as the model does 
not converge, I use a regular multilevel regression model. The results in both models reflect 
the baseline model well, in that the same variables (except living area refugee camp) are 
found significant, though somewhat less so for the governorate-level variables, and the signs 
are the same as in the baseline model. Model 7 is a binominal two-level regression model, 
using a dependent variable where the original dependent variable categories of “both” and 
“violence only” has been collapsed to one category for support for violence, and is compared 
to a category comprised of “neither” and “non-violence only”. Results correspond fairly well 
to the baseline model in that the same variables are highly significant. The magnitudes of the 
effects are somewhat smaller, especially for the individual-level variables. 
A potential problem with the horizontal inequality measures, discussed in Section 3.2.3, is 
that for geographical reasons Palestinians in Israel proper are measured on the “wrong side” 
of the ethnic divide. Because there are large differences in the Palestinian share of the 
population in each Israeli sub-district this might bias estimates. In Table 6.2, Model 2, I 
include a governorate-level variable measuring the share of Arabs in the neighboring Israeli 
sub-district to control for this. The variable is non-significant and does not alter the effects of 
any of the horizontal inequality measures to any significant degree.  
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Table 6.1: Content validity – alternative operationalizations of explanatory variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
exp(b) / z exp(b) / z exp(b) / z exp(b) / z exp(b) / z b / z b / z exp(b) / z
Grievances
[1] Wealth*education 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.92 -0.04 -0.01 1.04
(-0.26) (-0.15) (-0.16) (-0.31) (-0.50) (-0.14) (0.17)
[1] Wealth index*education 0.93
(-1.38)
[1] Civil and political rights 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.88***
(-3.80) (-3.83) (-3.85) (-3.81) (-4.76) (-3.10) (-2.59)
[1] Democracy status 0.77***
(-4.33)
[2] HI durables index 1.57*** 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.74*** 1.85*** 0.14** 0.14* 1.45***
(4.03) (3.89) (3.90) (3.62) (3.54) (2.29) (1.94) (3.52)
[2] HI household expenditure 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.76*** 2.01*** 1.64*** 0.19** 0.21** 1.56***
(3.80) (3.75) (3.75) (3.76) (4.01) (2.33) (2.09) (3.15)
[2] HI education 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 -0.05 -0.07 0.91
(-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.55) (-1.11) (-1.29) (-1.12)
Opportunity
[1] Self-evaluated wealth 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.02 0.04 0.05 0.95
(0.05) (-0.07) (-0.08) (0.11) (0.67) (0.63) (-0.33)
[1] Wealth index 1.25
(0.95)
[2] Regional expenditure level 1.14 1.14 1.13 0.03 0.06 1.15
(0.95) (0.99) (0.93) (0.59) (0.77) (1.18)
[2] Regional daily wage 1.31
(1.33)
[2] Regional durables index 1.23
(1.28)
Controls
[1] Political affiliation: Hamas 4.27*** 4.24*** 4.26*** 4.33*** 4.30*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 2.41***
(7.26) (7.23) (7.24) (7.30) (7.30) (7.95) (6.10) (5.58)
[1] Personal security: Feel safe 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.01 0.03 -0.01 0.91
(0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.18) (0.09) (0.75) (-0.29) (-0.82)
[1] Gender: Woman 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.92 -0.05 0.02 1.07
(-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.70) (-1.28) (0.37) (0.69)
[1] Education completed 1.01 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.00 -0.02 0.94
(0.08) (-0.43) (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.11) (0.08) (-0.39) (-0.44)
[1] Employment status: Unemployed 1.11 1.09 1.09 1.12 1.11 0.05 0.06 1.18
(0.55) (0.46) (0.47) (0.61) (0.55) (0.79) (0.84) (1.1)
[1] Living area: Urban Ref.
[1] Living area: Rural 1.02 1.00 1.02 0.97 1.07 -0.03 -0.05 1.03
(0.14) (0.01) (0.10) (-0.18) (0.42) (-0.59) (-0.81) (0.22)
[1] Living area: Refugee camp 1.32* 1.26 1.30* 1.29* 1.31* 0.01 0.06 1.32**
(1.85) (1.57) (1.81) (1.74) (1.84) (0.19) (1.13) (2.25)
[2] Casualty trend 1.53*** 1.54*** 1.50*** 1.54*** 1.48*** 0.14** 0.15** 1.43***
(3.96) (4.02) (3.77) (3.82) (4.05) (2.56) (2.16) (3.65)
[2] Proportion of young men 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.53*** -0.22*** -0.22** 0.67***
(-3.58) (-3.52) (-3.54) (-3.59) (-4.92) (-2.58) (-2.12) (-2.7)
Observations 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805
Log likelihood -2184.9 -2181.2 -2181.8 -2184.1 -2174.8 -2131.6 -2526.4 -1201.037




Notes: Dependent variable category for models 1-5 "Violence only" with reference category "Non-violence only", exp(b) reported. z-
values in parentheses. Individual and governorate level variables marked with [1] and [2], respectively. Estimates significant on the .10, 
.05 or .01 level marked with *, ** or ***, respectively. Level 2 variance reported in logit form with standard error in paranthesis. Models 6-
















Table 6.2: Alternative control variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exb(b) / z exb(b) / z exb(b) / z exb(b) / z exb(b) / z exb(b) / z
Grievances
[1] Wealth*education 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.93
(-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.27) (-0.19) (-0.17) (-0.26)
[1] Civil and political rights 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.79***
(-3.80) (-3.77) (-3.81) (-3.74) (-3.89) (-3.80)
[2] HI durables index 1.57*** 1.62*** 1.51*** 1.57*** 1.61*** 1.59***
(4.03) (4.44) (3.71) (4.07) (4.25) (4.12)
[2] HI household expenditure 1.76*** 1.76*** 1.82*** 1.53** 1.65*** 1.78***
(3.80) (4.05) (4.14) 2.57 (3.26) (3.86)
[2] HI education 0.95 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.94
(-0.60) (-1.18) (-1.19) (-0.97) (-1.06) (-0.66)
Opportunity
[1] Self-evaluated wealth 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.01
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.01) (-0.09) (0.04)
[2] Regional expenditure level 1.14 1.07 1.08 1.24 1.06 1.11
(0.95) (0.52) (0.51) (1.60) (0.44) (0.81)
Controls
[1] Political affiliation: Hamas 4.27*** 4.23*** 4.21*** 4.20*** 4.36*** 4.28***
(7.26) (7.22) (7.17) (7.16) (7.35) (7.27)
[1] Personal security: Feel safe 1.02 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.01
(0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.17) (0.22) (0.09)
[1] Gender: Woman 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92
(-0.70) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.77) (-0.64) (-0.68)
[1] Education completed 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (-0.00) (-0.03) (0.09)
[1] Employment status: Unemployed 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.13 1.12
(0.55) (0.51) (0.51) (0.48) (0.65) (0.61)
[1] Living area: Urban Ref.
[1] Living area: Rural 1.02 1.06 1.05 1.05 0.95 1.02
(0.14) (0.37) (0.31) (0.32) (-0.33) (0.11)
[1] Living area: Refugee camp 1.32* 1.31* 1.35** 1.36** 1.29* 1.41**
(1.85) (1.87) (2.03) (2.07) (1.73) (2.13)
[1] Refugee status 0.85
(-1.12)
[2] Casualty trend 1.53*** 1.59*** 1.74*** 1.64*** 1.56*** 1.53***
(3.96) (4.38) (4.12) (4.36) (4.19) (3.96)
[2] Proportion of young men 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.38*** 0.81 0.62*** 0.55***
(-3.58) (-3.92) (-3.37) (-0.82) (-2.85) (-3.68)




[2] Prop. young men*unemployment 258.7
(1.63)
[2] Intensity: Exposure to Israeli violence 0.79*
(-1.88)
[2] Intensity: Martyrs 0.83
(-1.63)
Observations 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805 1805
Log likelihood -2184.9 -2182.7 -2180.6 -2179.9  -2181.0 -2184
Level 2 variance 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Notes: Dependent variable category "Violence only" with reference category "Non-violence only". Exp(b) reported, with z-values in 
parentheses. Individual and governorate level variables marked with [1] and [2], respectively. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or 













In sum, I find my results are robust across alternative operationalizations of the dependent and 
explanatory variables. I conclude that the content validity of the measures in the model is 
sufficient. Table 6.2 displays the consequences of adding alternative control variables. With 
the exception of exposure to Israeli violence, they are all statically insignificant. As discussed 
elsewhere, bringing the refugee status variable back in increases the significance of refugee 
status, indicating omitted variable bias if excluded. What is interesting to note is that the signs 
of both alternative operationalizations of conflict intensity are negative, indicating that while 
a positive short-term increase in the number of casualties in a governorate (the casualty trend) 
increases support for violence, long-term increased intensity, in particular exposure to Israeli 
violence, tends to reduce such support. 
6.3 Statistical conclusion validity 
An inference is statistically valid to the degree that it is statistically significant and reasonably 
strong (Lund, 2002:115). Only when these conditions are fulfilled can we assume that the 
observed relationship represents something systematic, not just coincidences or sampling 
error. The most important threats to such validity are (i) insufficient statistical power and (ii) 
unfulfilled statistical assumptions (Lund, 2002:286).  
The statistical power is a function of several factors, among them sample size and 
significance level. The significance levels chosen (1, 5 and 10 percent) in this study should be 
sufficiently strict to assure sufficient statistical power. The total sample size of 1805 
respondents is fairly large. For testing fixed coefficients, small samples of individuals within 
some governorates are not a problem, as long as the total sample size is sufficiently large 
(Snijders, 2005). The main limiting characteristic of statistical power in a multilevel design is 
not the total sample size but the sample size at the highest level (Snijders, 2005). In this case 
the number of top-level clusters – 16 governorates – is fairly low. As shown in a 
comprehensive Monte Carlo study by Stegmueller (forthcoming), maximum likelihood 
estimates for macro-level variables are likely to be biased upwards when the number of 
clusters is smaller than 20. More importantly, 95 percent confidence intervals become too 
narrow. Models with only random intercepts are the best-case scenario, however – as long as 
at least 15 clusters are available they are biased only to a limited extent (Stegmueller, 
forthcoming). Thus, while 16 governorates results in somewhat anticonservative hypothesis 
tests, it can still be justified, particularly when z-values are as high as those of the significant 
estimates in my model. 
94 
 




As discussed in Section 4.4.2, I use a multilevel model to account for the fact that individuals 
are nested within governorates, meaning that observations are not independent and residuals 
not uncorrelated. In the multilevel model standard errors are also adjusted to let the 
governorate-level variables be evaluated with the correct number of degrees of freedom. By 
combining results across the imputed datasets according to the rules of Rubin (1987), as 
described in Appendix 5, I make sure that standard errors are adjusted to account for between-
imputation variance as well.  
Statistical assumptions include the assumptions of the multinominal logistic regression model 
and the multilevel model. A first important statistical assumption for both types of models is 
exogeneity. No independent variable in the model should be correlated with the error term. 
Important threats to exogeneity – omitted variable bias, measurement error and simultaneity – 
are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  
A second assumption is linearity. The assumption is that the effect of each independent 
variable is correctly described by the logistic S-curve when untransformed, and thus linear 
when logit-transformed (Skog, 2005:380). It must hold for all partial relationships in the 
model. “Violating the assumption of linearity [...] implies that the model fails to capture the 
systematic pattern of relationship between the dependent and independent variables. […] [A] 
partial relationship specified to be linear may be nonlinear, or two independent variables 
specified to have additive partial effects may interact in determining y” (Fox, 1991:53-54). 
While I am unable to empirically test each partial relationship in the model, I see no 
theoretical reason to expect that any of the relationships in the model are U-shaped or are 
contingent on each other (other than the interaction term already specified in the model) and 
will therefore assume that the logistic curve is a sufficiently good approximation of all partial 
relationships. The fairly even distribution of residuals around the regression lines (Figure 6.1) 
strengthens this assumption. 
A third important assumption for multinominal logistic models is the “independence from 
irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) property. The assumption is that the different odds do not 
depend on what other alternatives are in the alternative set (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 
2003:270). Removing or adding a category on the dependent variable should not alter the 
odds of any of the original categories. The odds of choosing to ride a bike to work rather than 
take the red bus should remain the same if the alternative of taking a blue bus is introduced 
(McFadden, 1973:113). In this case it might be overly restrictive to assume that removing the 
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“both” category on the dependent variable would leave the odds of supporting “violence 
only” rather than “non-violence only” unaltered. Still I do not think the problem is serious 
enough to justify choosing the overly complex model that would result from attempting to 
accounting for possible breaches of the IIA assumption by including random effects (Skrondal 
& Rabe-Hesketh, 2003:271). 
Collinearity, the existence of strong relationships between independent variables in the model, 
can make regression coefficients unstable (Fox, 1991:10-11). The relationship among the 
independent variables must be very strong to seriously degrade the precision of estimates, 
however (Ibid). The only variables in my model that might correlate that strongly are the 
horizontal inequality variables. In Model 7, 8 and 9 (Table 6.3), I therefore include each of the 
horizontal inequality variables separately, to avoid possible problems of multicollinearity 
between them and the related problem of overdetermination. For the economic horizontal 
inequality variables, both their magnitudes and z-values are reduced, indicating that they 
should not both have been included in the baseline model simultaneously. Still the effects are 
both sufficiently strong and significant that the statistical inferences made in Chapter 5 should 
hold. The effect estimates of the horizontal inequality variables also vary somewhat 
depending on which governorate-level wealth proxy is included (Model 1, 4 and 5, Table 6.1), 
indicating some collinearity, but the main results hold across all operationalization. 
6.3.1 Outliers and influential data points 
Unusual data may unduly influence results and can signal that the model fails to capture 
important aspects of the data. An outlier is “an observation whose dependent variable value is 
unusual given the value of the independent variable” (Fox, 1991:21). Such a data point is 
influential to the degree that excluding it and re-estimating the model would significantly alter 
estimates. To check for outliers on the individual level, I calculate Pearson and deviance 
residuals and standardize them. Individuals with standardized residuals above three qualify as 
outliers. Pearson residuals for all respondents on all outcomes can be graphically inspected in 
Figure 6.1. To make sure they do not influence the results to any undue degree, I exclude all 
individuals with standardized Pearson or deviance residual above three. This leads to the 
exclusion of 5 percent of the sample (87 individuals). Results are reported in Model 2, Table 
6.3. They remain almost identical, indicating that none of these individuals influence the 
analysis unduly for the “violence only” outcome.  
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              Figure 6.1: Pearson residual plot 
 
As recommended and described by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2003), I use standardized 
residuals and their deletion counterparts to flag potential outliers at the governorate-level. 
Deletion residuals are calculated by comparing actual value on the dependent variable to the 
expected dependent variable value in a model estimated without the governorate in question. 
They are then standardized. As shown in Table 6.4, the standardized residuals and 
standardized deletion residuals both indicate that none of the governorates are outliers, as they 
do not have standardized residuals or deletion residuals above three.  
To determine whether any of the governorates are influential for any particular parameter, I 
calculate DfBetas for the most important parameters (Table 6.4). They are estimated by 
calculating the difference between the effect estimate in question in a model including all 
governorates and a model excluding the governorate in question, then dividing the difference 
by the standard error or the effect estimate in the full model (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 
2003). It measures how many standard deviations an effect estimate changes if a specific 
governorate is excluded from the estimation sample.  
In this case DfBetas indicate that some governorates influence specific effect estimates to a 
degree that warrants closer attention. In particular, the governorates of the Central West Bank 
influence several effect estimates to a large degree. Ramallah has lower support for violent 
resistance than one would expect from its level of economic horizontal inequality, making the 
overall effect of these variables smaller in the full model than in a model excluding the 
governorate. This might be due to the “Ramallah bubble” (Ehrenreich, 2013) phenomenon. 
The Oslo Accords created a local elite that  
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lives comfortably within the so-called “Ramallah bubble”: the bright and relatively carefree 
world of cafes, NGO salaries and imported goods that characterize life in the West Bank’s 
provisional capital. During the day, the clothing shops and fast-food franchises are filled. New 
high-rises are going up everywhere. […] [T]here are no checkpoints inside Ramallah. The 
I.D.F. only occasionally enters the city, and usually only at night (Ehrenreich, 2013). 
Ramallah has the best prospects for social mobility in the Palestinian territories 
(Sønsterudbråten, 2009:75). With its low poverty rate, high educational attainment, high 
emigration and disproportionately high share of people educated abroad, the city is 
characterized by globalized urbanity and is the center of political leadership and intellectual 
communities (Hilal, 2006:202; Tarākī & Giacaman, 2006:31-34). Living under such 
conditions of apparent normalcy could make group comparison less prominent for many 
individuals than it is in the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories. 
 
























Jenin 0.56 0.99 0.09 0.30 0.20 0.10
Tubas -0.42 -0.70 -0.20 0.05 0.23 0.13
Tulkarm 0.47 0.55 0.06 0.07 -0.09 0.18
Nablus 0.31 0.50 -0.06 -0.28 0.06 -0.34
Qalqilya 0.58 0.77 -0.14 -0.23 -0.42 -0.24
Salfit -0.30 -0.35 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02
Ramallah 2.33 0.02 -2.07 -1.07 -1.45 -0.40
Jericho 1.20 0.10 0.23 0.90 1.72 -2.07
Jerusalem -0.11 -0.0003 -0.64 0.62 -0.02 -1.49
Bethlehem -1.22 -1.89 0.69 0.30 -0.19 0.45
Hebron -0.92 -1.42 -0.23 -0.21 0.35 -0.16
Gaza North 0.26 0.69 0.04 0.18 -0.10 0.07
Gaza -1.26 -2.67 0.80 -0.54 0.51 0.97
Deir al Balah -0.38 -1.32 0.24 0.11 0.29 0.11
Khan Yunis -1.34 -0.14 0.63 0.59 0.44 0.42
Rafah 0.80 1.26 0.44 0.10 -0.27 -0.12
DfBetas
Notes: Deletion residuals calculated by estimating model 4 without the governorate in question 
and comparing actual y to expected y in the estimated model. DfBetas are given by the difference 
between the effect estimate in question in a model with and a model without the governorate in 
question, divided by the standard error of the effect estimate in the full model.
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Other deviations are more difficult to explain. Jericho makes the effect of the educational 
horizontal inequality measure non-significant in the full model, if the governorate is excluded 
the effect is negative and significant. Ramallah pulls in the other direction, however, if it is 
excluded the effect gets a positive sign, but is non-significant. Jerusalem and Jericho are both 
suppressing the effect of the governorate expenditure level. If either is excluded, the effect 
becomes significant and positive, indicating some support for the Sønsterudbråten (2009) 
argument that the higher the level of regional wealth the more likely an individual is to be 
able to afford to take the risk of supporting violent resistance. 
Because of their high DfBetas, the three governorates of the Central West Bank are excluded 
in Model 3, Table 6.3. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, this increases the estimated effect of the 
economic horizontal inequality variables on the probability of supporting violent resistance 
only. The most interesting change in results is that the effect of regional wealth becomes 
significant on the 10 percent level, with a positive sign. This might indicate that the rejection 
of the regional argument of Sønsterudbråten (2009) was premature. With a z-value of 1.71 the 
effect is only just significant, however, and it might not have been if the robustness analysis 
was extended across the five imputed datasets and standard errors were adjusted for between-
imputation variance. Thus this is unlikely to threaten the validity of the previous discussion to 
any substantial degree. 
6.4 Internal validity: Causality 
An inference is internally valid to the degree that we can be sure that the statistically valid 
relationship in question is causal in nature (Lund, 2002:105). In non-experimental designs 
there are two main threats to such validity. First, omitted variable bias threatens causal 
inference. The model is designed minimize the risk, however, by including as controls 
variables there are theoretical reasons to expect to affect both the dependent variable and one 
or more of the explanatory variables. As discussed in Chapter 5, Model 6 in Table 6.2 
indicates that excluding refugee status produces some omitted variable bias with regards to 
the effect of refugee camp. The effects of the explanatory variables remain the same, 
however. 
Second, which variable is the cause and which is the effect in a statistical relationship is not 
always clear-cut. This is the problem of directionality (Lund, 2002:117). The fact that my 
dependent variable is attitudinal makes reversed causality unlikely for the significant 
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explanatory relationships in the model. If the dependent variable was participation in 
resistance, one might imagine that such participation could affect how an individual perceived 
the civil and political rights status of the occupied territories, through experiences with 
government crackdowns. It seems intuitively unlikely, however, that an individual’s 
attitudinal support for violent or other resistance should affect his or her perception of the 
status of civil and political rights. Neither does it seem particularly likely that an individual’s 
attitudinal support for violent resistance would affect the objective wealth or economic 
horizontal inequality of his or her governorate of residence.  
Directionality is not clear-cut for all the significant control variables either. In particular, the 
causality of the effect of political affiliation on support for resistance could be questioned. 
First, some might argue that affiliation with Hamas necessarily implies support for their 
strategy of armed resistance. If so, political affiliation with Hamas does not explain support 
for rocket attacks. Instead the two are alternative measures of the same underlying concept – 
“a disposition to favor armed resistance” (Sønsterudbråten, 2009:66). I argue that this is not 
the case. Hamas has come to represent much more than a strategy of armed resistance. 
Reportedly, many people voted for Hamas in 2006 because of the organization’s widespread 
social and charity work or because of disillusion with the patrimonial and corrupt Fatah-run 
Palestinian Authorities and the failure of the peace process (Mishal & Sela, 2006:xiii-xv; 
Tamimi, 2007:219-221). Comparing Model 3 in Table 6.5 to the baseline model shows that 
support for Hamas rather than Fatah is not determined by the same factors as support for 
violent resistance rather than non-violent resistance. Thus, political affiliation and support for 
rocket attacks appear to be two distinct concepts with different determinants.  
Second, Sønsterudbråten (2009:67-70) found that political affiliation was an intervening 
variable for many of the causal relationships she investigated. The results reported in Table 
6.5 indicate that this is not the case for any of the relevant relationships in my model. Other 
effects remain almost identical to the baseline model in a model excluding the political 
affiliation variable (Model 2). Also, the variables that significantly affect support for Hamas 














[1] Wealth*education 0.93 0.88 0.73
(-0.26) (-0.46) (-0.85)
[1] Civil and political rights 0.79*** 0.83*** 1.11
(-3.80) (-3.08) (1.28)
[2] HI durables index 1.57*** 1.58*** 1.40**
(4.03) (4.20) (2.53)
[2] HI household expenditure 1.76*** 1.75*** 1.19
(3.80) (3.85) (1.00)
[2] HI education 0.95 0.94 1.00
(-0.60) (-0.74) (-0.00)
Opportunity
[1] Self-evaluated wealth 1.01 1.05 1.20
(0.05) (0.26) (0.69)
[2] Regional expenditure level 1.14 1.11 1.00
(0.95) (0.82) (-0.03)
Controls
[1] Political affiliation: Hamas 4.27***
(7.26)
[1] Personal security: Feel safe 1.02 1.12 2.38***
(0.15) (0.85) (4.39)
[1] Gender: Woman 0.92 0.98 2.03***
(-0.70) (-0.20) (4.04)
[1] Education completed 1.01 1.04 1.12
(0.08) (0.23) (0.50)
[1] Employment status: Unemployed 1.11 1.08 0.98
(0.55) (0.44) (-0.06)
[1] Living area: Urban Ref.
[1] Living area: Rural 1.02 0.96 0.53***
(0.14) (-0.28) (-2.77)
[1] Living area: Refugee camp 1.32* 1.29* 0.71*
(1.85) (1.80) (-1.76)
[2] Casualty trend 1.53*** 1.51*** 0.98
(3.96) (3.92) (-0.12)
[2] Proportion of young men 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.93
(-3.58) (-3.45) (-0.32)
Observations 1805 1805 1805
Log likelihood -2184.9 -2218.6 -2497.5







Notes: Dependent variable for models 1-2 category "Violence only" with reference 
category "Non-violence only". Exp(b) reported, with z-values in parentheses. 
Individual and governorate level variables marked with [1] and [2], respectively. 
Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 level marked with *, ** or ***, 




Third, some might argue that party affiliation is determined by prior attitudes rather than the 
other way around, or that the causality goes both ways. According to Dancey and Goren 
(2010:687) the classic conceptualization of the relationship between party identification and 
issue attitudes in the American context holds that partisanship can be expected to shape 
political attitudes and beliefs. This is in line with my operationalization of political affiliation 
as affecting attitudes towards resistance. Newer research indicates, however, that when the 
issues in question are viewed as personally important (Carsey & Layman, 2006) or the issue is 
central in political debate and media coverage (Dancey & Goren, 2010), individuals 
simultaneously update party ties and issue preferences. Still, consistent with the classic model, 
they found that the effects of party identification on issue attitudes typically outweigh those of 
the reverse causal chain (Carsey & Layman, 2006:474). The issue of resistance is 
undoubtedly central and personally important to many Palestinians, so there is a possibility 
that the statistical assumption of exogeneity is violated for the political affiliation variable. 
But since political affiliation is only a control variable in my model, and excluding the 
variable from the model does not change results significantly (Model 2, Table 6.5), I do not 
consider this a serious problem.  
6.5 External validity: Generalizability 
6.5.1 Within-case generalizability 
The first form of generalization concerns generalizing within the case, from the sample to the 
specific population, situation and point in time the research question covers (Lund, 2002:105). 
The main threat to such validity is a non-representative sample due to either non-random 
sampling or non-response. Non-response comes in two forms. Item non-response is when a 
respondent does not answer one or more of the relevant survey questions. Respondent non-
response is when a respondent targeted by the sampling design does not answer any questions 
at all. If listwise deletion is applied, both forms of non-response may threaten within-case 
generalizability by resulting in a non-representative sample. 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, Fafo’s sampling procedure seems sufficiently random not to 
threaten within-case generalizability. To minimize the risk of bias from item non-response, I 
used multiple imputation of missing data, as discussed in Section 4.1.3. I used adjusted 
probability weights in the one-level model to account for design effects and minimize the risk 
of bias associated with respondent non-response, as discussed in Section 4.1.2. In the 
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multilevel models, I am unable to include weights. To minimize the risk that respondent non-
response should bias the results in these models, I run the baseline model on a dataset where I 
include the respondents that did not complete their interviews and impute the missing data, 
resulting in a dataset with 1978 respondents. By including these respondents I am trying to 
make the sample as representative as possible by reducing the respondent non-response rate 
and making use of the information I have about the respondents with incomplete interviews. 
As shown in Model 4, Table 6.3, results from the baseline model remain fairly robust across 
the two datasets. The only difference is that the magnitude of some of the effects is slightly 
reduced in the larger dataset.
40
 
I cannot be sure that the 18 respondents who were targeted by Fafo but refused to participate 
do not deviate from the other respondents in some way that would change results if they were 
included. Still, in light of the precautions I have taken to limit potential bias and the result of 
the robustness test just outlined, I would argue that results are generalizable to the population 
and time in question, namely all Palestinians above the age of 18 in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank in the first months of 2011. 
6.5.2 Across-case generalizability: Representativeness 
The second form of generalization concerns generalizing across populations, situations and 
time periods (Lund, 2002:122). This form of generalization is more clearly non-statistical. 
When considering to what degree the results of a single case study are relevant for other 
populations and historical circumstances, researcher discretion is required (Skog, 2005:114). 
The central question is to what degree each relationship the analysis has uncovered could be 
contingent on individuals, sub-groups, situations or time periods (Lund, 2002:121-123).  
Generalizing from a single case cannot be done with any specified degree of (un)certainty. 
But techniques exist that can aid the researcher in identifying cases that mirror the relevant 
causal features of a larger population of cases (Gerring, 2007:88). In this study the choice of 
the Palestinian case was informed mainly by pragmatic, rather than strategic and theoretical, 
considerations. Obtaining good micro data to underpin the opportunity and grievance 
arguments is a difficult task, given that conflict situations often create complex and dangerous 
environments where the collection of representative survey data difficult and expensive. The 
existence and availability of good and relevant micro data on Palestinians in the West Bank 
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 Model 5, Table 6.3, shows that the results from the baseline model remain approximately the same when the 
model is estimated in the unimputed dataset as well.  
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and the Gaza Strip provides a good reason for choosing this case. Still, when a case is chosen 
for pragmatic reasons, there is always a chance that the availability comes at the cost of 
representativeness, thereby jeopardizing the generalizability of findings across cases. 
The purpose of the following discussion is to consider to what degree the case under study is 
representative of the larger universe or population of civil war cases.
41
 By considering how 
the case is situated within this population, I will be able to draw some tentative conclusions 
about the generalizability or non-generalizability of the results across cases and thus how 
large a theoretical contribution the study makes to the grievance-opportunity debate. In 
considering the representativeness of the Palestinian case, I draw on the discussion of Gerring 
(2007:86-97) on strategic selection of cases. The strategy of most relevance here is the 
selection of a typical case. A case that is a typical example of some cross-case relationship(s) 
is per definition representative (Gerring, 2007:91). The ideal method for maximizing the 
probability of finding a typical case is to perform regression analysis on the larger sample of 
cases and choose a case with a small residual, one that lies close to the regression line 
(Gerring, 2007:93-96). I am unable to conduct a large-N cross-case study to evaluate how 
close to the regression line the Palestine-Israeli conflict falls for the relevant relationships. In 
the following discussion, I will argue instead that the case is not atypical for the causal 
relationships under evaluation, and thus it is to some limited degree representative.  
The class of cases I want my study to shed light on is internal conflicts. But not all scholars 
would agree that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict fits this category. Before discussing the 
representativeness of the Palestinian-Israeli case, I will therefore briefly review and challenge 
three reasons not to classify the conflict as internal.
42
 First, the conflict could historically be 
considered an inter-state conflict as much as an internal conflict, because it has involved 
                                                 
41
 It is important to keep in mind that I refer to “populations” on two different levels. In the previous discussion 
the population I referred to was the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is my target 
population within the case of Palestine and the population my research question specifies. It is the object of the 
within-case generalizations discussed the previous section. In the following discussion I refer instead to a 
population of cases, of which Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the one case selected for study. 
The question is to what degree the findings from the Palestinian case are generalizable to this larger population 
of civil conflict cases. This study makes a theoretical contribution to the grievance-opportunity debate to the 
degree that its findings can be reasonably assumed to transfer to other cases of conflict. 
42
 As acknowledged by Bhavnani et al. (2011:154), the Palestinias-Israeli conflict has been classified differently 
in different cross-national datasets. Much of the diversion in coding is due to the application of different battle-
death thresholds in different datasets, however. While in most periods the coders agree that the conflict does not 
amount to a civil war (the most common battle-death threshold being 1000 per year), the UCDP/PRIO armed 
conflict dataset, version 4, 2008 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002) categorizes the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict as an intermediate internal conflict (Bhavnani et al., 2011:154). 
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several wars between Israel and various Arab states. The last inter-state war was in 1973
43
, 
however. After peace agreements were brokered with Egypt and Jordan in the 1970s and 
1990s the inter-state conflict elements became less pronounced, while the two Intifadas 
brought the internal conflict elements to the fore.  
Second, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is formally and legally special in that there is an illegal 
occupation involved. But even if the territories are formally occupied, in practice “Israeli 
military control, financing and maintenance of civic institutions, conduct of municipal 
elections in the 1970s and 1980s and issuance of travel documents to Palestinians all serve as 
indicators of Israel’s ‘‘quasi-sovereignty’’ over the Occupied Territories since 1967” 
(Bhavnani et al., 2011:154). With the Oslo Accords the occupied territories were more 
formally classified as quasi-sovereign zones with the division into A-, B- and C-areas. The 
building of illegal settlements on occupied West Bank soil, vocally and legally contested but 
tacitly accepted by the international community, serve to reinforce the picture of the West 
Bank as de facto part of Israeli territory. And even if Israel has formally withdrawn from 
Gaza after 2005, its economic and military control remains intact. The Israeli quasi-
sovereignty was challenged in the Intifadas (Ibid) and later by continued rocket launches. In 
practice there is nothing exceptional about this sort of insurgency challenging the sovereignty 
of a state in parts of its (de facto) territory.  
Third, after Hamas’ electoral victory in Gaza in 2006, clashes between Fatah and Hamas 
added another layer to the internal conflict. But this is not a unique phenomenon. It should be 
considered an instance of triadic civil war (Bhavnani et al., 2011:136) or inter-rebel violence 
(Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012), fighting between groups on the non-state side during a civil 
conflict. Other examples include conflicts in Sudan, Myanmar and Afghanistan (Fjelde & 
Nilsson, 2012:604). The new conflict layer should not affect the mechanism of group 
comparison much. The strong ethnic and historical elements of the civil conflict should mean 
that Israelis remain the principal reference group for Palestinians in both the West Bank and 
Gaza. The new situation might have affected individual economic incentives. But the worst 
inter-rebel fighting was over and territorial control consolidated by the time the Fafo data 
were collected in 2011.  
In sum, there is little reason not to classify the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an internal 
conflict. But the extent of the theoretical contribution made by this study also depends on the 
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 Except for the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. 
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degree to which the conflict is representative of the relationships on question. I will therefore 
outline the most important reasons why some researchers consider the conflict exceptional, 
while arguing that none of them make the Palestinian case atypical for the causal relationships 
in question – horizontal inequality (relative group deprivation) and opportunity costs. For the 
proposed opportunity cost mechanism, representativeness has already been discussed in some 
detail in Section 5.3. 
First, some scholars might argue that its mere duration makes the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
atypical. The conflict is one of the longest-running in the modern era (Yehoshua, 2011). I will 
argue that this fact in itself does not make the Palestinian case atypical for the grievance and 
opportunity mechanisms, however. The theories under study are developed to explain conflict 
onset rather than conflict duration, but I find this distinction less relevant for micro level 
testing than in macro level research. In macro-level research the dependent variable is usually 
conflict versus no conflict in a given country-year. Both the macro theories under study 
propose that for conflict to occur a certain number of people must be available for 
mobilization due to the incentives stemming either from opportunity cost or some form of 
relative deprivation. These proposed mechanisms conceptually rest on the micro level, but are 
aggregated to the macro level via the mobilization of a number of combatants deemed 
sufficient to start an insurgency amounting to an internal conflict. Micro level tests concern 
whether the proposed mechanisms whereby individual incentives are turned into actual 
participation, or in this case support for such participation, hold. The opportunity cost and 
relative group deprivation mechanisms both hinge on the individual’s incentives to support or 
participate in resistance. While one specific individual’s incentives might change over time if 
the conflict situation changes the economic situation of the household or individual or the 
political or economic position relative to the adversary, the hypothesized mechanisms should 
remain logically unaltered despite a conflict’s prolonged duration. 
Second, the specific incompatibilies involved, in particular the centrality of the refugee 
question and the importance of Jerusalem to three world religions, may lead some researchers 
to argue that the conflict is exceptional. But there are incomparable and seemingly insolvable 
issues involved in most internal conflicts. The mere presence of such issues does not make the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict exceptional. The strong feelings involved might contribute to 
making the case an easier test for the grievance arguments, however. 
107 
 
Demonstrating that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not atypical does not guarantee its 
representativeness. Generalizing to the entire population of internal conflicts must still be 
done with extreme caution. Generalizing to a well-defined sub-group of internal conflicts 
might be a little less risky, however. It can be argued that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
belongs to a sub-group often referred to as protracted social conflicts (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 
1998)
44
. Such conflicts are characterized by their totality (touching on wider aspects of 
cultural and political life and including institutions as well as leaders and publics in the 
conflict), protractedness (duration of at least a generation means deep-rooted animosity and 
prejudice develops), centrality (reflected in the saliency of the conflict issues on the public 
and group agendas and historical narratives), violence, and a perception of irreconcilability 
(the conflict is seen as zero-sum by both sides) (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998:761-762). 
According to Kelman (1997:212) and Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998:762), the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is a typical case of this kind of ethno-nationalist conflict. If so, we can say 
with a little more certainty that the conflict could be representative for the causal processes in 
this sub-group than across other sub-groups. In line with the typological theory of (George & 
Bennett, 2005:110), I therefore argue that the results of the study can be generalized with 




I believe the results can be tentatively extended to other sub-groups of internal conflict as 
well. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not atypical in any 
respects relevant to the causal mechanisms in question. But in the absence of global micro-
level data, the only way to generalize across types of cases with any kind of certainty is to 
conduct case studies similar to this study on other internal conflicts. External validity across 
cases could be enhanced by choosing most similar or most different cases (Gerring, 2007:131-
150) or by deliberately sampling for heterogeneity (Gerring, 2007:97-101), defining classes of 
persons, settings and times to ensure that “a wide range of instances from within each class is 
represented in the design” (Cook & Campbell, 1979:75).  
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 Also called intractable conflicts, deep-rooted conflicts or enduring rivalry (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). 
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 Examples of protracted social conflict mentioned by Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) are Northern Ireland, Sri 




In this chapter I have evaluated the validity of the inferences made in Chapter 5. I conclude 
that the validity of the content-, statistical-, and causal inferences is sufficient. I can also with 
a reasonable level of certainty generalize to the specified population of interest, Palestinians 
over 18 in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not an atypical case 
when it comes to the causal relationships under investigation, and I will argue that tentative 
generalization of results across cases is possible. Such generalization to other times and other 
conflicts must nonetheless be treated with extreme caution, as it cannot be conducted with any 




This study has aimed to uncover how grievance and opportunity factors affect attitudinal 
support for violent and non-violent resistance among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 
To that end survey data has been applied to operationalize the mechanisms proposed in the 
traditionally macro-oriented theories of the opportunity-grievance debate on the micro level. 
On the grievance side of the debate, I hypothesized that the poorer a highly educated 
individual is (Hypothesis 1), the better an individual considers the civil and political rights 
situation (Hypothesis 2) and the larger the difference in economic conditions between the 
individual’s own governorate and the closest Israeli sub-district is (Hypothesis 3), the more 
likely he or she is to support violent resistance. On the opportunity side, I hypothesized that 
coming from a less wealthy household (Hypothesis 4) or a less wealthy governorate 
(Hypothesis 5) would significantly reduce support for violent resistance. 
Results indicate support for the economic element in Hypothesis 3. Individuals are more 
likely to support violent resistance the larger the difference in economic conditions between 
their own governorate and the closest Israeli sub-district. This points to the centrality of the 
ethnic group element, and is in line with the horizontal inequality mechanism proposed by 
Cederman et al. (2011) – group identities become more salient the higher the horizontal 
inequality, as the psychological process of group comparison intensifies. Thus objective 
horizontal inequality leads to a subjective state of relative group deprivation (cf. Gurr, 1970), 
creating frustration and anger that increases the probability of supporting violent resistance.  
Hypothesis 2 was also supported. Higher perceived status of civil and political rights is 
associated with lower levels of support for violent resistance. The hypothesized mechanism, 
as conceptualized by Gurr (1970), is that frustration arises when people feel there is a 
discrepancy between the amount of freedom and political participation they are allowed, and 
the amount they feel entitled to. The political reality in the occupied Palestinian territories is 
that decisions vital for the present and future of Palestinians (e.g. settlements and economic 
closure) are made by Israeli authorities that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have no 
access to. I have argued that the reference point against which this situation of powerlessness 
is likely to be measured for most Palestinians is Israeli Jews as a group. If so, Hypothesis 2 
implicitly captures the group comparison element sufficiently well that support for this 




I found no support for Hypothesis 1 – highly educated individuals in the poorer segments of 
the population are no more likely to support violent resistance than others.  The reason could 
be that this hypothesis captures vertical inequality better than it captures group comparison. 
While I cannot discard the possibility that for some highly educated Palestinians have as their 
primary point of reference the economic situation of Israelis with comparable levels of 
education, the main mechanism of the operationalization is one of comparison to an ideal 
situation of better economic conditions that higher education makes an individual entitled to. 
Thus the element of group comparison might not be as explicit as it is in the domain of civil 
and political rights, where the rights in question are granted or denied to groups as such. 
The opportunity cost argument for Hypothesis 4 – that individuals from less wealthy 
households are more likely to support violent resistance than others – found no statistical 
support. Thus the pure opportunity cost mechanism of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) – the less 
and individual can expect to earn, the less he has to lose by joining a rebel force – is not 
supported. Neither is the modified mechanism of Justino (2009) – that poverty should 
increase support for insurgents because it increases both the risks associated with non-support 
and benefits of supporting relative to the costs of non-support of insurgents. The opportunity 
cost argument did not hold on the governorate level either. No relationship between 
governorate-level wealth and support for violent resistance is evident in the data.  
Results remain robust across a range of alternative operationalizations and specifications of 
the model. The finding that grievance variables affect support for violent resistance while 
opportunity variables do not is also confirmed by in-sample and out-of-sample tests of 
predictive power. When combined, the significant grievance variables make a small but 
significant contribution to the predictive power of the model. The opportunity variables have 
no such effect. 
When evaluating the theoretical contribution the study makes to the opportunity-grievance 
debate, the nature of the dependent variable must be emphasized. Using an attitudinal 
dependent variable to test macro theories that make assumptions about micro level 
mechanisms of actual participation is a design with important limitations. First, studying 
support for violence rather than participation in it provides a somewhat easy test for the 
horizontal inequality theory. I am unable to test the second part of the Cederman et al. (2011) 
mechanism – how group mobilization overcomes the collective action problem and turns 
grievances into actual participation in violent resistance. Second, the attitudinal dependent 
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variable provides a very tough test for opportunity theory. Collective action can be considered 
a process consisting of a sequence of steps: (i) becoming a sympathizer, (ii) being targeted for 
mobilization, (iii) becoming motivated to participate, and (iv) moving from intention to actual 
participation (Klandermans, 1997:208). Opportunity considerations are more likely to come 
into play in the later stages of mobilization than in first stage of attitude formation. Therefore, 
the non-finding of any effect of regional and household level poverty on support for violent 
resistance does not disprove opportunity theory as such. A relationship may well exist 
between poverty and actual participation in insurgency that the attitudinal dependent variable 
makes this study unable to capture. To solve the opportunity-grievance debate, micro data on 
actual participation or intention to participate must be collected. 
Generalizing from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to a larger universe of conflict cases is 
fraught with uncertainty and must be done with caution. While I have argued that the conflict 
is not atypical in any respect relevant for the causal mechanisms under study, this does not 
guarantee its representativeness for the universe of cases. Such representativeness is most 
likely for the sub-group of conflict cases often referred to as protracted social conflicts, as the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is often considered typical for this sub-group, and I have argued 
that the results of this study can be generalized with some limited (though unspecified) degree 
of certainty to other cases of this kind. Whether results are non-generalizable across other sub-
groups because of interaction between characteristics of the sub-group in question and one or 
more of the independent variables in the theories under evaluation, is a matter that cannot be 
tested without conducting cross-country large-N research or more than one case study. In the 
absence of global micro-level data, the only way to generalize across types of cases with any 
kind of certainty is to conduct case studies similar to this study on civil conflicts belonging to 
other sub-groups. External validity across cases could be enhanced by choosing most similar 
or most different cases (Gerring, 2007:131-150) or by deliberately sampling for heterogeneity 
(Gerring, 2007:97-101), defining classes of persons, settings and times to ensure that “a wide 
range of instances from within each class is represented in the design” (Cook & Campbell, 
1979:75).  
By way of policy implications, the results of the study suggest that raising the relative living 
standard, political participation and civil freedom of marginalized groups is one way to go to 
reduce public support for violent strategies of resistance. Reduced public support for violence 
in key constituencies might then influence public opinion sensitive rebel groups like Hamas to 
shift their modus operandi towards increased use of non-violent strategies. The relatively 
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modest predictive power contribution of the grievance variables and potentially limited 
generalizability from one case study should be kept in mind, however. To be able to ascertain 
whether the suggested policies are likely to reduce actual participation in violent resistance, 
comprehensive data gathering efforts are necessary. To resolve the opportunity-grievance 
debate, survey data on actual participation or intentions to participate in violent resistance 
from a wide range of conflict cases is needed. If a sufficient number of conflict cases are 
included, an additional level might be added to the multilevel analysis, permitting the 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics 
Table A.1: Descriptives, unstandardized individual-level variables 
 
Table A.2: Descriptives, unstandardized governorate-level variables 
  
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
Self-evaluated wealth 1805 .757 1 4 2.10
Civil and political rights 1805 .776 1 4 2.04
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah 1805 .464 0 1 .314
Political affiliation: Hamas 1805 .327 0 1 .122
Political affiliation: Other 1805 .280 0 1 .086
Political affiliation: Will not participate 1805 .478 0 1 .353
Political affiliation: Don't know 1805 .331 0 1 .125
Personal security: Feel safe 1805 .465 0 1 .684
Gender: Woman 1805 .498 0 1 .541
Age 1805 14.4 18 92 36.0
Education completed 1805 1.36 1 6 4.33
Employment status: Working 1805 .439 0 1 .260
Employment status: Attending school 1805 .326 0 1 .121
Employment status: Housewife 1805 .491 0 1 .407
Employment status: Unemployed 1805 .341 0 1 .134
Employment status: Other 1805 .267 0 1 .077
Living area: Urban 1805 .491 0 1 .408
Living area: Rural 1805 .440 0 1 .262
Living area: Refugee camp 1805 .470 0 1 .330
Refugee 1805 .492 0 1 .590
Robustness tests
Support for rocket attacks 1805 .990 1 4 2.49
Resistance attitude index 1805 .809 .131 5.11 2.39
Wealth index 1805 .932 -2.44 3.63 -.009
Human rights situation 1805 .774 1 4 1.95
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
HI durables index 1805 .0679 .318 .543 .442
HI household expenditure 1805 .0885 .354 .699 .601
HI education 1805 .0481 .570 .802 .681
Regional expenditure level 1805 49.4 97.7 284.3 138.0
Controls
Per capita casualties 1805 .0000273 0 .000102 .000288
Casualty trend 1805 1.95 -6 2 -.369
Proportion of young men 1805 .00639 .124 .148 .141
Robustness tests
Household durables index 1805 5.01 46.6 64.1 54.0
Wage level 1805 16.8 50.2 113.6 71.7
Exposure to Israeli violence 1805 7.94 23.3 60.0 48.4
Per capita martyrs 1805 .00156 .000237 .00535 .00230
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Table A.3: Descriptives, individual-level variables before imputation 
 
Table A.4: Descriptives, governorate-level variables before imputation 
 
  
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
Self-evaluated wealth 1794 .756 1 4 2.10
Civil and political rights 1633 .753 1 4 2.04
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah 1725 .466 0 1 .319
Political affiliation: Hamas 1725 .325 0 1 .120
Political affiliation: Other 1725 .274 0 1 .082
Political affiliation: Will not participate 1725 .480 0 1 .359
Political affiliation: Don't know 1725 .324 0 1 .119
Personal security: Feel safe 1756 .464 0 1 .687
Gender: Woman 1805 .498 0 1 .541
Age 1805 14.4 18 92 36.0
Education completed 1804 1.37 1 6 4.33
Employment status: Working 1803 .439 0 1 .261
Employment status: Attending school 1803 .326 0 1 .121
Employment status: Housewife 1803 .491 0 1 .407
Employment status: Unemployed 1803 .341 0 1 .134
Employment status: Other 1803 .267 0 1 .077
Living area: Urban 1805 .492 0 1 .408
Living area: Rural 1805 .440 0 1 .262
Living area: Refugee camp 1805 .470 0 1 .330
Refugee 1802 .492 0 1 .590
Robustness tests
Support for rocket attacks 1616 .976 1 4 2.49
Resistance attitude index 1565 .816 1 4 2.39
Wealth index 1752 .932 -1.84 3.63 -.011
Human rights situation 1607 .748 1 4 1.95
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
HI durables index 1805 .068 .318 .543 .442
HI household expenditure 1805 .0885 .354 .699 .601
HI education 1805 .048 .570 .802 .681
Regional expenditure level 1805 49.4 97.7 284.3 138.0
Controls
Per capita casualties 1805 .0000273 0 .0001022 .000029
Casualty trend 1805 1.95 -6 2 -.369
Proportion of young men 1805 .0064 .124 .148 .141
Robustness tests
Household durables index 1805 5.01 46.6 64.1 54.0
Wage level 1805 16.78 50.2 113.6 71.7
Exposure to Israeli violence 1805 7.94 23.3 60 48.4
Per capita martyrs 1805 .0016 .00024 .00535 .0023
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Table A.5: Descriptives, individual-level variables, 1978 respondent imputation 
 
 
Table A.6: Descriptives, governorate-level variables, 1978 respondent imputation 
  
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
Self-evaluated wealth 1978 .756 1 4 2.10
Civil and political rights 1978 .795 1 4 2.04
Controls
Political affiliation: Fatah 1978 .463 0 1 .311
Political affiliation: Hamas 1978 .332 0 1 .126
Political affiliation: Other 1978 .291 0 1 .093
Political affiliation: Will not participate 1978 .473 0 1 .339
Political affiliation: Don't know 1978 .337 0 1 .131
Personal security: Feel safe 1978 .466 0 1 .681
Gender: Woman 1978 .500 0 1 .522
Age 1978 14.6 18 92 36.2
Education completed 1978 1.39 1 6 4.31
Employment status: Working 1978 .447 0 1 .276
Employment status: Attending school 1978 .324 0 1 .119
Employment status: Housewife 1978 .487 0 1 .387
Employment status: Unemployed 1978 .344 0 1 .137
Employment status: Other 1978 .271 0 1 .080
Living area: Urban 1978 .493 0 1 .415
Living area: Rural 1978 .437 0 1 .256
Living area: Refugee camp 1978 .470 0 1 .328
Refugee 1978 .492 0 1 .588
Obs Std. dev. Min Max Mean
Explanatory
HI durables index 1978 .068 .318 .543 .441
HI household expenditure 1978 .089 .354 .699 .601
HI education 1978 .047 .570 .802 .680
Regional expenditure level 1978 49.4 97.7 284.3 138.0
Controls
Per capita casualties 1978 .0000271 0 .000102 .0000285
Casualty trend 1978 1.92 -6 2 -.350
Proportion of young men 1978 .00641 .124 .148 .141
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Appendix 2: Weights calculation46 
The sampling process was executed in two stages. First, in August 2010, a sub-sample of 
clusters was drawn and the number of households to draw from each cluster decided on. 
Then, in January 2011, it was decided that the sample be expanded by drawing more 
households from some of the clusters. This second stage included weights calculation, and 
was described as follows by the Fafo researcher responsible: 
Gaza, increasing the number of households in the sample: 
First, adjusted the number of household take in clusters according to the weight ratio 
between weight of subsample from August 2010 and mean weight. Then we get a sample 
with 883 households. The target sample size is 1000 households. Then we add two 
households for each cluster. Impute 15 to household take for the cluster with no household 
detected in 2009. The final sample size for Gaza is 1048. 
Weight equation: 
  







   
 
      
Nh number of households in strata 
Nhc number of households in cluster according to the 1997 census 
m number of clusters selected in strata in the 2009 sample 
a number of clusters selected in strata in the new subsample 
n number of households selected in cluster in the new subsample 
Nhr number of households in cluster relisted in the 2009 sample 
Adjusting weights: 
1. Household expansion weight is calculated according to the formula:  
     







   
 
            
                                                 
46
 This information is retrieved from internal Fafo documents and e-mail correspondence with the person that 
calculated the weights. 
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Nh number of households in strata 
Nhc number of households in cluster according to the 1997 census 
m number of clusters selected in strata in the 2009 sample 
a number of clusters selected in strata in the new subsample 
n number of households selected in cluster in the new subsample 
Nhr number of households in cluster relisted in the 2009 sample 
If household expansion weight is larger than 3 times the median weight, then household 
expansion weight is adjusted to 3 times the median weight. 
RSI weight is calculated according to the formula: 
               
nrsi number of household members eligible as RSI 
2. Within each governorate, expansion weight and RSI weight are adjusted according to the 
ratio of mid-year population estimated by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
47
 to 
population size in sample. 
Household expansion weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
             
        
    
 
 
pop2010,g mid-year population size in a governorate estimated by Palestinian 
central Bureau 
popg population size in a governorate from the sample 
RSI weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
                      
nrsi  number of household members eligible as RSI 
If RSI expansion weight is larger than 3 times the median weight, then RSI weight is adjusted 
to 3 times the median weight. 
3. Within each age48-gender group, RSI weight is adjusted according to the ratio of 
population size estimated from the roster data and the population size estimated from the 
RSI data. 
                                                 
47
 Mid-Year Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory by Governorate. 1997-2010, link: 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/populati/GOVER1997-2010E.htm 
48
 Age in five years group. 
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RSI weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
                 
         
         
 
 
popros,a,g population size estimated from roster data 
poprsi,a,g population size estimated from RSI data 
 
4. wexpadj and wrsiadj are the final weights used. No non-response correction is conducted. 
West Bank 
The sample size in file got in August 2010 is 905. 
First, add 1 household for each cluster, then the sample size is 987; 
Second, for the clusters whose household take is still less than 10, increase household 
taking number to 10; 
The final sample size for West Bank is 1002. 
The usual weight equation of West Bank sample, such as for the 2009/2010 survey is 
  







    
 
 
    
 
      
Nh number of households in strata 
Nhc number of households in cluster according to the 1997 census 
m number of clusters selected in strata in the old whole sample of West Bank 
a number of clusters selected in strata in the 2009 subsample 
b number of buildings selected in cluster in the 2009 subsample 
Bhcb number of buildings in cluster in the 2009 subsample 
n number of households selected in building in the 2009 subsample 
Nhcb number of households in building in the 2009 subsample  
  
But as we are going to use random walk for this survey but not draw buildings, the weight 











   
 
      
Nh number of households in strata 
Nhc number of households in cluster according to the 1997 census 
m number of clusters selected in strata in the old whole sample of West Bank 
a number of clusters selected in strata in the new subsample 
n number of households selected in cluster in the new subsample 
Adjusting weights: 
West Bank 
1. Household expansion weight is calculated according to the formula:  
 
     







   
 
            
Nh number of households in strata 
Nhc number of households in cluster according to the 1997 census 
m number of clusters selected in strata in the old whole sample of West Bank 
a number of clusters selected in strata in the new subsample 
n number of households selected in cluster in the new subsample 
If household expansion weight is larger than 3 times the median weight, then household 
expansion weight is adjusted to 3 times the median weight. 
RSI weight is calculated according to the formula: 
               
nrsi number of household members eligible as RSI 
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2. Within each governorate, expansion weight and RSI weight are adjusted according to the 
ratio of mid-year population estimated by Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
49
 to 
population size in sample. 
Household expansion weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
             
        
    
 
 
pop2010,g mid-year population size in a governorate estimated by Palestinian 
central Bureau 
popg population size in a governorate from the sample 
RSI weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
                      
nrsi  number of household members eligible as RSI 
If RSI expansion weight is larger than 3 times the median weight, then RSI weight is adjusted 
to 3 times the median weight. 
3. Within each age50-gender group, RSI weight is adjusted according to the ratio of 
population size estimated from the roster data and the population size estimated from the 
RSI data. 
RSI weight is adjusted according to the formula: 
                 
         
         
 
 
popros,a,g population size estimated from roster data 
poprsi,a,g population size estimated from RSI data 
 
4. wexpadj and wrsiadj are the final weights used. No non-response correction is conducted. 
  
                                                 
49
 Mid-Year Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory by Governorate. 1997-2010, link: 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/populati/GOVER1997-2010E.htm 
50
 Age in five years group. 
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Appendix 3: The Wealth Index 
There are several reasons why one might want to use an asset index to measure wealth, 
particularly in developing countries. Measuring income in developing countries is fraught 
with difficulties – including seasonal variability of earnings and that large shares of often 
income stem from self-employment (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:464). Because of short reference 
periods for the income questions and frequently changing labor market conditions, we should 
use other questions than employment-related ones to measure the long-term economic 
situation of households (Øvensen, 2006:7). Income data are prone to systematic measurement 
error, usually due to underreporting and that they tend to fluctuate (Øvensen, 2006:9). The 
occupied Palestinian territories are particularly prone to income fluctuations due to Israeli 
blockades. Using instead an asset index in to measure long-term wealth in developing 
countries has the main advantages that assets in developing countries are fewer and easy to 
measure, and that problems connected to recall period and other forms of reporting bias are 
minimized (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:466). 
Different variable combinations have been used and validated for the construction of asset 
indexes (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003). The indexes are often constructed 
using variables from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The DHS manual 
recommends using all asset and utility service variables available when constructing the index 
(Rutstein & Johnson, 2004:8). I would argue than one should decide which variables are 
relevant from an understanding of the local context. 
Like Filmer and Pritchett (2001:115) and Sahn and Stifel (2003:468), I use data on housing 
characteristics
51
 and household ownership of consumer durables
52
 to construct the index.
53
 
                                                 
51
 H04: What is the total number of rooms in the housing unit?; H05 Are all or some of the rooms in the 
residence, including the corridors, the kitchen, and the bathroom, characterized by any of the following: 
Humidity(wet walls, ceiling, etc.); Cold and difficult to heat in winter; Uncomfortably hot in summer; Poor 
ventilation; Dark and gloomy (Fafo, 2011a). 
52
 H07 asks whether the household members own any of a series of 26 consumer durables. For some items the 
respondent is also asked how many of the item the household members own. In my final index I include 
variables for how many tvs, mobile phones, cars and personal computers members of a household own as well as 
dummies for whether they own a refrigerator, gas or electric oven (heating), washing machine (for clothes), 
vacuum cleaner, mix-master/electric blender, video player, DVD player, photo camera, video camera, ordinary 
telephone, internet connection, or a solar heater. As in Sahn and Stifel (2000:2128) the four numeral asset 
variables are calculated on a per household  basis instead of per capita. Sahn and Stifel (2000:2128) found 
validation results were robust to choice of such equivalence scales. 
53
 Sahn and Stifel (2003:468) included human capital (years of education of the household head) in their index. I 
think education measures a different concept, and will therefore not include it in my index. Sahn and Stifel 
(2003:468)  reported that excluding this variable from their index made no substantial difference in their analysis 
for validation of the index.  
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This should cover the concept of long-term wealth fairly well, as the validity of both indexes 
(using different combinations of the two groups of indicators) were thoroughly validated 
(Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003; Sahn & Stifel, 2000).  
There is one potential problem with the content validity of the index, however. Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001:115) include variables measuring land ownership, but data restrictions prevent 
me from doing so. According to Øvensen (2006:5-6) this is likely to give the index an urban 
bias, because it “rewards” owning items associated with modern society and urban life rather 
than traditional rural items like land.  
Factor analysis assumptions 
The purpose of constructing an index is data reduction and reducing random measurement 
error. Factor analysis provides a method for calculating weights for the index that are less 
arbitrary than for example giving them equal weight in a simple summated scale. Not all 
assets are similarly important for the wealth concept. So when data on quality or quantity of 
all assets, or their process, is lacking, the best option is to let the data determine the weights 
directly (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:467). Weights are calculated that reflect the relative importance 
of the different items to the concept, based on each item’s factor loading. 
Unlike Filmer and Pritchett (2001) and Rutstein and Johnson (2004) I use common factor 
analysis instead of principal components analysis. This is because I do not want to force the 
components to explain the entire covariance matrix. Common factor analysis allows for asset-
specific influences to explain the remaining variance (Sahn & Stifel, 2003:467). Still the two 
methods produce very similar results when few factors are involved (Filmer & Pritchett, 
2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003). 
I run a few tests to ascertain that the assumptions of factor analysis hold for the variable set in 
question. Significant correlations, many fairly close to or above .30, low or insignificant 
partial correlations, KMO (MSA) of .89 (above .80 for all variables except three, and none 
below .50) and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity, all point to the data being suitable for 
factor analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998:99-100). 
The crucial assumption when using factor analysis to extract only one factor to represent 
wealth, is that that such long-term household wealth represents the maximum variance in the 
variables included (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001:117; Sahn & Stifel, 2003:467). This assumption 
cannot be tested directly (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001:117). In my case early factor analysis 
revealed that based on the common eigenvalue > 1 criterion, ideally 3 factors should have 
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been extracted from the variables included in my analysis. There are several reasons why I 
still think I can justify extracting a single factor. First, the three factors produced by the initial 
analysis were highly correlated. Second, judging from the factors loading highly on each 
dimension in an obliquely rotated solution, it is unclear how the factors can be interpreted to 
signify clearly separable concepts or dimension. Third, in an unrotated solution, almost all 
items are shown to load highly on the first factor. It therefore seems reasonable to argue that 
this one factor represents all the variables pretty well. Intuitively, it seems plausible that the 
variance the variables have in common should be associated with the concept long-term 
wealth. Fourth, for pragmatic reasons I prefer to have one variable to include in the model 
rather than three. 
Index construction, reliability and validity 
First, I ran the factor analysis including all the items on variables H04, H05 and H07. Second, 
I removed the items that either loaded under .30 (no practical significance) or had 
communalities below .20.
54
 Ideally I would want to use a higher criterion for communality, 
but the decision to use one instead of 3 factors means communalities become lower and 
excluding all variables with communality below .30 produces a variable with a heavily 
skewed distribution. Third, I ran a new factor analysis for the remaining items and constructed 
an index with weights based on the factor loadings of each item. I compared the distribution 
of this reduced index to the distribution of a similar index where all items were included (to 
ensure that I had not artificially reduced or fitted the set) and found that the distribution was 
similar enough to justify using the reduced index. 
Reliability testing returned a Cronbach’s Alpha of .83, indicating sufficient internal 
consistency (Hair et al., 1998:117-118). The convergent validity of the index was tested by 
correlating it with other wealth measures. I found significant and fairly strong correlations 
with self-reported wealth and last month’s income, and with alternative indexes constructed 
slightly differently, e.g. larger or smaller variable sets, simple summated scale and one index 
per dimension in the factor analysis. Due to time and scope limitations I did not run further 
validity tests on this index, as it is only meant for use as a robustness check. The convergent 
and nomological validity of similarly constructed indexes has been thoroughly tested with 
good results (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003).   
                                                 
54
 The consumer durable items removed in this process included ownership of a gas or electric stove, kerosene or 




Appendix 4: Governorate distributions 
Figure A.1 through A.4 help visualize the distribution of central independent variables. Each 
color in the figures represents a quartile. In Figure A.1 through A.3, the darker the shade, the 
larger the horizontal inequality in a governorate. In Figure A.4, the darker the shade, the 
poorer the governorate. 
Figure A.1: HI household durables 
  




The difference in distribution observed between the two economic horizontal inequality 
measures probably has to do with the difference in time horizon between the two measures. 
Household durables represent a fairly stable and thus long-term measure of the concept, while 
household expenditure is much more vulnerable to short- and medium-term fluctuations due 
to for example closures and blockade. 
Figure A.3: HI education 
 
 
Comparing the educational horizontal inequality measure to the economic measures clearly 
show that in the case of Palestine the educational aspect of horizontal inequality does not 
overlap much with the economic aspects, geographically speaking. In fact the two are 
negatively correlated. 
Figure A.4 helps visualize the distribution of governorates when it comes to absolute level of 
governorate wealth. To be more easily comparable with the horizontal inequality measures, 
the expenditure level variable has been reversed so that the darkest color marks governorates 
in the poorest quartile while the governorates in the richest quadrant are white – the darker the 





Figure A.4: Expenditure level (reversed) 
 
Comparing Figure A.4 to Figures A.1 and A.2 helps visually demonstrate that while the 
horizontal inequality measures are obviously correlated with the absolute level of wealth, they 




Appendix 5: Combining results 
When manually combining the results for the two-level model across the five imputed 
datasets, I apply the pooling criteria of Rubin (1987:76). This method is widely accepted and 
is the method used by Stata in the “mi estimate” command (Stata 11).  
Let the m imputed datasets be indexed by j = (1, ... , m). For any point estimate Q (in this case 
the regression coefficients and level 2 variances in logit form and the log likelihoods), results 
are combined intoQm by simply calculating the average of Qj across the m (in this case five) 
imputed datasets.  
For variance estimates it is necessary to take into account both within-imputation variance 
and between-imputation variance to get the correctly adjusted estimates. The within-
imputation varianceUm is given by the average of variance estimates Uj across the five 
datasets.
55
  The between-imputation variance Bm is given by 
   Bm =         ∑
 
   (Qj –Qm ) 
2
     (A.1) 
The standard error ofQj is given by the square root of the total variance Tm, which is 
specified as  
   Tm = Um + (1 + 1/m) Bm      (A.2) 
The combined equation for the standard error of Q is thus given by 
   SE =  T 
      =  (Um + (1 + 1/m)(         ∑
 
   (Qj –Qm ) 
2
)  (A.3) 
I use an Excel worksheet to combine the estimates, calculate 95 percent confidence intervals 
and translate the estimates into odds and odds ratio form.  
                                                 
55
 To find each Uj, I square the standard errors reported in each of the five imputed datasets j. 
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Appendix 6: Governorate dummies 
 




Governorate exp(b) z exp(b) z exp(b) z
Jenin
Tubas 2.10 ( 0.89) 0.30*** (-2.70) 2.07 ( 1.22)
Tulkarm 3.20** ( 2.17) 0.52 (-0.97) 0.63 (-0.88)
Nablus 1.90 ( 0.91) 0.92 (-0.19) 0.73 (-0.61)
Qalqilya 0.90 (-0.16) 0.55 (-1.17) 2.22 ( 1.06)
Salfit 2.16 ( 0.92) 0.41 (-1.50) 0.45* (-1.73)
Ramallah 2.87 ( 1.59) 0.68 (-0.77) 0.74 (-0.37)
Jericho 3.50** ( 2.11) 1.39 ( 0.52) 2.01 ( 0.99)
Jerusalem 1.19 ( 0.24) 0.30** (-2.34) 0.85 (-0.32)
Bethlehem 0.51 (-0.84) 0.22** (-2.13) 0.27 (-1.03)
Hebron 2.90 (1.60) 0.20*** (-2.88) 0.43 (-1.43)
Gaza North 0.91 (-0.14) 0.36** (-2.57) 0.55 (-1.42)
Gaza 1.64 ( 0.81) 0.41** (-2.21) 0.67 (-0.85)
Deir al Balah 1.11 ( 0.16) 0.29*** (-3.19) 0.37 (-1.51)
Khan Yunis 2.58* ( 1.68) 0.78 (-0.65) 0.62 (-0.81)
Rafah 6.07*** ( 2.81) 1.20 ( 0.37) 0.45 (-1.56)
Notes: Dependent variable refence category "Non-violence only". z-values reported in 
parentheses. Estimates significant on the .10, .05 or .01 level marked with *, ** or ***, 
respectively.
Violence only Both Neither
Ref.Ref.Ref.
